

**SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
OF PEACE RESTORATION
INITIATIVES
IN
SOLOMON ISLANDS**



Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

Consultant: Regional Rights Resource Team /
United Nations Development Programme

Funded by DFID

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Foreword

This Social Impact Assessment is one of a range of activities undertaken by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in Solomon Islands since the Regional Assistance Mission commenced its work in late 2003.

The regional response to assist Solomon Islands has been implemented according to the principles set out in the Biketawa Declaration. Foreign Ministers of Pacific Island Forum countries met in June 2003 and indicated their overwhelming support for assisting Solomon Islands to restore law and order and it was agreed that a regional intervention force be sent to undertake this task.

Subsequently, a regional assistance mission was established to restore peace and security. Because of the desire to ensure the sustainability of peace restoration initiatives and their positive impacts on the lives of the Solomon Islanders, it was considered useful to undertake a social impact assessment of such initiatives. In this regard it was considered important for the study to establish baseline data, which can be measured in further stages to assess progress. The Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) form the basis of the indicators, along with the Solomon Island Government's National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan.

The Forum Secretariat is committed to assisting its members to use the Millenium Development Goals as a framework, by providing goals and targets that directly measure the effectiveness of development strategies, brought about through improved governance, to address poverty and improved human development. The MDGs are a means for measuring development beyond simply economic growth and promotes good governance by monitoring equity, cultural, environmental and other dimensions of development.

The Regional Rights Resource Team, under the United Nations Development Programme, was commissioned by the Forum Secretariat to carry out this study. We are grateful to the two key consultants, Ms Afu Billy and Ms Josephine Behulu, who worked tirelessly to obtain a wealth of information.

DFID provided funding for the study, for which we are most grateful.

I have pleasure in handing over this study to the Solomon Islands Government and trust that it will be a useful tool in the continuing task of strengthening the institutions of the country and its development process.

(signed) **Greg Urwin**
Secretary General

June 2004

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Executive Summary

The Solomon Islands crisis erupted in May 1999 when a group of Guadalcanal youth began violently evicting Malaitan settlers from their properties on Guadalcanal. Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was forced to resign at gunpoint. A month later armed hostilities between the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) of Guadalcanal and the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) broke out in Guadalcanal. More than 100 lives were lost and an estimated 32,000 people displaced. As a result of the crisis, the Solomon Islands Government was unable to fulfill its basic functions of exercising authority, raising revenue and managing state resources.

A meeting of the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers in Sydney on 30 June, 2003 discussed and endorsed a request by the Solomon Islands Government for "assistance" to deploy a multi-country police force backed by armed peacekeepers (if necessary) to restore law and order in the country. Locally known as "Operation Helpem Fren" (Pidgin for "helping friends"), RAMSI forces began arriving in Honiara on 24 July, 2003. RAMSI is seen as a long-term partnership between the Solomon Islands and member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum.

This Social Impact Assessment (SIA) was commissioned by the PIFS. The objective of the study is to "provide reliable information through systematic monitoring and analysis to the Solomon Islands Government and other stakeholders on the impact of the regional intervention force, assessing whether its presence has enabled a return to normal life, particularly the restoration of services; as well as assessing the impact of its presence on the people of the Solomon Islands."¹

This report on the first phase of the study contains baseline data on the status of the SI situation prior to the deployment of RAMSI and an initial impact assessment 100 days later. The study applies RAMSI's 'public purpose' mandate, contained in the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (June 2003) to analyse its intended outcomes:

- Ensuring the security and safety of persons and property;

- Maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community; preventing and suppressing violence, intimidation and crime;
- Maintaining law and order;
- Supporting the administration of justice;
- Supporting and developing Solomon Islands institutions.

Over 100 key informants were interviewed and 420 people participated in a public opinion poll. Particular attention was given to documenting the impact on vulnerable population groups such as women, children, internally displaced persons and disaffected youth. The indicators developed are framed with reference to the Millennium Development Goals and harmonised with relevant indicators in the Government's National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP) 2003-2006.

Preliminary findings

Law & justice sector

The law and justice sector was badly affected nationwide because law enforcement and the administration of justice were considerably weakened by a partially functional and compromised police force. While most institutions continued to function during the crisis, they did so under severe financial, staffing and logistical constraints. Staff was subjected to intimidation and personal threats. The police lost command and control over the deteriorating law and order situation. The Solomon Islands Court of Appeal (SICOA) has not sat since late 2000 due largely to resource constraints and security risks. The immediate priority was to maintain law and order, ensure security and safety of persons and property, support the administration of justice and support and develop Solomon Islands law and justice institutions.

There were numerous reports of stolen property, such as vehicles, being returned to their owners, extortion and demands for protection money against businesses stopped. By October 2003, there had

¹ Terms of Reference.

been 340 arrests, with over 600 charges laid. Among those arrested were high profile MEF and IFM leaders and combatants. Over 300 firearms were recovered and 16 police posts were established around Solomon Islands. Nearly 30 villagers along the road from Auki to Malu'u were declared 'Gun Free'. Without a doubt, the intervention force had created a safe and secure environment for a return to normalcy. 93% of people polled said they felt more at ease by the return of law and order.

RAMSI support to the RSIP, the courts, the Attorney General's Office, the Public Solicitor's Office and the Prison Services has improved the administration of justice. RAMSI carried out Professional Standards investigations within the RSIP aimed at re-building discipline, professionalism and credibility. A Business Plan for 2004 has been developed to address professional standards and public accountability; border security and national security; family violence; crime prevention and investigation; and youth, etc.

A number of issues warranting monitoring and mitigation were raised, which were mainly related to capacity building and sustainability. Eight indicators have been identified to guide future studies.

Economic recovery

The socio-political situation of Solomon Islands has impacted on the country's economic performance. Weak governance contributed to the poor management of the economy. Corruption and external economic factors put a further squeeze on the economy. The economy was stagnant well before the conflict started. The conflict exacerbated a worsening economic situation that the Government could not redress. The economy contracted further due to the closures of major industries and loss of foreign investor confidence. Job losses impacted negatively on household income in both urban and rural areas. Government was paralysed in the face of mounting debts, greatly reduced revenue and outrageous compensation claims.

Throughout the crisis Government efforts for economic recovery continued. The National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP) 2003-2006 arose from Government

dialogue with donors. NERRDP received donor support in November 2003. It outlines policies, strategies and actions for economic recovery, social restoration and development for immediate to medium-term nation building that would set the pace for the long-term development of the country.

The management of government accounts worsened and problems were exacerbated by numerous demands on the Government for payment of claims and allowances. The public service is the biggest single employer in the country and yet the most ineffective and inefficient. The lack of resources was a problem. Total external debt in 2002 was SBD1.0873 billion and domestic debt was SBD458.6 million. In the first seven months of 2003 government finances showed an overall deficit of just below SBD90 million, much higher than budgeted.

Solomon Islanders have high expectations of RAMSI and unrealistically expect it to address all the problems, including economic. Its impact the entire economy is not immediately evident. At the micro-level recovery is visible and long-term positive economic impact is anticipated provided security is sustained and underlying causes of the crisis are addressed quickly. Economic recovery also hinges on reforming government, the sustainable harvesting of resources and Government/donor cooperation and development assistance.

Feedback from finance and business communities reflect, in general, a slow but positive recovery in the economic sector due a secure environment and improved law and order situation. RAMSI assistance to DOF has helped maximise revenue, enabling government to plan and manage its budget and deliver basic government services. RAMSI has also paid Solomon Island Government arrears owed to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank paving the way for re-engagement. The 2004 Budget is supported by substantial budget support from Australia and New Zealand under the RAMSI arrangement. Health, education, provincial affairs and the Auditor General's Office get larger budget allocations. Restoring financial credibility and stabilisation of the budget has led donors to reinstate development assistance.

The issues for mitigation relate to sustainability and capacity building. A further concern is delay in addressing long-standing land and resource allocation grievances by Government and RAMSI.

The five indicators developed relate to economic growth, employment creation and finding solutions to land problems, expeditiously.

Restoring essential services to the community

The Solomon Islands Government had been unable to provide adequate security or basic services to the provinces, including those not affected by the crisis. Access to education and health services has been badly affected and shortages of water and electricity severe.

The Ministry of Education reported that enrolments in 1999 and 2000 were substantially lower than in 1998 due to the closure of schools in Guadalcanal. The ministry reported that schools in Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal experienced the most disruption. This had major implications for a large number of students given that 53% of all students are from these areas.

Education is neither free nor compulsory. Parents have to pay school fees to supplement the costs of their children's education. The attrition rate for girls is higher than for boys. There is anecdotal evidence that girls may have been more affected than boys as a result of the unrest and disruption in schooling. There was also an expressed concern for the safety of girls, due to the perceived increase in rape and violations against girls and women during the crisis, which may have restricted opportunities to attend school. Academic performance was affected by the crisis and there were irregularities in scholarship awards. Fewer students sat exams due to the lack of adequate teacher support to prepare. Teacher morale was low and their absence from class may have contributed to poor student attendance. Frustrated teachers went on strike in March 2003.

The development budget was hardly expended through the Government systems. Support for the financing of education was only made through the support from various aid donors through special funding arrangements in 2002. A stable environment has set the stage for the Ministry of Education to develop a revised Education Strategic

Plan 2004-2006. While donor confidence has increased, staff at the Ministry of Education reported concern about donor coordination. They noted their need for donor assistance, in both money and technical assistance, according to Solomon Islands Government needs and priorities. The ministry is also mindful of its capacity and does not want to move too fast as all donor money is additional to the New Zealand SBD60 million budgetary supports for 2003/2004 and SBD150 million for a three-year period.

The planned restoration of education services is vital to increase quality provision and requires emphasis on both management systems and the development of a relevant curriculum, with sufficient trained teachers to improve access to basic education; eliminate gender equality; increase support for community education for non formal learning of youth and adults relevant for SI sustainable development. The establishment and development of the planned youth centres is considered to be essential in helping "disaffected youth at risk" seek opportunities to contribute successfully, through recreation, employment and income generating opportunities, to the social and economic development of their country. Indicators have been developed to monitor implementation of the Education Strategic Plan to achieve these outcomes.

Health

The Ministry of Health relied on the AusAID Trust Fund to maintain basic health care services during the crisis as government resources were not allocated to the service as planned. Reforms were unable to be implemented as a result of the major disruption and violations to staff and facilities in some areas. While RAMSI has not had direct input into the Health Planning Unit there is evidence of improved dialogue on health service provision through the SIG Taskforces set up to coordinate SIG planning. Key informants noted that future reforms must be modified to suit local situation in order to successfully establish appropriate organisational, financial, management, and human resource capacity to deliver adequate and quality services. Building of hospitals and clinics and community health services are to be prioritised to address changes in population catchments as a result of the unrest. With a movement and change

in the demographics of the population so too will changes need to be made to support health needs where the demand is greatest.

Staff morale in the health service has been low and the trauma they have experienced has been identified as a priority to be addressed. Adequate government budget support must be forthcoming. The Ministry of Health emphasised the importance of filling vacancies with skilled personnel. While they acknowledged as necessary the need to rely on external skilled personnel, concerns were expressed that expatriate staff would need to show regard for local knowledge, as well as utilise and recognise local expertise.

In the post-conflict period, the focus within the health services is on rebuilding capacity and confidence of staff, including emotional and psychological trauma counselling. There are plans to establish 3 counselling centres for victims of the atrocities. Restoration of health infrastructure in Honiara has begun and the development outreach health services to provinces are high priorities. RAMSI has supported upgrading of two provincial hospitals Gizo and Kilu'ufi implemented through the AusAID Community Peace and Restoration Fund (CPRF). RAMSI contributed personnel to the National Referral Hospital (NRF) in Honiara and transferred some emergency cases to the NRF from the provinces for care.

It is difficult to assess the full impact on the health status in the recovery period to date. However there is evidence the unrest has negatively impacted on child and maternal health and community health services, for example, the disruption of the malaria eradication programme has resulted in a rise in malaria. The SIA outcome indicators will be directed at assessment of the status of health programme coverage and the restoration of the anti-malaria programme, the TB drug programme, STIs/HIV incidence and prevalence, family planning, immunisation, water and sanitation programmes, the MMR, IMR, antenatal and post natal services and midwifery training.

Water and electricity

On average 69% of the population is reported to have access to "safe water", however there are

disparities between urban and rural provision. Water supply in Honiara has never been adequate for the ever increasing population. The high demand for water, inadequate water sources restricted by failed negotiations with landowners and poorly maintained infrastructure. Overall, national electricity coverage is low at 16%, while Honiara has 73% coverage. During the conflict period, water source disputes with landowners over rental payments resulted in poor electricity supply. This disruption of basic services placed a particular burden on women and risked the health of families.

Since the presence of RAMSI, it has been frequently observed and reported that the "water supply and electricity has improved a bit in Honiara". With the assistance of RAMSI to the water and electricity authorities, there has been a consistent supply of electricity. Donors are supporting water infrastructure development. It is necessary to resolve land issues to guarantee water and electricity supply and permit maintenance of infrastructure for water and electricity distribution.

Population groups and civil society

The personal trauma experienced by many is extreme and many people expressed the need for increased support and services to reduce the effects of trauma. The effects on men, women and children differ. Both men and women were subjected to increasing levels of violence, however most of the abuse is perpetrated by men and women are known to be at a higher risk of sexual violence in conditions of conflict. Children were subjected to increased fear due to the presence of guns and exposure to unacceptable levels of violence in their formative years. Women in particular maintained their traditional role as primary carers, placing considerable effort holding families together and played a crucial role in reducing violence and brokering peace.

The loss of income and employment both within the public service and private sector has exacerbated problems for those who rely on consumers to buy from the semi-subsistence productive sector. There was a loss of income earning capacity to those in the non formal sector. New vulnerable groups are emerging, for example, those displaced by the ethnic conflict, disaffected youth, and women. These groups emphasise the necessity in the

recovery period, for improved education, employment and income generating opportunities.

Women report that when RAMSI arrived they perceived the need to improve consultation and representation of women's groups. Violence against women was their major concern and welcomed the emphasis placed on addressing this seriously. Support for women's continued active participation in the peace and reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction period is considered essential to increase development of women and improve the life of their communities.

RAMSI has assisted the reintegration of internally displaced persons with improved community development programmes to support this resettlement. Successful reintegration is considered vital to community harmony. Both men and women referred to the necessity to heal the emotional and mental trauma faced by many who have been intimidated and harassed. The proposal for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is supported as a means to address this, together with improved functioning of local courts. Youth and civil society representatives recommended RAMSI's role to be expanded to contribute resources to improve local courts so that crime is addressed at the location it occurs and within the community affected by it, to prevent it spilling over to Honiara and vice versa back to the provinces.

The instability and uncertainty directly affected the media's work and freedom. Freedom of expression was curtailed as most people were not able to participate freely in open dialogue and discussion because of fear. The media was physically intimidated – journalists were threatened. For the long term recovery of the country it is critical that civil society has a legitimate role and political space to function. The presence of RAMSI has freed the media from intimidation. Opinions are being expressed more freely through editorials and letters to the editor and are more critical. There is a great deal of reporting on RAMSI and people are being encouraged to articulate their concerns and issues via the media. RAMSI has produced a radio programme which also facilitates this called 'Talking Truth'.

There is disquiet amongst civil society and all community representatives that there may be a regrouping of the ex-combatants and argued that there was a need to be sure of effective reintegration and disarmament before it downscales. Civil Society groups are particularly concerned that reconciliation based on compensation will perpetuate problems that previously resulted in extortion. They want money misappropriated from the country to be returned and invested in the Solomon Islands Development. Concerns are also expressed by all civil society interviews that the conflict will reoccur and keep reoccurring and ruin society unless there is a concerted and genuine effort to reconcile and address causes of the crisis.

Key indicators are identified to monitor population groups and civil society key priority issues and provide a base to assess RAMSI presence to improve the security and safety of persons and property essential to SI peoples future development in the post-conflict recovery period. The SIA indicators will monitor the: developments towards establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to reduce the negative impacts of trauma and in communities; employment, income and educational opportunities particularly for internally displaced people, at risk youth and women; the justice systems responsiveness to address violence, particularly against women; government and community efforts to establish effective systems to address the causes of conflict particularly the resolution of land issues and disputes at community level. The levels of active involvement of civil society in free and open discussions on governance, development and democracy.

Conclusion

RAMSI intervention has undoubtedly created a conducive climate within which to restore basic services. There is evidence that health and education and utilities can now plan ahead to maintain and develop the social service sectors. With RAMSI Budget and donor support 53% of overseas development assistance is allocated to social services and community development. This will contribute to the improvement in human development status and be utilised to accommodate the demographic changes, which have occurred as a result of the crisis.

The restoration of government functions and coordination of development funding aims to meet the expressed need for improved health and education services and utilities. A concerted effort and a stable political and economic base will be required to if the Solomon Islands are to make up for lost educational and development opportunities for young people, and the resultant lost income opportunities for families. Budget support, government and donor harmonisation and community development planning will contribute to this. However there are some specific issues, which require mitigation to ensure essential services are sustained and maintained. A social impact indicator framework has been developed to guide future social impact assessments.

Introduction

The Solomon Islands crisis erupted in May 1999 when a group of Guadalcanal youth began violently evicting Malaitan settlers from their properties on Guadalcanal. They claimed that repeated government failure to address grievances of Guadalcanal people was justification for their action. These grievances included inadequate compensation for land loss and use by non-Guadalcanal people and by the State for national developments; the murders of Guadalcanal people² and the denial of jobs and disrespect for Guadalcanal people's culture.

The fact that the conflict erupted between two ethnic groups does not in itself make it an ethnic conflict. A closer analysis points to a number of long-standing issues, including years of poor governance and a struggle over resources. Efforts by the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) to restore peace on Guadalcanal were undermined by allegations of its partiality due to the large numbers of Malaitans within the force.

Commonwealth sponsored mediation through a Special Envoy, former Fiji Prime Minister, Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka failed despite the assistance of an Australian/New Zealand-led International Peace Monitoring Council (IPMC).

The Honiara Peace Accord (HPA) and the Panatina Agreement (PA) signed in June and August of 1999, respectively by Guadalcanal and Malaita representatives also failed to restore peace. The HPA was intended to dissolve the illegal organisations formed to push the demands of Guadalcanal people through the use of force. Members of these groups were to surrender their weapons and return to their villages. The Panatina Agreement highlighted concerns of Guadalcanal people such as police partiality in implementing law and order on Guadalcanal.

In June 2000, the police armouries in Honiara were broken into and Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was forced to resign at gun point. A month

later armed hostilities between the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) of Guadalcanal and the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) broke out in Guadalcanal. More than 100 lives were lost and an estimated 32,000 people displaced.

The fighting stopped after the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in Townsville, Australia on October 15, 2000. The TPA provided for a ceasefire, the surrender of arms and the granting of amnesty. Signatories included representatives of the IFM, MEF, their respective provincial leaders and Central Government. The TPA however was problematic in its implementation due to a variance in interpretation and the lack of enforcement powers of the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). Responses to the surrender of arms were disappointing and the ceasefire did not stop further killings. The lawlessness created by former militants and criminal groups disrupted lives and created fear and insecurity among Solomon Islanders.

As a result of the crisis, the Solomon Islands Government was unable to fulfill its basic functions of exercising authority, raising revenue and managing state resources. Public servants went without pay for extended periods. Services such as health and education were greatly reduced. The social cost of the conflict, while quantitatively incalculable, is evident from people's horrific stories of pain and suffering. The traumatic experiences of displacement, children held at gunpoint, rape victims, families that lost relatives, property and livelihoods will have long-term effects. Reconciliation and healing will be required between the perpetrators and victims in order to restore social coherence because the crisis had undermined values, norms and practices that have held together Solomon Islands society.

On 28 October, 2000, only a week after the signing of the TPA in Australia, Forum leaders adopted the Biketawa Declaration (Kiribati). The Declaration committed member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum to a set of guiding principles, which

² Allegedly by Malaitans.

encompassed good governance, human rights, democracy, equity, peace and security. It included provision for the Forum to “constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict”³.

In line with the aims and objectives of the Biketawa Declaration, the Australian Government, with the assistance of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), arranged a meeting of the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers in Sydney on 30 June, 2003. During that meeting, the Solomon Islands Government’s request for “assistance” was discussed and a proposal to deploy a multi-country police force backed by armed peacekeepers (if necessary) to restore law and order in the Solomon Islands was endorsed. Australia’s generous package of assistance was commended for its comprehensive nature – “encompassing law and order, the justice and prison systems, re-building the Solomon Islands institutions and establishing conditions under which Solomon Islands can achieve social and economic recovery”⁴. Solomon Islands Parliament unanimously passed the enabling legislation – the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (FIAA) on 17 July, 2003 (Annex II). Forum leaders in Auckland six weeks later endorsed the regional assistance mission.⁵

The Solomon Islands Government legislation facilitated the deployment of RAMSI. Much of the FIAA relates to the administration and operation of the visiting force and includes a justification for RAMSI’s presence, which is to achieve a “public purpose” defined as follows:

- Ensure security and safety of persons and property;
- Maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the community;
- Prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime;
- Maintain law and order;
- Support the administration of justice;
- Support and develop Solomon Islands institutions; and
- Respond to natural catastrophic events.

³ Biketawa Declaration Articles 1 & 2.

⁴ Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting Outcome Statement, 30 June, 2003 (paragraph 7).

⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Forum Communiqué, 34th Pacific Islands Forum, Auckland, NZ, 14-16 August, 2003

Locally known as “Operation Helpem Fren” (Pidgin for “helping friends”), RAMSI forces began arriving in Honiara on 24 July, 2003. RAMSI is seen as a long-term partnership between the Solomon Islands and member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum. It is a multi-country intervention force led by Australia and at the time of this study consisted of a 2,116 personnel. The police force of 276 was drawn from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa, Cook Islands, Tonga and Kiribati. The contributors to the military contingent of 1,840 were Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. In addition, RAMSI has a budgetary allocation to achieve its objectives to restore law and order, revive the economy, provide humanitarian aid and reinstate basic services. The strategy includes posting advisers in key positions in the legal/justice sector and Ministry of Finance.

Social Impact Assessment

This Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is commissioned by the PIFS. The study is consistent with the wishes of Forum leaders “that a consultative mechanism be implemented through the Forum Chair, and the Secretary General’s office, to ensure regular reports to all Forum members on developments in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.”⁶ The findings of the SIA will complement the quarterly reports of the Prime Minister of Australia, the Solomon Islands Government and reports by RAMSI. It will also offer an independent perspective that reflects a wider range of views because of its consultative approach.

The SIA was a six-week exercise that began in late October, 2003. The Regional Rights Resource Team (RRRT) was engaged for this initial phase of the SIA to establish a baseline. The objective of the study is to “provide reliable information through systematic monitoring and analysis to the Solomon Islands Government and other stakeholders on the impact of the regional intervention force, assessing whether its presence has enabled a return to normal life, particularly the restoration of services; as well as assessing the impact of its presence on the people of the Solomon Islands.”⁷

⁶ Communiqué of the 34th Pacific Islands Forum Meeting, August 2003 (paragraph 15).

⁷ Terms of Reference.

Methodology

Regular monitoring is critical and the SIA is a means to do this. The findings of the SIA will help inform leaders to make better decisions in future, to mitigate and minimise negative and maximise positive impact of the current intervention. This SIA will analyse and monitor the intended and unintended social consequences of RAMSI through extensive stakeholder consultations.

Prior to the field research, a literature review was undertaken. Key references included policy and planning documents, reports, and research papers from national, regional and academic organisations. These included the PIFS, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Solomon Islands Government, Australian National University, media and civil society organisations.

Initiating the study 100 days into the deployment of the multi-country force also provided an opportunity to assess RAMSI's initial impact. RAMSI's presence created a favourable environment for the field research, which may not have been possible in a less secure setting. Those interviewed and participants in focus group discussions spoke freely, as did the 420 people who participated in a public opinion poll. Over 100 key informants were interviewed – from government ministers and permanent secretaries, to the Police, RAMSI and civil society organisations. Focus group discussions were held with youth, women and community groups. A community meeting during market day at Silolo in north Malaita was attended by more than 300 people. Two meetings were held with police officers, one in Malu'u on Malaita and the other in Honiara (Annex VII).

The public opinion poll was undertaken at key gathering points in Honiara, such as markets, schools and hospitals. The poll was designed to be representative of the Solomon Islands population based on gender, age and geography. The questions in the poll were framed to assess people's expectations as well as opinions on the perceived causes of the crisis and the impact on their lives (Annex VII).

In accordance with the Terms of Reference (Annex I), particular attention was given to documenting the

impact on vulnerable population groups such as women, internally displaced persons and disaffected youth. The social impact indicators, therefore, specifically take account of the effects of the crisis and intervention on these groups.

The indicators are also aligned to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)⁸ and the Government's National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP) 2003-2006⁹. NERRDP is the planning initiative that the Solomon Islands Government finalised in the aftermath of the crisis. It built upon earlier economic governance work undertaken in late 2002, and multi-sectoral planning which included wide consultation from April to October, 2003. RAMSI created a conducive environment to finalise of NERRDP, which was approved in October 2003. NERRDP sets out a strategic framework that identifies clear priority targets and actions, which the Government and its development partners will use to guide and fund work towards achieving economic recovery and reform. It is appropriate for the SIA to draw on the NERRDP and its timely release allows for a harmonisation of the indicators.

The next four chapters contain a brief account of the effects of the conflict and the state of affairs prior to the arrival of RAMSI. This baseline provides the first part of each chapter on: law and order; the economy; essential services to the community; and population groups and civil society organisations. The latter part of each chapter outlines the recovery achieved, draws attention to issues needing mitigation and lists the indicators. Chapter 5 captures in a matrix, the key issues, baseline and indicators.

⁸ Millennium Development Goals are development targets agreed by 147 Heads of States and Governments, based on the Millennium Declaration, to achieve significant measurable improvements in peoples lives by 2015 using baseline from 1990.

⁹ SIG, National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan 2003-2006, Department of National Reform and Planning, October 2003.

Chapter 1

Maintaining law and order

1.1 Impact of the crisis on the rule of law

Two and a half years after the signing of the TPA, peace remained fragile. Atrocities such as murder and extortion continued to be committed in Honiara, parts of Guadalcanal, Malaita and Western Provinces – an example being the murder, of a former RSIP Commissioner by a police officer who escaped from custody and eluded capture¹⁰ (See Box 2.1 below.)

By mid-2003 Solomon Islands remained a country under siege because:

- Between 400 – 1000 high powered military style weapons stolen from police armouries were still missing;
- The presence of armed criminal gangs made up of former IFM and MEF militants continued to terrorise citizens especially in Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal, while other criminal gangs were doing the same in Gizo and Munda in the Western Province.

- Villagers used the militants to threaten their enemies;
- The RSIP failed to investigate and prosecute serious offences such as murder and extortion;
- Of the partiality of the RSIP and the involvement of some officers in criminal rackets;
- Villages on the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal were burnt and people brutalised, killed or taken hostage. Over 7,700 residents in the area were affected¹¹;
- The IFM militants threatened to poison the water source in Honiara;
- Former militants in Honiara, Auki and Malu'u were stealing and vandalising property on a daily basis; and
- Both the MEF and IFM militants were involved in the sale and consumption of marijuana and brewed and traded Kwaso¹².

Box 2.1

Examples of reported deaths

The IFM and MEF were blamed for a number of deaths¹ (including many believed to be unreported):

- The de-capitation of a Guadalcanal man at the Honiara main market in November 2001;
- The murder of a Malaitan man at Honiara's Rove Prison;
- The beating to death of an elderly North Malaitan man who questioned TPA provisions for economic development in his area;
- The killing of a former IFM commander in November 2001 in east of Honiara;
- The killing of four youth in Gizo, Western Province - three were involved in a brawl allegedly with Bougainvilleans;
- The killing of a Guadalcanal man at Noro in the Western Province;
- The death of ten Kwaio men murdered by Harold Keke and his followers in the Weather Coast;
- The murder of a government minister and 7 'Tasiu's' from the Church of Melanesia;
- The murder of a New Zealand Construction Supervisor in Honiara;
- The killing of a former Commissioner of Police of Solomon Islands on Malaita in early 2003;
- The beheading of a Seventh Day Adventist Church worker at Atoifi Hospital.

¹⁰ RAMSI Information Sheet.

¹¹ RAMSI Cabinet Paper, August 2003.

¹² A home brewed alcoholic drink.

1.1.1 The law and justice sector

The law and justice sector was badly affected nationwide because law enforcement and the administration of justice were considerably weakened by a partially functional and compromised police force. While most institutions continued to function during the crisis, they did so under severe financial, staffing and logistical constraints. Staff were subjected to intimidation and personal threats.

Police

The police lost command and control over the deteriorating law and order situation. Many Malaitan police officers were associates of the MEF and over 1000 Special Constables (SCs), including former MEF militants, were recruited into the RSIP soon after the signing of the TPA. Their on-going links to the MEF allowed them to wield influence beyond their ranks.

Public confidence in the RSIP plummeted, as the SCs were often the instigators and perpetrators of many criminal activities. The Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Office were targeted for extortion by criminal elements in the RSIP and militant gangs. Any government revenue collected went to meeting fabricated and outrageous compensation demands. The SCs were a major impediment to police efforts to respond to citizen complaints and the maintenance of law and order because they were constantly dealing with militant power brokers.¹³ Police investigations against SCs and armed ex-combatants stalled for fear of reprisals. Police work was also hampered by the lack of resources – they had no access to vehicles and fuel. (See Box 2.2 below.)

Box 2.2

A case of unattended domestic violence

One woman was threatened by her former husband that he would destroy her home. She called the police but was told that they had no vehicle. The ex-husband arrived soon after and smashed all the louvres of the windows in her home. Her 7-year-old son who was sleeping in the main bedroom sustained deep cuts to his head from slabs of glass that had fallen onto the bed while he was still asleep.

Source: Researcher's Observation

¹³ Interview with Police, Honiara, November 2003.

Attorney General's Office (AGO)

The crisis generated an increased volume of work for the AGO. As legal adviser to Government the AGO was involved in all efforts to find a solution for the crisis, including the peace agreements. The AGO also defended Government against the growing numbers of compensation claims and its officers were threatened over advice against the cancellation of custom duties and free remissions on overseas imports. Staff members were harassed and forced to sign documents against their will and the office sustained damage from a break-in and stoning. These challenges coupled with staff shortages and resource limitations meant that the AGO was barely able to fulfill its constitutional role.

The Public Solicitor's Office (PSO)

The PSO provides free legal services to poorer sections of the community and is normally poorly funded. The conflict only served to reinforce its perennial resource problems, such as a shortage of lawyers, office space, lack of computers and funds to cover basic operating costs such as stationery and communication. Its ability to respond to public demands was therefore severely restricted. The PSO felt that this adversely affected ordinary people's access to justice and the exercise their constitutional rights. PSO lawyers were especially threatened when dealing with maintenance, domestic violence and custody cases where husbands were either ex-militants or associates of ex-militants. The number of cases dealt with by the PSO was fewer, but still considered quite high and many involved major land disputes.

The Courts

The Solomon Islands Court of Appeal (SICOA) has not sat since late 2000 due largely to resource constraints and security risks. Only one case was heard by SICOA in 2000, which is a major drop when compared to 16 cases in 1999. (See Table 1.1 below.)

The Court of Appeal, High Court and Magistrates Court continued operating throughout the crisis, but not at full capacity because of a drop in the number of cases. Between 1999 and 2000 the High Court cases dropped by 50 per cent. (See Table 1.1.) This fluctuation is partly attributed to litigant fear and

insecurity arising directly from the conflict. A further reason would be the disruptions to the preceding legal processes and procedures. Court adjudication is dependent on a functioning police force and prosecution procedures. The flux within the RSIP impacted on investigations, charging suspects and serving court orders. A number of land and logging cases were stalled because witnesses and lawyers were threatened.¹⁴

Table 1.1 Number of High Court and SICOA cases in Solomon Islands (1999 – Nov 2003)

Year	High Court	SICOA
1999	436	16
2000	208	1
2001	341	0
2002	327	0
2003 (to 4/11)	286	1

Source: High Court Office, Honiara, November 2003.

Court revenue fell due to a drop in the number of cases and police laxity in the collection of fines¹⁵. However, despite these challenges, the courts were able to deal with both criminal and civil cases without compromising the rules of due process. Judges and magistrates were not immune to threats and security precautions restricted their travel to hear cases. For example, court hearings have not been held in Auki (Malaita Province), Lata (Temotu Province) and Kira Kira (Makira Ulawa Province) since June 2000. Local courts that deal with land related issues and misdemeanors at village level ceased to function.

The Prison Service

All five prisons in the Solomon Islands experienced gross inadequate holding capacity and a sixth prison, Tetera on the Guadalcanal Plains, was closed soon after the armed conflict. Malaita, the most populated province, only had a six-cell remand facility to hold prisoners. Overcrowding was a normal occurrence in the Rove and Gizo Prisons. In November 2002, Rove Prison held 116 inmates, 52 more than its capacity. Gizo Prison always

exceeded its capacity of 16 and at times held more than twice its capacity.¹⁶

Table 1.2 Solomon Islands prisons and their capacities

Name of prison	Capacity
Rove Central Prison, Honiara	64
Gizo Prison, Western Province	16
Kira Kira Prison, Makira Province	4
Lata Prison, Temotu Province	4
Auki, Remand Cells, Malaita Prison	6

Source: Prison Information Report 2002

Overcrowding was a potential threat to both guards and prisoners. Prisoners were denied adequate food, medical services and hygienic conditions.¹⁷ The shooting of a prisoner in Rove was traumatic and an indication of the potential for things to get out of hand. During the crisis many prison staff returned to their home provinces for safety.

1.2 RAMSI's role in recovery of law and order

The economic, political and social situation in the country worsened, creating a trap from which there appeared to be no escape¹⁸ and without external assistance, the Solomon Islands Government appeared incapable of reversing the situation.

The first phase of RAMSI was deployed on 24 July, 2003. (Refer to Table 1.3 (Annex III) for RAMSI personnel and logistics figures.) Within 100 days of deployment, it made significant inroads in the restoration of law and order¹⁹, restoring a sense of security, which extended to and filtered through all sectors and levels of Solomon Islands.

The immediate priority was aligned to the following four areas of its 'public purpose' objective:

¹⁶ The lowest was in December 2000 with 18 prisoners and the highest was in March and April when both months recorded 52 prisoners, 36 more people than the prison is built to accommodate - *Prison Information Report 2002*, Honiara, April 8 2003.

¹⁷ Controller of Prisons, Solomon Islands Prison Service, *Prison Information Report 2002*, Honiara, April 8, 2003.

¹⁸ *Our Failing Neighbour*, p27.

¹⁹ NERRDP focus areas are: law enforcement, security and peace; strengthening the legal and justice system and promoting national reconciliation, unity and peace.

¹⁴ Interview the Solomon Islands Bar Association (SIBA), 27 November, 2003.

¹⁵ According to SIBA, the lawless situation in the Solomons affected revenue to the courts.

- Maintain law and order – prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime;
- Ensure security and safety of persons and property;
- Support the administration of justice;
- Support and develop Solomon Islands law and justice institutions.

Maintain law and order – prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime

There were numerous reports of stolen property, such as vehicles, being returned to their owners – clearly, an indication that the thieves feared the heavy hand of the law. Extortion and demands for protection money against businesses stopped. RAMSI's presence has had a similar beneficial impact outside of Honiara.

Secure Honiara

There is a general feeling of security among people in Honiara since the arrival of RAMSI. Freedom of movement has increased and people are moving around without fear, for example Guadalcanal people are returning to Honiara to shop and sell at the markets to earn much needed income. State institutions and government offices in Honiara are resuming services due to the absence of threats. RAMSI's ability to provide salaries is an added incentive. Citizens are no longer afraid to be critical and newspapers are freely publishing the critical views of ordinary people, especially in their 'Letter to the Editor' columns. A resident of Burns Creek in Lunga, east of Honiara, observed that people felt secure hearing RAMSI vehicles patrolling their area at night. Despite this, concern has been raised by some Honiara residents, as well as provincial interviewees such as those in Malu'u, that the peace brought about by RAMSI is 'peace with fear.' They are concerned that when RAMSI leaves, there would be retribution by former militants against police informants. The withdrawal of more than 1000 RAMSI personnel at the end of October 2003 fueled this fear.

Target core criminal elements

By October RAMSI had made 340 arrests, with over 600 charges laid. Among those arrested were several high profile ex-combatants, including former MEF leaders, Jimmy 'Rasta' Lusibaea, RSIP Inspector Patteson Saeni, Moses Su'u and James

Kili. Former IFM combatants such as Stanley 'Satan' Kaoni and Harold Keke have also been arrested. (See Table 1.4 (Annex III) for summary of arrests and charges.) RAMSI has carried out Professional Standards investigations within the RSIP, resulting in the arrest of 25 officers and 92 charges laid against them. Charges included murder, assault, intimidation, and inappropriate use of firearms and robbery. Furthermore, 17 cadets were disqualified because they either did not meet minimum academic requirements, or had criminal records.²⁰

Initiate community policing programmes

Sixteen (16) police posts have been established in locations around Solomon Islands. (See Table 1.5 (Annex III) for details of RAMSI police and military personnel at these police posts). These are to promote community policing in the rural areas. Given the excesses of the police during the crisis, re-building public confidence in the police will take time. RAMSI is banking on community policing to re-build bridges with communities. From the start this has gone hand in hand with the weapons recovery exercise and seemed to be well received by people. Community policing also offers RAMSI the opportunity to inform communities about its work and role.

Remove weapons from the community

By the end of October 2003, over 3700 firearms, including 659 military-style weapons had been recovered. RAMSI's Special Coordinator noted that the removal of weapons from the community had an immediate positive effect. Fear subsided and people went about their lives unimpeded. All public servants, community representatives and general public interviewed in Honiara, Guadalcanal, Malaita and Munda confirmed this. Nearly 30 villagers along the road from Auki to Malu'u were declared 'Gun Free'.²¹

Ensure security and safety of persons and property

Without a doubt RAMSI created a safe and secure environment for a return to normalcy. RAMSI installed fences around the compound which houses the Prime Minister's Office the Ministry of

²⁰ Interview with Police, Honiara, November 2003.

²¹ Informal count of the 'Gun Free Village' signs in front of the villages by researcher.

Finance (which hosts the Government Treasury), Cabinet, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Commerce and Trade and the Immigration Division. RAMSI security personnel provide a 24-hour guard service to these premises and at the Prime Minister's residence. RAMSI also introduced a systematic, visitor-screening procedure and visitors are required to make appointments to see officers in these departments. Visitors must have passes to enter the premises. The security measures have had a reassuring effect on staff members and intimidation of public servants and politicians has ceased.

A new high security unit at Rove Central Prison has been installed and the low security prison farm at Tereva has been re-opened.

The presence of RAMSI police and military personnel around the country has given the populace a sense of peace and security within their own communities. 93% of people polled said they felt more at ease by the return of law and order.

Support the administration of justice

RAMSI's support to the RSIP, the High Court and the Magistrates Courts, the Attorney General's Office, the Public Solicitor's Office and the Prison Services has improved the administration of justice. These institutions have received computers, funding for stationery, funds to install telephones and internet connection as well as resources paying of their bills and office rental. Some of these institutions will be relocated to new offices. Others, such as the Prison Service and Police, have been assisted by RAMSI advisors. More advisors are promised for the end of 2003 and early 2004. The AGO, the PSO and the courts will have new overseas and local lawyers and other legal personnel in early 2004. (See Table 1.6 (Annex III) for a comprehensive list of inputs into the justice sector.)

Support and develop Solomon Islands (law & justice) institutions

RAMSI is providing a Deputy Police Commissioner to assist the Commissioner. A Business Plan for 2004 has been developed to address corruption and six key service delivery areas, which include: professional standards and public accountability; border security and national security; family

violence; crime prevention and investigation; youth; and traffic management and road safety.

A strategic review of RSIP aimed at re-building it into a disciplined, professional and credible force was announced in September by the Ministry of Police and Justice. It will be jointly planned and implemented by RAMSI and local police officers. An Executive Steering Committee to oversee the planning and implementation of the Review has been formed and chaired by the Minister of Police, with members including the Commissioner of Police, RAMSI, National Peace Council (NPC) representatives, other key government personnel and representatives of civil society and women's organisations.

The review will concentrate on 15 key priority issues identified by the Police Commissioner, and recommendations will form the basis for planning the future direction of the RSIP. A 'cleansing' of the police payroll will also be undertaken. RSIP officers have requested greater involvement of local officers in the strategic review. They are worried that a redundancy exercise may result in senior and experienced officers being retired, leaving the RSIP short in experience. These officers have encouraged RAMSI to integrate more effectively with local officers and pursue counterparting arrangements.

The Deputy Police Commissioner warned that he would not tolerate any police officers engaging in criminal activity such as corruption and stealing or drunkenness. He called on all police officers and Special Constables in the Honiara area to surrender their guns to the Rove Police Centre and those that did not comply would be dismissed and possibly face criminal charges. The Deputy Police Commissioner promised that honest and hard working officers would be protected and rewarded. There would be more training opportunities and a fair promotion system would be introduced.

A review of the prisons is also planned and an overhaul of the institution is expected. Training and strengthening security will be given greater priority. RAMSI's presence has deterred prisoner agitation and attempts to assist inmates escape. RAMSI is teaching prison officers security procedures such as locking and opening the prison gates, searching drills and opening cells and has opened four more

new wings in Rove Prison. RAMSI has enabled the Solomon Islands Government to make a commitment for the future establishment of a total staff of 308 for the prison services.

RAMSI's institutional support to the Courts includes:

- The renovation of the High Court Sheriff's Office;
- The extension of the courtrooms;
- Providing an additional venue for court hearings;
- Commitment to meet recruitment and salaries for two local associated judges, clerical officers and a librarian;
- Enforcement of the laws by dealing with cases as they come through the courts;
- Enabling court hearings to begin in the provinces once again and providing funds for the provincial tours;
- Promise of a tour of by local judges to New South Wales, Australia, to gain further experience;
- Applying Solomon Islands laws to all offenders, whether local or expatriate.

1.3 The Peace Process

While RAMSI states that peace building is not one of its major aims, its arrival has restored peace in the country. The NPC is working closely with RAMSI in promoting a safe and secure environment. This is an extension of RAMSI's previous focus on weapons collection.

NPC Monitors are to be trained in early 2004 in conflict resolution and basic counselling skills to assist those traumatised by the conflict. The NPC will also organise nationwide peace initiatives such as unity summits, music concerts and sporting activities.

Concerns however exist among Solomon Islanders that the root causes of the conflict are not being addressed by either the Government or RAMSI. Practices that contributed to the rise of the conflict in Solomon Islands are beginning to reappear. For example, there is fresh resentment from Guadalcanal landowners that Honiara picnickers have started helping themselves to resources from Guadalcanal land and beginning to make new

gardens without seeking permission from the landowners.

The need for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was raised by the Civil Society Network (CSN). A TRC will assist relatives of the hundreds of people who were killed or disappeared during the conflict. CSN has submitted a proposal for its establishment to the Government. This will enable the truth to be told by victims. It would individualise guilt for crimes committed, provide the opportunity for forgiveness and meaningful reconciliation and healing. Many feel that this is critical for ensuring lasting peace. The proposed TRC could also address the causes of the conflict, including land issues. A Human Rights Commission (HRC) is also proposed in a new Solomon Islands Constitution. The HRC will have responsibility for addressing human rights matters.

1.4 Conclusion

The majority of people in Solomon Islands welcome the deployment of RAMSI. People are pleased that hardcore criminals are at last going through the justice system and that it has created a safe and secure environment in most communities. Fear is reduced as criminal groups are now being locked away or have disbanded. People in Honiara and the other lawless areas in the country, especially Auki and Malu'u on Malaita, the Weathercoast on Guadalcanal and Gizo and Munda, are no longer being intimidated and harassed.

The functions of judiciary and law enforcement institutions, such as the police and prison services are being re-activated with assistance from RAMSI. Sustaining this recovery will be a challenge and dependent on the cooperation between RAMSI and its local partners.

1.4.1 Key issues for mitigation

Consultation & counterparting

Local police officers feel that they are being bypassed by RAMSI personnel. The RAMSI initiated review and reform is not doing enough to include local officers. Inclusion is important to implement and sustain the reforms. For this reason there is a call for greater local participation in the strategic review of the RSIP.

While RAMSI is committed to building the capacity of local counterparts this is yet to translate into action. Views gathered from local officers express a strong desire to improve professionally, but not enough mentoring and capacity building of counterparts is happening.

There is a need for improved or greater communication about the proposed police reform because concerns (rightly or wrongly) surround the sensitive issue of redundancy. There is speculation that many senior and experienced officers will be retired leaving the force in the hands of inexperienced officers.

The Bar Association holds the view that RAMSI needs to assist in the reactivation of local courts, which deal with customary law cases. The rationale being to reduce the volume of minor cases coming before Magistrates Courts and ease case flow.

The tendency of RAMSI personnel to do things their own way and in some cases contrary to established Solomon Islands norm and practice is a source of tension, hence a call for RAMSI legal personnel to adhere to local laws.

Sustainability

Sections of Solomon Islands community are anxious whether peace will be lasting. For example the People in Malu'u have described the current situation as 'peace with fear.' They fear retaliation from former militants when RAMSI leaves.

The recovery achieved since the arrival of RAMSI has clearly raised expectations. Many of those interviewed felt that neither RAMSI nor the Government were addressing the root causes of the conflict – such as long standing grievances over land and resource allocation. The delay is re-igniting old frustrations and resentment among the people of Guadalcanal.

1.4.2 Law and Order SIA Indicators

- Reform of RSIP and Prison Services lifts their professional standards;
- Reform of RSIP strengthens capacity and efficiency to quickly and effectively deal with militancy and retrieval of illegal weapons;
- RSIP adheres to the due process of law in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of

suspects by disregarding the status or position of suspects;

- Coverage of Community Policing extended around the country and security reinforced in known trouble spots on the Weathercoast, Solomon Islands Plantation Limited area, Honiara and Malaita;
- The capacity of the offices of the Attorney General, Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor strengthened to perform their role;
- Increase budget for the judiciary to meet overheads and address shortages in human resources;
- The capacity of the Judiciary strengthened and its independence protected;
- Large backlog of serious criminal cases are disposed expeditiously by the Courts.

Chapter 2

Economic recovery

The socio-political situation of Solomon Islands has impacted on the country's economic performance. Some of the causes that gave rise to this situation include:

- Britain's hurried departure, which left a country ill-prepared for nationhood. In 23 years there were 10 changes of government, making it difficult for any executive to commit or plan for long-term development. Government was also unstable due largely to Members of Parliament repeatedly switching party allegiances;
- An expansion of the public sector neither improved effectiveness nor efficiency in service delivery. Revenue was squandered because of the failure to investigate allegations of corruption and prosecute perpetrators;
- The country's cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, which made it especially challenging to build and deepen national consciousness. Today, most Solomon Islanders continue to identify with and have stronger allegiances to their clan, island and province than their country;
- Land is an essential resource and treated by Solomon Islanders as a perpetual source of sustenance rather than a tradable commodity²². There has been an increase in land disputes over access, ownership and compensation. The delay in resolving land cases through formal and traditional mechanisms is a source

of ongoing tension and has been a constraint to economic development.

2.1 Impact of the crisis on the economy

The economy was stagnant well before the conflict started. The conflict exacerbated a worsening economic situation that the Government could not redress. The lack of employment opportunities, especially for a large number of women and youth, was a cause for concern in a climate of rapid population growth. Weak governance contributed to the poor management of the economy because of ineffective and inappropriate development policies and strategies. Corruption and external economic factors put a further squeeze on the economy.²³

The conflict led to further contractions of the economy due to the closures of major industries and loss of foreign investor confidence. A fall in exports and job losses impacted negatively on household income in both urban and rural areas. Three quick changes of government did little to salvage the situation²⁴. The impact on the economy was severe. Government was paralysed in the face of mounting debts, greatly reduced revenue and outrageous compensation claims. Table 2.1 below illustrates the impact of the conflict on the economy.

Table 2.1: Economic change from 1990- 2001 (in million SBD)

Economic indicator	1990	1995	1999	2000	2001*
Imports	53.2 (un-audited accounts)	73.0	53.2	47.0	11.4
Exports	12.6 (un-audited accounts)	77.9	72.4	35.3	76.9
Net External Reserves	42	51.1	255.0	159.8	102.6+
Direct Investment	26.2	4.6	-89.8	7.1	-
Real GDP	0.9	6.7	(0.5)	(14.2)	(9.0)

* Figures represent Quarter IV for 2001. + Figures for quarters as above and represent Gross External Reserves.

Note: Exchange rates USD1.00 = SBD5.00 Source: CBSI Annual Report 2000 & Economic Report on Solomon Islands, 1997.

²² Land Issues in the Pacific, Forum Economic Ministers Meeting Briefing Paper, May 2001.

²³ External factors include the Asian Economic Crisis in the mid 1990s, which led to a fall in log prices.

²⁴ Prime Minister Bart Ulufa'alu was forced to resign in June 2000. He was succeeded by Manasseh Sogavare and Sir Allan Kemakeza who took office following the general election of 2001.

2.2 The National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan (NERRDP)

Throughout the crisis Government efforts for economic recovery continued in consultation with development partners. The NERRDP 2003-2006²⁵ arose from Government meetings with a multi-donor economic governance mission in November and December, 2002²⁶. The NERRDP received donor support at a meeting convened in November 2003 to harmonise efforts and consider resource commitment for the plan.

The NERRDP incorporates recommendations from three government sub-taskforces covering the economic, social, and law and order sectors. It outlines policies, strategies and actions for economic recovery, social restoration and development for immediate to medium-term nation building that would set the pace for the long-term development of the country.

The Government has identified the need for considerable improvement to mitigate risks of deepening poverty and injustice.²⁷ At the core of the human development process is the improvement of people's livelihoods and adherence to the principles of good governance. The principles of good governance, necessary to ensure an equitable and just society, are contained in NERRDP and include: inclusive participatory development in economic and social affairs of the nation; maintenance of the rule of law; transparency in decision-making; accountability by public officials and other decision-makers; and efficient allocation and management of public resources.²⁸

2.3 Recent economic performance

A review of economic developments from the last quarter of 2002 showed that most sectors of the economy began to improve before the arrival of RAMSI. Much of this is attributed to a resilient productive sector, consistent donor emergency aid,

and some improvement in the law and order situation.

National income and distribution

Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI) sources indicate:

- Improved GDP in 2002 relative to 2000 and 2001 (see Table 2.1 above);
- A drop in inflation rate from 15% in 2002 to 12% by June 2003;
- Increased external reserves since 2002;
- A continuance of the wide income disparity between rural and urban areas, between income groups, and between nationals and expatriates. The last survey on household income and distribution was carried out in early 1990s and there is no up-to-date data available²⁹.

Production

The CBSI Quarterly Report, June 2003, states:

- Increased commodity export value in 2002 (see Table 2.2 below);
- Rise in commodities production index by 7.9% in June quarter of 2003.
- Despite a 5% growth in private sector lending by July 2003, the sector is growing slowly in size and scope and strict lending policies by the lending institutions are still in place;
- Resumed participation in cocoa and copra production in the rural areas and government commitment to assist in the sector as stated in NERRDP;
- Major industries such as the Gold Ridge Mine and palm oil plantation remain closed to date;
- A lack of income as a result of the conflict reduced demand for goods and services, which affected manufacturing and service industries. However some production increases were recorded by these industries in 2002 (see Box 2.1 below).

²⁵ SIG, NERRDP 2003-2006.

²⁶ Solomon Islands Multi-donor Economic Governance Mission Report, 2002.

²⁷ Multi-Donor Economic Governance Mission report, SI, 2002.

²⁸ SIG, NERRDP 2003-2006.

²⁹ Ibid.

Table 2.2: Foreign receipts (in million SBD) for major exports

Commodities	1 98	1 99	2 00	2 01	2 02
Copra	39.0	39.0	35.0	0.4	2.0
Fish	194.0	159.0	41.0	37.0	71.0
Logs	196.0	251.0	224.0	190.0	254.0
Palm oil & kernel	98.0	65.0	7.0	0.2	0.0
Cocoa	30.0	24.0	9.0	5.0	28.0
All others	50.0	69.0	15.0	16.0	35.0

Source: NERRDP/CBSI

Box 2.1

"Income generation was hard – copra, cocoa, fish and shells stopped selling. There was no one to buy them. Wage earners in rural areas were not receiving their salaries so they didn't have purchasing power. Women and children were facing death. The cash flow was very low. All forms of income came to a standstill. \$10 became very big money in those days. Most people in the rural communities still had gardens to grow their own food, but food in shops was too expensive.

"Those that own motels were affected and their income was cut by less than half. Used to have tourists from Sweden, sometimes 10, 12 or 13 at one time. They used to do 4 to 5 tours a year but due to the tension they stopped coming. Since October 2000, there have only been 4 tours in total. Business people and overseas volunteers that worked in Malaita used to stay in the motels, but they had to leave because of the tension.

"The provincial government couldn't do much because it didn't have money. There was no money to maintain the roads. The airfield at Gwaunaru was closed for a long period – land owners used militants to demand compensation from the government and Solomon Airlines for using the airfield. Malaita shipping was affected. MV Ramos couldn't run properly because passengers and ex-militants were not paying their fares and freight charges. The Ramos is now out of commission because there is no money to carry out major repairs."

Excerpts from an interview with a local businessperson from Auki, Malaita province (19/11/03)

External Sector

The June 2003 CBSI Quarterly Review states:

- The balance of payment has improved up to June 2003, recording an overall surplus of SBD82 million compared to a deficit of SBD19 million in the same period in 2002. This is due to improvements in both current and capital accounts;
- The trade account recorded a surplus of SBD13.5 million in the June 2003 quarter, compared to a SBD3.3 million surplus in the March 2003 quarter and SBD39.5 million deficit in the same period last year;
- Export values rose by 74% in 2002.

Financial and Monetary Sectors

Analysis in the CBSI Economic Brief 2003 states that due to positive developments in the external sector, notably the improvement in Net Foreign Asset:

- Currency rose by 1.3% in July 2003;
- Demand deposits rose by 20% in July 2003;
- Savings rose by 4.6%.

Employment

Analysis in the CBSI Economic Brief 2003 and 1999 National Census state:

- Formal employment remained low in 2002;
- According to the 1999 National Census³⁰, youth unemployment is as high as 61%;
- Over the period of conflict, nearly 8,000 employees lost their jobs through redundancies or sent on unpaid leave.

State-owned enterprises

Analysis in the NERRDP and interviews findings show:

- Inefficient and not cost-effective;
- Plans to privatise have never materialised;

³⁰ 1999 National Census, SIG.

- Development Bank of Solomon Islands (DBSI) now near dysfunctional with an uncertain future.

Land

Analysis in the NERRDP and other sources indicate:

- Increasing land disputes deter economic development;
- No specific measures undertaken as yet to address land issues, which, according to the SIA poll, is an underlying cause of the ethnic crisis;
- Through the NERRDP, Government will commence a tribal land project in 2004.

Supporting infrastructure

Analysis in the NERRDP and interviews findings show:

- Stabex fund for infrastructure development was halted during the conflict;
- Deteriorating land, sea and air transport;
- Poor rural infrastructure to boost economic activities in the provinces;
- Through the NERRDP, the Government will establish a new Investment Promotion Act in 2004 to encourage more industrial development.

2.3.1 Government finances

For 1998 and 1999, Solomon Island Government budget outcomes showed cash surpluses due largely to substantial grants and financing from external sources for a policy and structural reform programme.

However, as a result of the conflict, revenue and grants fell sharply from 2000. In the subsequent years this resulted in deficit budget outcomes, despite the increases in revenue in 2001 and 2002, which was exceeded by corresponding increases in expenditure during those two years.

The management of government accounts worsened and problems were exacerbated by numerous demands on the Government and Department of Finance (DOF) for payment of claims and allowances. Discretionary accounts, payment of public revenue and bank accounts being opened by

individual departments without the authority of the DOF made it more difficult for the proper management of public finance.³¹ No auditing of government finances has taken place since 1998.

The public service is the biggest single employer in the country and yet the most ineffective and inefficient. Efforts to reduce the size of the service to an affordable and manageable level were disrupted by the conflict. A planned redundancy for 2001 that would see 1500 officers leave the service was stalled due to lack of funds.³²

The public service is poorly resourced - most departments have old furniture and unserviceable equipment; have minimal or no basic stationary supplies; and limited operating budgets. Delays in the transfer of were also restricting. Salaries have not increased since 1996. Many departments have unfilled posts and staff development is low priority. Staff morale and efficiency dropped during the crisis due to long delays in salary disbursement and harassment from members of the public.

2003 Recurrent Budget

In the first seven months of 2003 government finances showed an overall deficit of just below SBD90 million, much higher than the budget estimates.³³ This outcome reflected increases in expenditure, especially payroll and other charges. Despite improved revenue collection (almost 70% of total budgeted revenue for the year) for the same period, government expenditure, based on cash flow, was 83% ahead of the budget estimates for 2003.

The 2003 budget outcomes are summarised below, reflecting the situation just prior to the arrival of RAMSI:

- Revenue and expenditure estimated at SBD259 million for the 2003 Budget;
- Expenditure for this year up to August was SBD225 million against budgeted expenditure of SBD173 million (i.e. SBD52 million or 30% ahead of Budget);
- Massive expenditure blow out (SBD57 million) by the Ministry of Police;

³¹ Hou, R. Economic Brief, CBSI, 2003.

³² Ibid.

³³ CBSI Quarterly report, 2003.

- Expenditure blow outs by the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet and Parliament;
- Funds were extorted by special constables, police officers and politicians due to non-existent security and expenditure controls at the Ministry of Finance;
- Other legitimate areas of expenditure were severely squeezed, for example, payroll and provincial health funds;
- Debt servicing – SBD9.2 million spent out of an annual allocation of SBD39 million;
- Tax compliance was poor with a lot of tax evasion;
- Revenue and expenditure were completely off track;
- No clear, consistent way to determine which expenditure should be paid and which should not;
- Urgent attention needed to restore expenditure control, improve revenue compliance and provide some budget plans for expenditure approval.

2004 Recurrent Budget

The 2004 Budget is designed to build on the plan for the final quarter of 2002 to get the expenditure mix right. It is supported by substantial budget support from Australia and New Zealand under the RAMSI arrangement. AUD12 million will be provided in monthly installments for the first half of 2004. Health, education, provincial affairs and the Auditor General's Office get larger budget allocations.

The total Recurrent Budget 2004 has a planned expenditure of SBD479.6 million, which matches the revenue estimate with zero surplus/deficit. SBD362 million is expected from domestic revenues (a SBD103.2 million increase from the 2003 Budget) and SBD117 million Budget support from Australia and New Zealand. (Other characteristics of the 2004 budget and measures put in place to manage the budget are in Annex IV.)

Government debts and arrears

Total government debts including debt arrears increased from SBD1.1536 billion in 2001 to SBD1.6539 billion in 2002. Total external debt in 2002 was SBD1.0873 billion and domestic debt was

SBD458.6 million. Total government debt stock reached SBD1.653 billion by the end of September 2003, of which SBD1.085 billion was external and SBD568 million was domestic.

In the Parliamentary Budget Session in November 2003, Finance Minister Francis Zama said the government had borrowed beyond its legal limit under the Central Bank Act, as well as beyond its 'enhanced ceiling' under the same Act. Borrowing from the Central Bank stood at SBD203.84 million (USD27.34 million) at the end of October 2003.³⁴

Because the government only managed to make external debt service payment of SBD5.4 million in 2001 and SBD7.7 million in 2002, total external debt arrears rose to SBD82.8 million, but by end of September 2003 the total soared to SBD101.5 million. Domestic debt arrears were SBD56 million in 2001, doubled to SBD112 million in 2002. Despite debt servicing of SBD22.3 million in 2001 and SBD12 million in 2002 domestic arrears continued increasing and by September 2003, it stood at SBD177.4 million. Domestic debt holders include the commercial banks, the Solomon Islands National Provident Fund (SINPF) and CBSI.³⁵

Development Budget

Development Budgets for 2002 and 2003 were prepared under very difficult circumstances surrounded by uncertain funding sources following the coup in June 2000. There were no accurate data to properly estimate projects for donor funding and thus did not meet donor requirements. Development plans in this regard become 'wish lists' that had little planning and were not prioritised, with no back up feasibility and appraisal studies undertaken on them.³⁶ The 2004 Development Budget has substantial ODA funding as stated in the subsequent section.

2.3.2 Official Development Assistance (ODA)

The implementation of the Development Budget 2004, like for past budgets, is expected to be funded mostly by bilateral and multilateral agencies,

³⁴ CBSI, Quarterly Report, 2003.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

including international financial institutions, regional organisations and international non-governmental organisations and government. Committed funding from development partners for the 2004 Development Budget, totals SBD448,880,330³⁷.

Basic social service and community development sectors will receive the largest share of donor assistance. While external assistance is required for both the recurrent and development budgets, domestic revenue is expected to fund the bulk of the recurrent budget expenditure items.

2.3.3 Community development

There are numerous community-oriented and community-based programmes and projects funded by traditional donors such as the AusAID Community Peace Restoration Fund (CPRF), the EU-funded Micro-projects Programme and the Japanese Grassroots Projects.

The CPRF, begun in November 2000, provides small grants to community groups for rehabilitation, restoration and peace building. Its outreach is broad, impacting on youth, ex-militants, women, children and displaced people. Total funds committed for 2003 was SBD35 million. It funds a total number of 639 projects across all provinces, 512 of which have completed. At least 90% of CPRF projects are based in rural areas serving isolated communities. It promotes local capacity and employment. It employs 48 full-time local staff and nearly 100 part-time and casual workers across provinces at rural level. 48% of staff is female.³⁸

Other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also continuing with their largely community oriented and based programmes. These include Save the Children Fund Australia, Oxfam, the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA) and the Adventists Disaster Relief Agency (ADRA). Like for ODA, it is expected that funding through NGOs would increase with the improved security situation in the country.

³⁷ 2004 Development Budget, SIG.

³⁸ AusAID/SI CPRF, Information Document 2003.

2.4 RAMSI's role in economic recovery

With the arrival of RAMSI in late July 2003, the Solomon Islands Government sub-taskforces were established. One focused on economic recovery. RAMSI's direct inputs include budget support to the Department of Finance (DOF) and placement of advisers in line posts of the DOF, enabling RAMSI to restore fiscal credibility – beginning with the stabilisation of the budget.³⁹ While recovery was already in train when RAMSI arrived the secure environment and improved law and order situation provided further impetus.

Direct financial assistance

An economic assistance package of AUD25 million (about SBD125 million) in 2003/2004 makes up RAMSI budget support to the Department of Finance. RAMSI assistance to the DOF is helping maximise government revenue in order that expenditure is planned more effectively and services delivered. RAMSI personnel totaling 17 advisers and in-line officers are in the DOF working with counterparts to achieve budget controls and deliver basic government services that include paying public servants and ensuring departments have basic operational budgets.⁴⁰ (Details of RAMSI inputs and impacts on Government finance are found in Annex IV.)

RAMSI has also paid Solomon Island Government arrears owed to the World Bank (USD338,000) and Asian Development Bank (USD2.65 million). Now the two banks can re-engage with the country.

RAMSI assistance to other sectors includes:

- AUD25 million for the criminal justice sector;
- AUD100,000 for internally displaced people around Honiara, especially those from the Weathercoast in Guadalcanal;
- AUD43,000 to procure required chemicals for public water treatment in Honiara;
- AUD1 million to stabilise electricity supplies in Honiara. (Australia is considering an additional AUD3 million in support for electricity).

³⁹ Satish Chand, "Resuscitating the Solomon Islands economy", Pacific Economic Bulletin, Volume 18 Number 2, 2003.

⁴⁰ RAMSI Brief, Cabinet Paper, 2003.

Australia has provided AUD17 million through the Health Sector Trust Fund Account to help restore basic services since May 2001 and has also helped trained health staff in Honiara and the provinces. For basic education New Zealand will provide SBD60 million for 2003/2004. An additional AUD6

million is being committed through the Community Peace and Rehabilitation Fund (CPRF) thus totaling CPRF funding by December 2004 to AUD21 million. AUD1 million has also been announced to support peace and national unity through the National Peace Council (NPC).

Box 2.2

"Things (the economy) were already picking up before RAMSI arrived. RAMSI however has made life easier. The environment is again conducive to work, businesses are re-opening, and government finances are coming back and are under control. The bleeding has stopped, but the patient is still very ill."¹

Extract from CBSI interview (13/11/03)

"Since RAMSI's arrival, there has been an increase in compliance with financial rules. A Revenue Enhancement and Generation Report was made last year, which forms the basis for greater control of government finances as well for the current follow up exercise on tax collection.

"Currently, the government account in the bank is in surplus. That should be enough for fortnightly pays for public servants. Salary payments are no longer in arrears.

"The Ministry of Finance reversed all payments. All payments for illegal claims have been stopped. Payments are only made for necessary expenditures based on immediate needs. Any payment prior to 1 October, 2003 yet to be paid will be treated as arrears and according to forecasts, will be settled by end of March 2004. Annual accounts auditing is being done.

"Extended RAMSI influence has ensured that businesses and companies are functioning well."

Extracts from Department of Finance interview (12/11/03)

Indirect impact

The impact of RAMSI's direct budget and personnel support on the Solomon Islands' economy is not immediately evident. Comments from finance and business communities reflect, in general, a slow but positive recovery in the economic sector as a result of the secure environment and improved law and order situation.

Positive recovery is being felt in provincial urban centres, but improvements in the maintenance and development of basic infrastructure is still needed, as evident in comments made by local businesspeople and farmers in Malaita in Box 2.3 below.

Positive and anticipated impacts on the general economic situation arising from RAMSI's presence include:

- The success of the donor harmonisation meeting in November 2003 to consider resource commitment for sector development in the NERRDP is a reflection of increased donor confidence that has seen increased ODA flowing in and reflected in the 2004 National Development Budget;

- The ADB project for rural roads in Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces is resuming after Australia cleared Solomon Islands Government debt arrears;
- A relatively large number of departmental accounts with small balances have been found and discrepancies are being investigated. Banks and departments had been called upon to provide information with a view to close illegal accounts and review legal accounts;
- Commitment to review status of state-owned enterprises with a view to convert them into more efficient and cost-effective private institutions;
- A favourable environment for economic growth and competition in the private sector and income generating activities in the rural areas. (Some comments from communities in Malaita and Guadalcanal about changes that RAMSI's has and could still bring about are in Box 2.3 and 2.4.);
- Government commitment to boost private sector development to provide more employment while the public service size will

- be reduced through a redundancy exercise in 2004 to reduce expenditure on payroll and commit more funds to service delivery;
- Anticipated increase in employment opportunities in the long term;
 - Investment enquiries are flowing in and a more stable exchange rate is anticipated;
 - Increasing level of confidence and optimism in business community. Lending institutions may eventually relax current strict lending policies;
 - Some sectors of the economy have resumed activities – for example, construction, traded goods and service sectors. According to CBSI: "...activities in trade and construction are coming to life after RAMSI arrived and trade and services will encourage lots of activities, services like hotels, restaurants will increase";
 - Major industries such as the palm plantation and gold mining are anticipated to reopen and further industries developed;
 - Infrastructure development under the 1998 EU Stabex fund has resumed, leading to a commitment to improve East and West Honiara roads;
 - Marine infrastructure development for 14 jetties has started. Work on Gizo jetty in the Western Province has begun;
 - The Shipping Act is being enforced and donors attracted to fund overall infrastructure development;
 - Stolen Department of Infrastructure Development vehicles have been retrieved.⁴¹

Box 2.3

"Business slowly picked after RAMSI's arrival, however the cash flow is still low. You see producers bringing in their products to the market and can't sell them. This is affecting their selling prices negatively and they are not making any profit. For example, a bag of fish and chips which cost \$5 is reduced to \$1. Local businessmen are buying from local farmers, but they themselves do not have much money.

"After three years of disuse, many copra dryers and cocoa facilities are in disrepair. This has made farming difficult for some and farmers need the government to subsidise new copra dryers.

"The condition of roads is basically the same. We hear that AusAID, through the CPRF, has upgraded the Auki to Malu'u Road and that they are about to work on the Atori Road. However, the road from Malu'u to Fouia is still in bad condition. We need maintained roads, roads to the mountain villages, to transport out goods to markets. If we do this, money will be flowing. People will be more willing to work in their gardens, they will have something to do and not stay idle and cause trouble.

"Shipping has improved – there are now direct trips from Honiara to Malu'u. Farmers can now transport their produce to Honiara. Because of the road repairs, they are also able to transport their copra and cocoa to Auki.

Excerpts from interviews with local farmer and provincial officer from Auki, Malaita province (19/11/03)

Box 2.4

"With RAMSI's arrival, there is freedom of movement. People are now able to attend to work and gardening without fear and for longer hours. They can now enter Honiara and sell their produce in the Honiara markets as well as visiting neighbouring communities. Parents can now resume income generating activities that will help them meet education expenses for their children.

"Improved road construction and maintenance to improve economic standard for rural areas and reduced unemployment rate. The current road to the community was redone under the UNDP project, however it needs regular maintenance.

"We expect rural communities will receive their fair share of government money and infrastructure, including shipping and air services, will be improved."

Excerpts from Malanqo Focus Group Discussion, Guadalcanal (November 2003)

⁴¹ Interview with Department of Infrastructure & Development, 18/11/03.

2.5 Conclusion

Solomon Islanders have high expectations of RAMSI and unrealistically expect it to address all the problems, including economic. The impact of RAMSI work on the entire economy is not immediately evident. At the micro-level recovery is visible and long-term positive economic impact is anticipated provided security is sustained and underlying causes of the crisis are addressed quickly. Economic recovery also hinges on reforming government, the sustainable harvesting of resources and Government/donor cooperation and development assistance.

2.5.1 Key issues for mitigation

Consultation

Questions about whether peace and economic recovery will be sustained are directly linked to RAMSI's term of presence in the country. Many spoke of not knowing what RAMSI's long-term plans are.

The NERRDP was developed to steer the nation through the period of public sector reform and post-conflict recovery. However, the majority of development projects in the Development Plan (derived from the NERRDP) and Budget have not been subject to prior feasibility studies and consultation with donors and this is a lesson to be learned for future planning and budgeting.

Counterparting

A repeating concern has been raised about the effectiveness of current counter-parting arrangement between RAMSI personnel and local DOF staff. Local staff members feel excluded and RAMSI personnel are not coaching/mentoring or transferring skills to national counterparts.

Employment and inequity in income

In urban centres youth and women dominate the unemployment statistics. Clearly if economic recovery is to be sustained, policies must be put in place to address this. Strategies creating economic livelihood for rural dwellers is equally important. Questions on whether the benefits of economic growth will be distributed equitably have also been raised. Improving distribution of income needs fundamental policy, institutional and structural changes.

Sustainability

The NERRDP does not adequately address the underlying causes of the ethnic conflict, for example, land ownership and access. For long-term economic growth resolving long standing and new land issues is imperative.

The current logging rate (forecast for 2003 is 800,000 cubic metres) is highly unsustainable and detrimental to the environment, and needs reduction to a more sustainable level of at most 500,000 cubic metres per year.

A major risk in terms of the 2004 recurrent budget is there may be too much budget supplementation provided too soon that could reduce pressure and incentive for reform.⁴² There is also the risk of the Government's ability to fill up the gap when RAMSI Budget Support is finally withdrawn. The government would in this case sustain its capacity, currently strengthened by RAMSI, to collect revenues.

The risk in the substantial ODA funding of the 2004 Development Budget is that there may be too much budget supplementation too soon so that the national capacity to efficiently and effectively utilise the budget support may be limited. In this regard, the need for expatriate technical assistance would be high and the donor assistance may be diverted from actual development of sectors. Moreover, there is a concern that development projects may be more donor-driven so that they become inappropriate for local situation therefore would not positively impact on people.

The risk of continuous dependency on handouts is also there and the sustainability of such huge assistance may be a disincentive to real reforms and poses uncertainty when RAMSI finally withdraws and donors reduce levels of ODA.

A concentration of RAMSI support to the public sector, who some feel is inefficient has raised concerns that not enough of its financial assistance is going into promoting private sector development.

⁴² SIG, DOF, 2004 Budget-Highlights, 2003.

2.5.2 Economic Social Impact Assessment indicators

Success in restoring a secure environment, law and order and economic recovery is crucial to revitalising the economy and enhance social development. The overall economic status and reforms will have a direct impact on development and the standard of living in Solomon Islands. These reforms will be monitored through the NERRDP review.

Longer term evidence of improvements in economic recovery will be reflected in key indicators. These include:

- Employment creation. NERRDP plans to create 500 jobs by 2004 and 1000 by 2005,

particularly in the copra, cocoa, mining, logging and fishing sectors;

- Minimal negative effects of public sector reform and retrenchment;
- Increase in per capita income and GDP;
- Extent of actual economic investment in small to medium enterprise and small business development assistance, in particular to smallholder production in the rural areas in provinces;
- Resolution of land issues with reduction in risk of conflict.

Additional indicators of the economic situation for the next monitoring phase are found in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3

Restoring essential services to the community

The crisis had a serious impact on the lives of most Solomon Islanders. The Solomon Islands Government had been unable to provide adequate security or basic services to the provinces, including those not affected by the crisis. Long-term inequitable distribution of resources and a concentration of development in urban areas had already been to the detriment of those living in rural areas.

Living standards are reported to have deteriorated, although the *wontok* system⁴³ minimised the impact on individuals by helping to retain social and cultural values, provided stability, social cohesion and eased tensions.

In spite of lack of relevant recent data to provide accurate evidence of reduced funding for essential social services, there is ample anecdotal information and a few recently produced government and other reports that provide verification of diminished access and quality of provision⁴⁴. Government has increasingly relied on communities and individuals to provide and pay for essential services, despite their lack of financial resources.

Access to education and health services has been badly effected and shortages of water and electricity severe. The current baseline situation, status and issues of access, funding and planning are explored in more detail below.

⁴³ Interviews in the provinces, particularly in Malaita, revealed ways which the family support systems accommodated and fed families displaced by the conflict - housing, expanding gardens to feed families etc.

⁴⁴The Census (1999) provides the main basis for assessment and analysis. Solomon Islands, Human Development Report 2002, SI Ministry of Education, 2002, Draft Solomon Islands Ministry of Education Annual Report 2002, Ministry of Health, and the UNDP Coordinated Country Assessment (2002). (Annex V)

3.1 Impact of the crisis on essential services

3.1.1 Education

As with other sectors the unrest exacerbated existing problems with the provision of education. Formal learning opportunities for children, youth and adults were severely curtailed. The provision of education in Honiara and the provinces were effected in the following ways:

- MOE headquarters administration and funding was affected; and Ministry staff found it very difficult to plan ahead and could not implement its Strategic Plan (2002-2004).
- Tuition and student allowances for many local and overseas students were not paid;
- Teachers did not attend class regularly and education officers were absent;
- Many schools were closed;
- Students were denied resources and education: and
- Low student attendance.

The Ministry of Education (MOE) reported that the social unrest, ethnic tension and government failure exacerbated problems that the government was already experiencing – the economic situation of the country was declining and the government's machinery was not functioning. Poor governance, corruption and lack of transparency prevailed. He reported that, *"after the Townsville Peace Agreement was signed donors, especially bilateral aid donors, could only provide emergency assistance and for only selected and limited sectors. Even after the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA), teachers were still intimidated because of the presence of guns by the militants. No salaries were paid for weeks and sometimes months at a time and grants to schools were not paid. Teachers left the classroom in search of their salaries."*⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Interview with Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development.

Internally displaced persons place pressure on Malaita Schools

During the ethnic tension, many students flooded into Malaita from Guadalcanal and the Western Province. The displaced include many teachers who

Box 3.1

Internally displaced persons place pressure on Malaita Schools

"The Malaita schools were overcrowded. It was a case of 40 – 45 children to one teacher. The quality of education was affected. Some rural schools were particularly badly affected. The Malaita province made an attempt to combine schools to further resources, especially teachers. Teachers went on strike and others did not go to work because the Education Authority did not pay their wages. No one could reprimand anyone. The Education Division of the Province could not do much either because the staff in there too were facing problems of no salaries. It was a very difficult and chaotic situation. Children did not have classes and were very badly affected by this situation.

"Resources were insufficient. Text books have always been a problem within the schools. Due to poor storage, the remaining text books deteriorated further, books were also stolen. School facilities remained with no improvements and thus experienced further wear and tear. School fees were expected to be paid. Some schools heard that Parliament was going easy on school fees so they relaxed the payment of school fees as well. Schools were less able to rely on fees to assist in keeping the schools functioning."

Extracts from interviews with Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (November, 2003)

Access to basic education

Access to basic education is an aim of the SI Government. The current enrolment rates are low at 66% of all eligible students. Insufficient allocation of resources caused many students to be 'pushed out' of the system very early. Forty percent of students are 'pushed out' at Standard 6 level. Only 4% (349 of approx 8400) students survive to Form 6.

Box 3.2

Thirty-five new Solomon Islanders are entering the world each day – the equivalent of one full classroom. 33,650 children between the ages of 6-15 are not enrolled in school.

Source: Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002

Enrolment had been on the increase prior to the instability. As a result of the crisis, the Ministry reported enrolments in 1999 and 2000 were reportedly substantially lower than in 1998 due to the closure of schools in Guadalcanal⁴⁶. The ministry reported that schools in Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal experienced the most disruption. This had major implications for a large number of

were given teaching positions in Malaita. Most of the schools, especially on Guadalcanal and Malaita, were closed. Teachers were intimidated, teachers' salaries were unpaid so teachers failed to attend to classes, and children missed school.

students given that 53% of all students are from these areas - Malaita (28%), Guadalcanal (16.5%) and Honiara (8%).

Education is neither free nor compulsory. Parents have to pay school fees to supplement the costs of their children's education. The attrition rate for girls is higher than for boys.⁴⁷ In 2002, girls had an enrolment rate of 47% in primary school and 43% in secondary school. There were 8952 (7.5%) more boys than girls accessing education. At primary level there are 5962 more boys than girls and at secondary level 3090 more boys were enrolled.⁴⁸

There is anecdotal evidence that girls may have been more affected than boys as a result of the unrest and disruption in schooling. Girls are relied upon more than boys to support families and this situation is known to impact on girls' education more than boys. Shortage of family income also results in priority to boys' education over girls'. There was also an expressed concern for the safety of girls, due to the perceived increase in rape and violations against girls and women during the crisis, which may have restricted opportunities to attend school.

⁴⁶ Solomon Islands Government, *Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002, Building a Nation*, Chapter 6, SIG, 2002. The early 90's showed an increase of 7% enrolment and in the mid 90's about 4%, with a decline in enrolment in 1998.

⁴⁷ Solomon Islands Government, *Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002, Building a Nation*, SIG, 2002. MDG Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education: Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

⁴⁸ SIG MOE Annual Report 2002

Table 3.1 2001-2002 Enrolment for primary and secondary schools, by sex

Level	Boys		Girls		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	Total enrolment	Mo : boys tha : girls	
Prep	8,277	51.5	7,773	48.5	16,050	13.0	504
Primary	43,844	53.0	38,486	47.0	82,330	69.0	5358
Secondary	12,395	57.0	9,305	43.0	21,700	18.0	3090
Total	64,516	54.0	55,564	46.0	120,080	100.00	8952

Source: Ministry of Education, School Returns Statistics (IPU, MET) 2001-2002

Academic performance was affected by the crisis and there were irregularities in scholarship awards. Fewer students are reported to have sat exams due to the lack of adequate teacher support to prepare. In addition, most primary and secondary schools either did not pay to sit exams or did not complete payment.

The *MOE Annual Report 2002* noted that government-funded students faced problems with allowances, tuition and accommodation. This situation is likely to have affected the performance of the students. For example, there were 233 scholarships allocated in 2002, out of which 33 were terminated on academic grounds and 9 suspended for poor academic performance⁴⁹.

Tertiary education is also provided by overseas institutions, and supplemented by overseas scholarships. USP statistics show that there was a reduction in approx 100 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) in students on scholarship attending in 2000 than in 1999 as a result of traditional donors (AusAID and NZAID) ceasing new scholarship funding. The Government could not fund new scholarships due to the financial crisis. EU funding under the EU Stabex funds were used to continue financing scholarships in tertiary institutions including USP.

Payroll discrepancies

The *2002 MOE Annual Report* shows SBD56 million was budgeted and SBD55.5 million expended. However an analysis by the MOE shows the payroll was over-budget by SBD16 million in headquarters,

curriculum, library and teaching service, with a corresponding SBD16 million under expenditure in the other related costs, indicating redirection of budgeted resources to compensate for overspending the payroll.⁵⁰

The Ministry of Education cannot accurately state the number of teachers employed⁵¹. The allocation of teachers is managed at the provincial level. There are discrepancies in the payroll system. In 2001 there were 2920 primary teachers payroll listed with evidence of 2665 being paid,⁵² and at secondary level there were 1104 teachers on the payroll, with 986 receiving salary payments.

Delays in paying salaries resulted in teachers taking time from school to wait for their salary or following up on non-payment. Teacher moral was low and their absence from class may have contributed to poor student attendance. Frustrated teachers went on strike in March 2003⁵³.

Insufficient Government funding

There is clear evidence that while some donors continued to fund the education sector, the SI Government budget commitments over recent years were not met.

⁴⁹ Ibid. The total 407 students include those studying internationally and for a number of years in overseas and PI country tertiary institutes. It is not clear in the report that who met the costs of the contributions and if it includes other government ministries e.g. midwives training in PNG and at SICHE etc.

⁵⁰ Ibid. All figures are rounded to closest million - correct figures.

⁵¹ Despite MOE efforts on 200-2001 to estimate the number of teachers employed

⁵² The MOE 2002 Report does not provide information the intermittent payments and non-attendance of teachers during the crisis.

⁵³ MOE Annual Report 2002.

Table 3.2 SI Government Education Budget 1998-2004

Year	Estimated budget	Actual
1998	51,728,420	65,318,647
1999	63,999,755	77,659,215
2000	81,096,806	70,014,942
2001	90,050,804	66,981,963
2002	56,000,000	55,607,248
2003	56,499,526	-
2004	89,310,000	-

Source: Budget Estimates 1998-2002, Treasury, Ministry of Finance; MOE Annual Report 2000;2003 and 2004 from Solomon Islands Government Year 2004, Recurrent Estimates (First Draft)

The development budget was hardly expended through the Government systems. Support for the financing of education was only made through the support from various aid donors through special funding arrangements in 2002. Seventeen projects were funded in the Education Development budget of SBD77.54 million by special arrangement. The only development project to be funded by the Solomon Islands Government was SBD10 million for the SI Training and Education Awards Scheme Project. Due the national economic crisis, only SBD62, 298 was used.

Most donors held back their funding due to the lack of good governance and the inability of the Government to service its loans. The World Bank and ADB suspended their assistance in 2001 due to non-repayments and the uncertain Solomon Islands environment. As mentioned above, AusAID and NZAID stopped funding new external, tertiary

scholarships and high school funding assistance was suspended. Schools stopped getting government grants.

The Solomon Island College of Higher Education (SICHE) was closed due to the lack of funding. Earmarked resources were diverted to militants. The EU froze its funding for the nursing, education (secondary education) and the marine school of the SICHE. Rural Training Schools run and funded by churches, received no funding from Government between 1999 and 2003. There is high demand for education and learning opportunities at the community high schools which was unable to be met.

The University of the South Pacific (USP) and its students suffered due to the non-payment of government contributions to the university. In December 2003, the USP Council noted that there was an increase in the number of students attending USP since 2001. These include both FTE students on scholarships and private students studying mostly at the USP Centre in Honiara and a few at centres around the region - refer Table 3.3 for details. The increase in numbers reflects the resumption of scholarship funding by AusAID and one-off funding by the Republic of China (Taiwan) coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office. Demand for tertiary education exceeds the availability of scholarships. There is a slight increase in the number and percentage of women from 27.5% in 2000 to 31% in 2002-2003, however there is a consistently higher proportion of male students both accessing scholarships and attending education than girls.

Table 3.3 Internal and external USP Solomon Islands student numbers by sex

Year	Male	Female	Total	% Female
2000	570	218	788	27.5
2001	691	273	964	28
2002	752	341	1093	31
2003	892	396	1288	30.5

Source: University of the South Pacific

3.1.2 Health

Health services

Political and socio-economic factors of the instability and harassment placed significant pressure on the health system. The ongoing crisis saw the most devastating impact on health services provision. These external factors accentuated an already structurally weak health system. Limited funding for the delivery of health services directly and seriously impacted on staffing and medical supplies, maintenance and development of the health services.

Provincial health grants budgeted, "were not paid on time or at all".⁵⁴ In 2002 provincial grants were sometimes several months late and this situation affected staff morale. Staff were laid off, resulting in closure of some clinics and nurse aide posts.

The Ministry of Health relied on the AusAID Trust Fund to help it maintain basic health care services to the people. With Government revenue falling by half in 2000 compared to 1998, the health service delivery of the whole country was threatened. The percentage of total government expenditure on health dropped from 1998 to 1999 by 2% (Refer Annex VI.) The health budget in 2000 was 16% (SBD61.5 million) of the Government recorded budget.⁵⁵

The crisis affected the procurement and distribution of medical and drug supplies.⁵⁶ Continued procurement of medical and drug supplies is essential. Debts owed to buying agents in Australia and New Zealand was unpaid and disrupted purchases. The governments of New Zealand and Australia, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the International Red Cross provided funds to assist the Government. In 2001 alone the estimated debt for new drugs was SBD12 million.

While minimal basic supplies were maintained, the *MOH Annual Report* that there was a high number of diagnostic and drug requests which pointed to the need for doctors to be stricter due to budget

limitations. Maintaining the cold chain and storage capacity is essential to drug life and essential to the maintenance of the immunisation programme. This programme, was affected which in turn risked child health status.

Human Resource Development

The health reforms of 1999-2003 were designed in the context of the Solomon Islands Public Service Policy and SIG Structural Reform Programme (PSRP). The plan was to strengthen the health institutions. The reforms were unable to be implemented due to the pressures of 2000 and the difficult situation which followed. There was concern that the reforms were premised on over staffing.

Staff morale suffered severely during the unrest, due to intimidation, threat and other failures of the government system. There was a stated need to boost the staff morale, acknowledge staff input in development of the reforms and improve in salaries. In spite of the losses during the crisis the dedication of staff under difficult circumstances was reported. Salaries were low and this was "derisory" for staff, making corruption a high risk. Staff discipline and work had deteriorated.

Senior staff at the National Referral Hospital reported staff management was difficult as decisions were compromised between professional ethics and staff safety. External threats to staff and patients meant that safety could not be guaranteed, and support to the provinces was inevitably curtailed. Staff left and others were torn between family safety and work duty..

Health status

The direct impact of the crisis on the health status of the Solomon Islands people will take time to be revealed. Changes in access to health services provision can be quantified, but it is more difficult in the short term to assess the extent of the epidemiological disease patterns and the changes to health status that have taken place. Case reporting has not been well maintained. There is a reported need to assess the accurate status of morbidity and mortality as soon as possible so as to ascertain the impacts.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ SIG, MOH, National Health Report, 2000, Review of Work of Ministry of Health Solomon Islands 2000.

⁵⁵ SIG, Annual Recurrent Budget Estimates 2001. The 2000 Health Budget per capita was SBD135.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Health, National Annual Health Report 2000, Review of Work of Ministry of Health, Solomon Islands, 2002.

⁵⁷ Interview with Ministry of Health and Reproductive and Child Health Services

There is evidence that both curative and the community based health protection and prevention programmes were directly compromised. The following examples illustrate the risk to the health status:

- Malaria control programmes on Guadalcanal were badly affected. Malaria is again on the rise as the very successful anti malaria programme was interrupted;
- The second phase of tuberculosis (TB) treatment for patients was delayed. This situation may result in an increase in prevalence and incidence of TB.
- Diabetes is a fast growing disease in Solomon Islands. There is a rise in diabetes-related complications such as eye problems and amputations at the hospital. Complications may have occurred as a result of delayed access to care.⁵⁸

Maternal and child health (MDGs 4 & 5)

There is evidence that maternal and child health services and status were negatively affected. Analysis of the National Health reports and discussions with senior medical staff at the National Referral Hospital and Malu'u Area Health Centre⁵⁹ reveal that the two provinces mostly affected by the crisis were Malaita and Guadalcanal:

- In Guadalcanal there was a decline in antenatal care, family planning and immunisation coverage and maternal mortality rose;
- In Malu'u, Malaita the touring outreach Maternal Child Health Service programme to five rural health clinics stopped over a year ago and financial support for Kilu'ufi Hospital suddenly stopped. Follow-up immunisations for children were not received.

Discussions with the NRH noted that prior to RAMSI, women were giving birth at home with no antenatal and very little postnatal care as nurses was stretched from day to day. There are verifiable stories of women giving birth in the bushes as a

result of fleeing violence during the crisis. Two-thirds of neonatal mortality was reportedly due to trauma. Logistical difficulties, such as the lack of efficient transportation to rush women to emergency obstetric care resulted in an increase in pregnancy complications. The drug used to reduce the risk of haemorrhage post delivery was not readily available, creating higher risk for postnatal women. The midwifery training programme was interrupted. Reinstatement of the programme is a high priority for the provinces. Improvement in maternal care is vital to reduce IMR and MMR (MDG 4 and 5). The gynaecology ward at the National Referral Hospital is yet to be serviced by a unit to provide adequate and specialised antenatal and postnatal facilities. The *MOH 2001-2002 Annual Health Report* noted cervical cancer is on the rise and a "deadly killer of women". Most women are "discharged to die at home" due to lack of services to treat them.

The maternal mortality rate (MMR) in 1997 was 209/100,000, while the infant mortality rate (IMR) in 1999 was high at 66/1,000 live births (higher than the WHO average of 50/1,000). The 2003 IMR/MMR is not accurately known. The major cause of IMR is complications at childbirth⁶⁰. The coverage for maternal and child health services in the areas most affected by the instability as compared to national coverage are as follows:

⁵⁸ The National Referral Hospital shows evidence of 3396 patient visits to the Diabetic Centre with an increasing number of referrals. If there is improvement in health service delivery, diabetes awareness programmes and patient management, the demand on admissions and surgery as a result of complications may show a reduction.

⁵⁹ Malu'u Area Health Centre Report, 1 January - 30 June 2002.

⁶⁰ SIG, *Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002, Building a Nation*, Volume One, Main Report, SIG, 2002. The coverage of health services is provided in more detail in Annex VI.

Table 3.4 Coverage of Maternal, Child Health Services (SI, Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal)

Service	Honiara	Malaita	Guadalcanal	SI average coverage
Antenatal	78%	71%	66%	63%
Postnatal	61%	36%	29%	35%
Family planning	8%	10%	7%	8%
Immunisation	74%	62%	67%	67%

Source: Solomon Island Human Development Report (2002)

Communicable diseases (MDG 6)

Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) continue to be an important health issue and problematic. STIs are reported in the Health Information System (HIS 2001-2002) which contains clinical data, but not the incidence from private health clinic or the referral hospital. Given the reported increase in sexual activity by a large youth population (about 50% of entire population), there is a concerning increasing risk of contracting an STI. There was one case of HIV/AIDS reported in 1994. Blood donors have revealed no new cases. It is recognised that improved surveillance is required to accurately assess the prevalence and incidence of STIs and HIV/AIDS.

There was a remarkable improvement in tuberculosis reduction from 117/100,000 in 1990 to 65 in 2000, as a direct consequence of a sustained and widespread TB BCG vaccination programme. Severe forms of childhood TB are also diminishing. Five new cases were reported in 1997 and five in 1998. However, the vaccination programme was interrupted during the crisis, risking a rise in TB.

Malaria remains a significant health problem in Solomon Islands. An intensive anti-malaria programme was in place. The prevalence rate of malaria 1992 to 1999 dropped 455 to 155 per 100,000. However, a break in the malaria prevention programme brought on by the crisis has led to an increase in incidence of the disease. One of the reasons cited was the interruption of the mosquito net distribution programme. This increase is now a priority area for health prevention programmes (refer MOH 2002 Report). The effect of

the increase in malaria is reported to be the third highest cause of death of pregnant women.⁶¹

3.1.3 Water and electricity supply

On average 69% of the population is reported to have access to "safe water" (Honiara 95%, Malaita 60%, Guadalcanal 42%).⁶² Ideally, the Solomon Island Water Association (SIWA) should produce water count flow at 50 litres per second (100 litres per second from the source). However, because of leakages, currently only 3 litres per second is usually provided. Residences on hilly sites rarely get water during the day when water usage is high.

Water supply in Honiara has never been adequate for the ever increasing population. The more people settled in Government Temporary Occupation Land, the higher the demand for water and the SIWA has never coped with this demand. A second reason is inadequate water sources. Plans to expand water sources were restricted by failed negotiations with landowners and a lack of funds to build a planned dam. Poorly maintained infrastructure – broken water pipes and leaks causing deflated water pressure have affected disruption. Disparities exist between urban and rural water supply.

Overall, national electricity coverage is low at 16%, while Honiara has 73% coverage. The electricity supply relies on water and diesel. During the conflict period, water source disputes with landowners over rental payments resulted in poor electricity supply. IFM militants threatened to poison the Honiara water source but only succeeded in sabotaging

⁶¹ Interview with the senior staff of the National Referral Hospital., Honiara Current HIV/AIDS rate is yet to be reported, but it is estimated to be higher than currently reported.

⁶² Water and sanitation are essential health protections measures and play a major role in reducing ill health, particular for children.

distribution and disrupted supplies.⁶³ For Honiara, constant power cuts were a way of life because the Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (SIEA) resorted to load shedding.⁶⁴ Power and water was supplied alternately – half of the town would get water in the morning and the other half in the afternoon. Honiara residents were sometimes without electricity for a whole day.

Women suffered most from the lack of water and electricity, as they continued to negotiate providing support to their families while undertaking daily chores. The health of families was risked.

Box 3.3

"In Honiara, electricity and water did not come. This caused problems for women. Some women cook with electricity so when there is none it is hard to find firewood due to scarcity and being too scared to go and find any.

"We had no money to pay for water and electricity bills. We couldn't afford spare parts to make repairs. Washing became a burden, especially for women with babies. Cooking and bathing was also hard. People had to use small streams for bathing and cooking water, but the streams were not clean because people used the surrounding areas as toilets because there was no water to flush their toilets. This was a major health hazard. Children had diarrhoea and sore tummies."

Excerpts from women's focus group discussion (November, 2003).

Box 3.4

"In Malu'u, water became a problem. The number of people increased and demands for water could not be met. The influx of people also made sanitation a problem and people became careless, using the river as a toilet. The water source became unreliable. There was a diarrhoea and malaria outbreak (confirmed by the nurse at the Malu'u Area Health Centre). The Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) School ran awareness talks in villages on water and sanitation."

Excerpts from Malu'u community focus group discussion (November, 2003)

⁶³Interview with Solomon Islands Water Authority (SIWA), November 2003.

⁶⁴Rationing of electricity by providing electricity to one part of town while the other part of town's supply is disconnected and vice versa - interview with SIEA, November 2003.

3.2 RAMSI's role in recovery of essential services

Education

Guadalcanal Provincial Government officials reported that "education and health services are improving in the Guadalcanal province with children being able to return to school."⁶⁵ Those schools that closed during the crisis are reopening, with materials getting through.

The true extent of the effect of the conflict on education status (see Annex VI) and changes attributed to RAMSI are difficult to assess. While enrolment records are available for 2002, attendance records are not. However studies and surveys are currently being undertaken which will provide the status of schools, the current number of teachers (trained and untrained) and students and will be able to provide information on the number of schools open and functioning since the start of the intervention. It is assumed that students will gain re-entry to repeat failed or missed exams to compensate for lost education opportunities.

Although RAMSI has little direct input in the Ministry of Education, its presence has facilitated an environment where policy makers have gained confidence to move ahead and reassess their education plans. There is now a positive outlook for all stakeholders, including development partners, to move forward and reinstate the education services to pre-conflict status and create a base from which to improve the system and educational provision. Donor confidence has improved.

Box 3.5

"There was an expression from ministry staff of an overwhelming feeling of relief. At last a neutral party was willing to control the situation in the country. The neutral status of RAMSI was a big welcome to the nation. A feeling of safety, relief and security was evident among the people.

"It took the ministry one month to realise that RAMSI meant business, so it started to get things going by first looking to the future. The ministry was immediately able to plan for a rehabilitation phase and started to conduct a series of conferences such as one titled *Re-thinking education in Solomon Islands*."

Excerpt from an interview with the Ministry of Education (November 2003)

⁶⁵ Guadalcanal Provincial Government, interview with officials, November 2003

The Education Strategic Plan for 2004-2006

RAMSI created an opportunity for a review of the 2002-2004 Education Strategic Plan, which had not been implemented, and for the drafting of a new, rescheduled Strategic Plan for 2004 – 2006 in line with new funding provisions. It was approved in November 2003. The *Draft Annual Report for 2002* was completed in December 2003. Both these documents provide a baseline for analysis on the effects of the crisis on the provision of education and a basis upon which some comparison for improvements can be made.

The approved plan provides the philosophical framework and a brief overview on the administrative reforms intended to provide universal access to nine years of basic education for all children by the year 2015, inline with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The preamble to the Strategic Plan states "the education system is seen by many as unconnected and antagonistic to the social and cultural values upon which the Solomon Islands society and culture are based".⁶⁶ Discussions with the Ministry of Education noted that "the education system is partly to be blamed for the conflict. People need to be educated and be aware of choosing good leaders. There needs to be awareness on voting and values of education to instill virtues into children".⁶⁷

The new plan now includes a number of specific objectives which this SIA will monitor to indicate improvements and changes as a result of the recovery of the education system and as an indirect outcome of the RAMSI intervention:

- Status of enrolment and attendance. Commitment is to close the gender gap by 2006 and eliminate gender disparity by 2015. Gender equality as a priority for achievement and funding under the NERRDP (MDG 2, 3);⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Solomon Islands Government, Ministry of Education, Education Strategic Plan 2004-2006, November 2003.

⁶⁷ Interview with MOE, idea supported by officials of Guadalcanal Province.

⁶⁸ National Economic Recovery and Development Plan 2003-2006. This emphasis is as a result of a recent review of the gender gap by government. The SI Government has committed to gender equality through is stated support for Education for All Goals (UNESCO), the PI Forum Regional Basic Education Action Plan (2001) and the Millennium Development Goals, and in 2002 ratified the UN Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against all Women.

- Development of 'Values Education' curriculum with the National Peace Council and the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA);
- Curriculum development to educate students to gain skills to contribute to sustainable economic and social development;
- Emphasis on increasing literacy levels and the minimisation of literacy gaps by encouraging use of the vernacular by teachers. Many teachers are untrained (19% in primary schools).⁶⁹ (MDG 2);
- Funding to facilitate more active engagement of the community to facilitate their 'ownership' of the education programme. This has potential to open up opportunities to improve adult literacy and learning and non-formal education, for women in particular, whose literacy levels lag behind men's (MDG 3);
- Cleansing the payroll and to ensure that teachers have a more efficient system for salary payments to limit the time they leave the class to collect their salaries.

The Solomon Islands College of Higher Education (SICHE) has reopened; students are getting scholarships and getting paid their allowances. The coordination of scholarship awards by the Prime Minister's Office is an irregularity as only the Department of Education (DOE) is the designated authority for education linked with tertiary institutions. Plans to strengthen these linkages on scholarship provisions have occurred. An officer position will be established by July 2004 to support tertiary education development and will address such irregularities.⁷⁰

The MOE plans to increase learning opportunities for youth and adults through community high schools. If stability remains, new learning opportunities will also be created through the development of three youth centres to be set up in 2004 for employment skills and training, in particular for disaffected (MDG Goal 8).

Increased donor confidence

While Solomon Island Government money has now been allocated in the Budget (SBD150 million over

⁶⁹ Refer Annex VI.

⁷⁰ Interviews with , senior officials in Ministry of Education, November 2003.

three years), the provision of basic education is still heavily reliant on donor commitment and funding.

The ministry expressed confidence in receiving budgetary support and at the time of interview reported donor funds have been committed for:

- The Ministry's implementation of its Strategic Plan (funds received from the European Union);
- Repairs to existing schools and the setting up new secondary schools (NZ);
- Fees and allowances for overseas students (Australia, NZ and Taiwan ROC).

New Zealand and Australia are re-starting their training awards for tertiary education and are now prepared to take on new students.

Health

The focus for the health sector is now on rebuilding capacity and confidence of staff, including emotional and psychological trauma counselling. Finance for counseling is required alongside the re-establishment of outreach health services in the provinces. Rebuilding the health facilities in the provinces, particularly the renovation of the health infrastructure in Honiara, is a high priority. There are a high number of vacancies for medical and nursing staff in centres, clinics and hospitals to be filled.

As population movements increase, so too does the demand on health services, accommodation and health facilities. Two provincial hospitals, Gizo and Kilu'ufi, are being upgraded. RAMSI, with support from the Community Peace and Rehabilitation Fund, contributed to this upgrade. In the short term, RAMSI also contributed personnel to the National Referral Hospital, transportation of drugs to provinces and assistance with emergency cases. The newly-built, RAMSI-controlled Red Beach hospital, with excellent facilities, is primarily for RAMSI personnel and to address emergency traumas.⁷¹

In the first instance it may appear that infant and maternal mortality and gynaecology statistics may have no relevance to RAMSI, however, service provision was compromised because of the unrest and it is a vital to see evidence of improvements in

⁷¹ Interview with MOH, November 2003.

IMR and MMR as a result of budget support in the future. For example, given the need to reduce maternal and infant mortality rates the resumption of the Midwifery training, there is plan to address the need for 15-20 maternity graduates annually. Currently there are nine in training. Seven graduates this year will be posted to provinces. The midwifery programmes were funded by a World Bank loan, with arrears payments recently met by Australia. The midwifery programme has been resumed with World Bank funds.

The recovery has allowed the reproductive health services to improve. The Planned Parenthood Association, the Adolescent Health Programme of the Ministry of Health and Save the Children Australia have set up an informal network that assists young people with reproductive health, family planning and distributes condoms.

The surveillance of STIs and HIV/AIDS needs to improve to permit the monitoring of changes in status since the end of the crisis. However, it should be noted, the health status of RAMSI personnel would not show up on national records as they are catered for by their own health service.

Water and electricity supply

Donors are supporting water infrastructure development.⁷² RAMSI Budget support will procure required chemicals for public water treatment and stabilise electricity supplies in Honiara. This has enabled the SIWA to now work on identifying needed repair work and improve water supply in some residential areas in Honiara.

The EU project to build a Honiara water pipeline from the Kobito source to improve water distribution to Naha and Vura, which was delayed by the tension, is continuing. In the absence of water treatment plants to ensure the supply of quality water, chlorine use is based on a WHO standard of quality. In October 2003 there was still rationing and intermittent supply throughout the day and night. By December people reported it had improved. The SIWA is currently in discussion with the Department

⁷² EU is putting in SBD15 million for water infrastructure development; RAMSI AUD43,000 to procure required chemicals for public water treatment in Honiara; AUD1million from Australia and NZ to stabilise electricity supplies in Honiara and; Australia may contribute a further AUD3 million.

of Energy to identify and negotiate with landowners for access to new water sources. While the SIWA is also responsible for water supply in urban areas in the provinces, some provinces took up the responsibility themselves.

Since the presence of RAMSI, it has been frequently observed and reported that the “water supply and electricity has improved a bit in Honiara”. With the assistance of RAMSI to the SIEA, there has been a consistent supply of electricity.

3.3 Conclusion

The restoration of government functions and coordination of development funding aims to meet the expressed need for improved health and education services and utilities. A concerted effort and a stable political and economic base will be required to if the Solomon Islands are to make up for lost educational and development opportunities for young people, and the resultant lost income opportunities for families. RAMSI Budget support, government and donor harmonisation and community development planning will contribute to this. However there are some specific issues which require mitigation to ensure essential services are sustained and maintained.

3.3.1 Key issues for mitigation

Education

While donor confidence has increased, staff at the Ministry of Education reported concern about donor coordination. They noted their need for donor assistance, in both money and technical assistance, according to Solomon Islands Government needs and priorities. The ministry is also mindful of its capacity and does not want to move too fast as all donor money is additional to the New Zealand SBD60 million budgetary supports for 2003/2004 and SBD150 million for a three-year period.

The planned restoration of education services is vital to increase quality provision and requires emphasis on the development of a relevant curriculum, with sufficient trained teachers. The establishment and development of the planned youth centres is considered to be essential in

helping “disaffected youth at risk” seek opportunities to contribute successfully, through recreation, employment and income generating opportunities, to the social and economic development of their country.

Health

Staff morale in the health service has been low and the trauma they have experienced has been identified as a priority to be addressed. Adequate government budget support must be forthcoming. The Ministry of Health emphasised the importance of filling vacancies with skilled personnel. While they acknowledged as necessary the need to rely on external skilled personnel, concerns were expressed that expatriate staff would need to show regard for local knowledge, as well as utilise and recognise local expertise.

Water and electricity

It necessary to resolve land issues to guarantee water and electricity supply and permit maintenance of infrastructure for water and electricity distribution.

3.3.2 Social service Social Impact Assessment indicators

Key indicators have been identified to gauge the extent of the restoration of essential services, including the population’s status in education and health and the degree of improved provision by water and electricity utilities. The indicators are compatible with the MDGs and the NERRDP 2003-2006.

In the education sector the indicators will focus on:

- Access to basic education determined by enrolment and attendance of girls and boys at primary and secondary schools;
- The extent to which schools are reopened and remained open;
- MOE plans to increase learning opportunities for youth and adults through community high schools and the establishment of the three youth centres (Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal);
- Provision of training of teachers (trained and untrained) and curriculum development on ‘virtues’ education with the National Peace Council;
- Funding issues related to the cleansing of the payroll, scholarships and the actual expenditure

for implementation of the Strategic Plan 2004-2006 through government budgets and ODA partnerships;

- An increase in students sitting exams and attaining qualifications to regain lost opportunity.

In the health sector the key indicators will include the:

- Restoration of key community health programmes (malaria reduction, immunisation and drug availability for TB patients);
- Provision of reproductive health services and family planning coverage, particularly access for youth, and the incidence of STIs and the revised surveillance of HIV/AIDS (by sex and age);
- Status of maternal and child health, which includes provision of antenatal, postnatal and midwifery services in Malaita (Malu'u), Guadalcanal and Honiara;
- Restoration and improvement of the MOH and National Referral Hospital services – for example, staffing replacement and trauma counseling, restoration of outreach services to the provinces, midwife allocations and cold chain and drug supplies.

The key indicators for the water and electricity sectors include the:

- Extent of improvement in the hours water and electricity is supplied to Honiara;
- Resolution of land issues and payments to landowners by utility and resource managers to guarantee uninterrupted provision;
- Actual financial allocation and expenditure on the development of water and electricity by government and development partners.

Chapter 4

Impacts on population groups and civil society

4.1 Impact of the crisis on population groups

A high annual population growth rate has put pressure on limited resources. According to the 1999 Census, 50% of the population is under the age of 25. (See Annex V.) Government has not been able to cater for the development needs of this young population, such as creating education and livelihood opportunities. Without these opportunities young men in particular are more prone to militancy.

There is evidence that the unrest and instability resulted in hard times for many, and short-term poverty and hardship for some⁷³. The loss of employment in key industries, disruption in income generation activities, displaced and disrupted lives and harsh living conditions has occurred as a direct result of the economic downturn.

In the context of the crisis, the traditional family structures ensured that most basic needs were met, which is evidence of community cohesion. Rural citizens are not destitute, but remain supported and guided by their traditional communities and the churches.⁷⁴ The safety mechanism for the majority of rural people in the provinces is that they rely mostly on land and natural resources for their livelihoods.

There is insufficient data available to accurately assess the current prevalence and extent of causes resulting in poverty, hardship and inequity. However, the *Household Income and Expenditure Survey* (HIES) shows that in the mid 1990s, the urban-rural income per capita disparity was \$358 in the urban areas and \$55 in rural areas – with 93% of families in the low income group. It shows significant inequalities exist between urban areas and rural areas.

The *Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002* shows that Honiara has the lowest Human Poverty Index (HPI) and Malaita the highest among the provinces. This index reveals that Malaita,

Temotu and Guadalcanal have the highest level of human deprivation⁷⁵.

The Solomon Islands Government has committed to conduct a HIES in 2004, which will provide information to assess poverty status, reveal impacts of the crisis and facilitate planning for more effective human development outcomes.

The economic and social information available suggests there is a risk of more people experiencing poverty if there is inadequate economic recovery in both the private and public sectors. New vulnerable groups are emerging, for example, those displaced by the ethnic conflict, and youth and women seeking education, employment and income generating opportunities. The loss of income and employment both within the public service and private sector exacerbated problems for those who rely on consumers to buy from the semi-subsistence productive sector. There was a loss of income earning capacity to those in the non-formal sector.

The personal trauma experienced by many is extreme and many people expressed the need for increased support and services to reduce the effects of trauma. The effects on men, women and children differ.⁷⁶ Both men and women were subjected to increasing levels of violence, however most of the abuse is perpetrated by men and women are known to be at a higher risk of sexual violence in conditions of conflict. Children were subjected to increased fear due to the presence of guns and exposure to unacceptable levels of violence in their formative years. Women in particular maintained their traditional role as primary carers, placing considerable effort holding families together and played a crucial role in reducing violence and brokering peace.

⁷³ SIA Poll 100 days of RAMSI (October 2003)

⁷⁴ SIG, NERRDP 2003-2006

⁷⁵ Human Poverty Index (HPI) is based on the 1999 Census. HPI measures deprivation in basic in basic human development - measures those who die before the age of 40, the % of adults who are illiterate, the overall economic provisioning - % of people without access to health services, safe water and percentage of underweight children under 5. MDG Goal 1: Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger.

⁷⁶ SIG, *Human Development Report 2002, Building a Nation*, SIG, 2002.

4.1.1 Internally displaced persons

A steady influx of migrants from all over the country, into and around Honiara, since 1945, had become a source of anxiety for the people of Guadalcanal. Of particular concern was the large numbers from neighbouring Malaita province who, in "over two generations came to dominate both Guadalcanal's agricultural economy and a large proportion of jobs in Honiara itself, including the public service".⁷⁷

The *Solomon Islands Human Development Report (2002)* reports the displacement of people has been caused both by natural disaster and the recent social unrest. Over the past 20 years thousands of people have been displaced within the Solomon Islands. This includes those from the 1972 earthquake in Weathercoast, the Bougainvillians who sought refuge in Western Province during their civil war. The more recent instability resulted in a high influx of people, reportedly 35,309 (Census 1999) were displaced from Guadalcanal and Honiara. Over 20,000 from Malaita and 12,805 people from Guadalcanal were displaced.⁷⁸

During the height of the crisis, many families reported that they were unexpectedly required to accommodate, feed and support extra families due to the influx of relatives back to Malaita from Guadalcanal. This placed increased stress on many people. One family reportedly had to accommodate four displaced families from Guadalcanal. Many families had gardens planted to meet their own family food needs, but not those of who required shelter. There was a reported shortage of food for six to seven months before the displaced families' new gardens were ready for harvesting.

In Malu'u, Malaita, environmental problems were created as a result of forests being over felled for houses. Gardening land became scarce.

⁷⁷ Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003, *Our Failing Neighbor, Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands*, ASPI, 2003, p 21.

⁷⁸ SIG, *Human Development Report 2002, Building a Nation*, SIG, 2002.

Box 4.1

Malu'u Health Centre's experience of displaced persons

"The 1999 evacuation of people from Guadalcanal to Malaita was huge. There was an outbreak of malaria, flu and diarrhoea. The centre was full. In a month there were about 100 to 200 admissions but only 38 beds. They were always full and people had to sleep on the floor in the corridor.

"The centre has no doctor and no senior-nursing officer, and no nursing officer or assistant nursing officer to take care of the administration. In 2000 the ethnic tension happened and militants threatened to burn the centre down. Nurses from other provinces left, leaving the centre with only seven nurses from an initial 17."

Extracts from interviews with Malu'u health workers, (November, 2003)

In June 2003, a fresh wave of more than 1000 people fled the Weathercoast. They were temporarily re-settled in camps on Titinge Ridge above Honiara. Militant activities restricted movement and prevented villagers from taking their produce to market. This effectively removed their only means of income. This is an experience recounted by Visale villagers of West Guadalcanal. During the conflict the women in the area could only work in their gardens between 8am to noon each day.⁷⁹

Women and women's groups in particular provided much needed support for displaced persons. These included the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA), the Federation of Women (FOW), Soroptomist International of Solomon Islands and Women for Peace.

4.1.2 Youth and children

The 1999 influx of Malaitans from Guadalcanal brought new problems, particularly youth related.⁸⁰ There was an increase in crime and the use of marijuana and home brew. Marijuana was also grown for income.⁸¹ A new urban ("townie") lifestyle was

⁷⁹ Interview with women of Visale, West Guadalcanal, November 2003.

⁸⁰ Youth Focus Group discussions and opinion poll (November 2003). A CRC Report (2002) was compiled and Solomon Island Government reported it to the UN. The CRC Report provides a collation of existing status of children and youth and the UN Report with recommendations for SIG.

⁸¹ Meeting with Malu'u Provincial officials, Baelelea Council of Chiefs and Seventh Day Adventist Church Administration, West Are Are, Malaita, 19 November, 2003.

introduced into Malu'u.⁸² Youth education and employment opportunities were disrupted and they became engaged in the tensions and violence. Villagers would use militant youth to threaten their enemies.

4.1.3 Women

Solomon Island women played an important role in mediation and brokering peace during the armed conflict.⁸³ The presence of women in peacekeeping and in recent SI elections as observers helped foster and maintain confidence and trust among the people.

In 2001, the Peace Monitoring Council increased the number of women field monitors on Guadalcanal and Malaita, because it was noted ex-militants responded positively to the women. The women were trusted more than men and viewed as neutral participants in the peace process. The Women Peace and Security Project, the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs was developed to strengthen national approaches to women in conflict situations. It was formulated with assistance from women's representatives and provides an outline of their future strategic interests⁸⁴. Women's groups reported there was a need for collaboration among themselves to better carry out this work.

Women's focus group discussions revealed concerns about loss of income, jobs and family instability during the crisis, however there is little quantifiable data on this. There was concern about the lack of health and education provision, particularly for children.

Box 4.2

"There was inadequate income and employment. Movements were restricted – we could only garden with protection, we were scared to send our children to school, the market, or the shop. There was little access to medical services, water and electricity

Extracts from Honiara women's focus group discussion (December, 2003)

⁸² Police Group interview in Malu'u.

⁸³ UNIFEM, Gender Profile of the Conflict in the Solomon Islands, www.womenwarpeace.org

⁸⁴ Women's Peace and Security Project can be sought from Home Affairs.

The closure of such companies as SIPL and Gold Ridge meant many women lost jobs. The economy went down, while prices reportedly increased in both the shops and the market.

4.1.4 People with disabilities

The 1999 Census revealed 2.7% of people in Solomon Islands had a disability. The prevalence is higher among males and varies between provinces, with hearing and impaired eyesight as the main forms of disability, followed by impaired movement. The Census acknowledges mental health problems. The Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) programme promotes awareness and rights of the disabled, improves access to rehabilitation aides and services, and coordinates non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and churches working to support disabled people. The Red Cross, Honiara, also supports a programme for disabled children. There is a reported need to extend services to the rural areas and in particular to improve services for blind people.⁸⁵

4.1.5 Violence and trauma

The full extent of the trauma is unknown. The SIA poll revealed the types of atrocities men and women faced. The poll indicated that 85% of men and women noted their families had been directly affected by the crisis, with 75% of women and 73% of men had suffered direct personal trauma. This included rape, death of family members, threats and intimidation of violence and being held up by gunpoint. Some of these people reported damage to property, which included houses being burnt, property stolen, vehicles removed and loss of jobs and income earning capacity.

Both women and men report the effect of the crisis resulting in family breakdowns. Families were often divided when one parent was from either Guadalcanal or Malaita Province. Women reported on increased tension in their homes: "Even if you are not actively involved in fighting, the tension between husband and wives in the home was increased due to the changing situation, the frustration and tensions resulted in disagreements over trivial matters."⁸⁶ While the poll identifies that family breakdowns were a

⁸⁵ Solomon Island Government, Human Development Report, *Building a Nation*, SIG, 2002.

⁸⁶ Field notes Women's Focus Group Discussion (November 2003). The number of single or women-headed households is not known.

consequence of the crisis, it is not possible to compare this with a baseline as data is not available.

While there are no national statistics on the extent of domestic violence, the Family Support Centre (FSC)⁸⁷ claims an increase in the demand for its services since the crisis began. A survey in 1995 in Honiara and Guadalcanal indicated that 30% of the population covered had been victims of domestic violence, with 90% of these being women. It appeared to be higher in urban areas than rural. In 2002 more than 1,500 people visited the FSC to seek information, support, counseling and legal advice, and attended workshops on violence issues. FSC records revealed an increase in its number of clients from 1997 (71), to 1998 – 2001 (approximately 200 annually) to 2002 (676). The reasons for this need to be explored further and monitored in the future.

There is ample anecdotal evidence of increased violence against women. There was an increase in violence noted by the Guadalcanal women from their own families, perpetrated mainly by young boys who were under threat to prove allegiance to the militia. Some boys were known to have burnt their own family's houses to prove their affiliation.⁸⁸

4.1.6 Impact of the crisis on civil society organisations

Civil society organisations (CSOs) played a key role in diffusing the conflict through advocacy (national and international), service delivery, mobilising against militant elements, actively engaging in peace and reconciliation, and promoting good governance.

The instability and uncertainty directly affected the media's work and freedom. Freedom of expression was curtailed as most people were not able to participate freely in open dialogue and discussion because of fear. The media was physically intimidated – journalists were threatened by militants and ex-combatants, who broke into the newsroom. The media imposed self censorship for protection.

⁸⁷ The FSC was established in 1995 to address the high incidence of violence against women and sexual and child abuse in the country.

⁸⁸ An interviewee with SICA trauma counsellors noted the violations often occurred within families.

The Solomon Island Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) had to restrict expenditure because of reduced revenue decreased. Most companies could not afford advertising and some left large bills unpaid. Aid donors (Australia, UK and China) assisted SIBC with operational costs. Some organisations left large bills unpaid. The Government has not provided a grant since 2001 with SIBC continuing to seek Cabinet approval to provide resources.

In mid-2000, there were 50 members of staff. Two months after the coup SIBC had to downsize to survive. They abolished 17 posts and made 16 people redundant. The number of broadcast hours was reduced by two. On reflection the increased uncertainty allowed the SIBC to take stock and plan ahead, and by the end of 2002 it had developed a corporate plan for 3 years. At the national level, SIBC resurrected the Media Association of Solomon Islands and used the overseas media to relay stories. As a result, regional and international links have strengthened.

The print media was also curtailed as a result of the crisis. There was a reduction in the amount of copies of the *Solomon Star* printed at the height of tension due to lack of advertising dollar and Solomon Island foreign reserves. The Central Bank put in control measures and suppliers wanted cash upfront.

The Civil Society Network (CSN), an umbrella group of civil society organisations, criticised government's failure to provide essential services expressed concerns about the lack law and order. As a result, some staff were threatened and physically assaulted. Private residences and offices were damaged. Donors began to reduce contributions in the belief that funds were misused.

4.2 RAMSI's role in recovery with civil society

4.2.1 The resettlement of displaced people

AusAID's Community Peace and Rehabilitation Fund (CPRF) have responded to the needs of internally displaced people around Honiara who fled the Weathercoast. It provided food relief to over 7,700

people in affected areas (at a cost of AUD100,000). Distribution was completed on 5 October, 2003.⁸⁹

RAMSI has negotiated support from CPRF to continue assistance for displaced persons and ex-combatants. In Guadalcanal province, three projects are specifically designed to assist resettlement – the establishment of Titinge primary schools, and provision of relief supplies in Honiara and disaster relief in Weathercoast.

The current contention, however, is whether or not the displaced are willing to return to the Weathercoast at this time for fear of further harassment from Harold Keke's followers. The National Peace Council and RAMSI are currently negotiating the return of the displaced group to their homes. Assistance has included provision of trauma counselling, and the supply basic food supplies and tarpaulins and improving road access. CPRF also supports the development of health centres and roads in some provinces. RAMSI returned two groups to Guadalcanal. The last group returned with 30 RAMSI troops for protection.⁹⁰

4.2.2 Expectations of improved opportunity for youth

RAMSI has limited involvement with youth. Youth focus groups believed that RAMSI has a positive impact on reduced youth involvement in drug use (marijuana and *kwaso*); less involvement in criminal activities; a newfound freedom from intimidation with people more confident to express themselves; and new hope for educational opportunities and job creation. There is also a reported recent increase in RAMSI's cooperation and networking with youth.

Youth concerns about RAMSI extended to an anticipated increase in STIs, unwanted and teenage pregnancies, arrests of past crimes and breaches of culture. There was a reported increase in "sexual services" and friendship with RAMSI personnel which has not been verified. They expressed how safety means "living in a conducive environment, with freedom to move and express ideas".

⁸⁹ RAMSI Report, 2003 (Cabinet Paper).

⁹⁰ *National Express*, Solomon Islands, 12 December, 2003.

4.2.3 Security for women

Women's focus group discussions indicated firm support for the presence of RAMSI's and said they and their families felt secure, but expressed the need to improve health and education provision.

Since RAMSI the opportunities for women to sell coconuts and betel nut at the market has reduced. The Tourism Department enacted City Council regulations to clean up the streets and removed the betel nut sellers (primarily women) to less productive areas away from the markets. This affected their income. The women approached Home Affairs who took up the issue with the Council on their behalf. Home Affairs argued for the Council to provide suitable venues for women to generate adequate income and to improve the support for market vendors. More women are selling garden foods in the market place.

RAMSI has included women in peace building activities, such as its request for SICA to translate (unpaid) interviews with displaced people in the Honiara camp.

In October 2003, RAMSI met with the FSC to discuss working together. FSC recommended RAMSI establish a separate desk for women to deal with violence against women, sexual abuse and family violence. RAMSI has indicated that it will take domestic violence and abuse of women seriously. There is anecdotal evidence that since the arrival of RAMSI, men are less violent in the home. The FSC reports that it has involved RAMSI in its awareness raising and discussed ways RAMSI could work on violence against women in Tulagi, Auki and Honiara. This meeting created an opportunity for RAMSI to discuss, for the first time, law and order issues with the Gela House of Chiefs.

The National Council of Women is now represented on the Royal Solomon Island Police Review Team. In November, the RSIP established a Family Unit in Auki to address issues of domestic violence, child and sexual abuse. The FSC advised the RSIP on setting up a Welfare Unit in Honiara and works closely with staff on case referrals.

There is now a State commitment to improve the situation and status of Solomon Island women

through the NERRDP 2003-2006 (MDG Goal 3). This commitment includes increasing the representation of women by one female to each board of directors of public authorities and other state-owned enterprises. The aim is to have at least one woman on representation in all boards by 2006. There are presently, no women among the 50 Members of Parliament. At last national election in December 2001 14 female stood as candidates. Many of the women were "subjected to male threats and intimidation alongside many of their male election candidates"⁹¹. The election did not return the sole female member.

The Government aims to formulate a National Policy on Violence Against Women in 2004 and monitor its implementation (NERRDP 2003). The RSIP Review has violence against women, particularly domestic violence, as a key priority area for action and aims to set up a unit to address violence against women and child abuse.

The SI Government intends to establish three counselling centres and a centre for conflict afflicted youth (NERRDP 2003-2006) to reduce the impacts of the trauma that prevents people from fully functioning in support of their families and the nation's development.

4.2.4 People with disabilities

Since RAMSI no direct assistance has been reported.

4.2.5 Freedom of speech and good governance

For the long-term recovery of the country, it is critical that civil society has a legitimate role and political space to function. These include active participation in the development of the country and advocacy on human rights, democracy and good governance.

The presence of RAMSI has freed the media from intimidation. People (leaders and ordinary people) are calling for open, uncensored media reporting. Opinions are being expressed more freely through editorials and letters to the editor are more openly critical. Advertising appears to be on the increase, along with the number of pages in the newspapers. The Broadcasting Act for the SIBC is now being

⁹¹United Nations Development Programme, Common Country Assessment, UNDP, 2002.

reviewed to gain independence from political interference and increase commercial opportunities.

Radio programmes connected to the peace process now provide alternative revenue sources. The SIBC now has a large human rights focus and currently produces a programme, "Talking Truth", which RAMSI contributes to. It is used as a medium for RAMSI to communicate its plans with the public. SIBC is also currently trying to get Cabinet approval for more resources.

There is a great deal of reporting on RAMSI, through the print and radio. The media is well informed on RAMSI's role and objectives. While there was acknowledgement that RAMSI's impact on restoring law and order was significant, it was encouraged to expand its role by increasing support to the investigation of past crimes and encouraging people to articulate their concerns and issues via the media.

The Solomon Islands People's First Network (PFNet), an innovative ICT network linking rural communities, has set up a webpage called "*Helpem Fren*" (Pidgin for "helping friends"), which contains information on the role of RAMSI and encourages feedback. RAMSI media statements are also posted on the webpage.⁹²

As a result of RAMSI, CSN has changed its direction and is undergoing a major review. It is now less critical of the Government and intends to work forward, ideally in partnership. It is working with the SICA and National Curriculum Centre on values education, which is also supported by the Ministry of Education.

⁹² The Solomon Islands People's First Network (PFNET), use radio and telephone technology to connect with rural communities. They built their experience on communicating and seeking opinion on the Constitutional Reform Project (UNDP), continuing throughout the crisis. They approached the Australian High Commission to facilitate access to establish a RAMSI website and are aware that RAMSI uses their website to assess feedback from Solomon Islanders.

Box 4.3

"Before RAMSI, the *Solomon Star* was unwilling to print our statements. People are now willing to speak out. The Civil Society Network now has a lawyer – paid for by the Solomon Islands UN Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (UNOHCR).

"Since RAMSI, there is improved access to information from senior government personnel. We have lots of support from advocacy groups overseas, such as Greenpeace (on the dolphin issue), Oxfam, World Vision and Transparency International.

Extracts from an interview with the Civil Society Network (October 2003)

SICA and CSN presented a proposal to the SI Government to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). A Cabinet paper has recently been produced for presentation to Parliament.⁹³ It is proposed the recommendations of the TRC be implemented by a Human Rights Commission.

4.3 Conclusion

People are feeling safe and secure. As a consequence of law and order being restored and evidence of reduced crime and corruption, people have gained confidence to go about their daily lives. However the maintenance of this will be dependent on resolving the effects of trauma suffered by many.

4.3.1 Key issues for mitigation

Many men and women referred to the necessity to address and heal the emotional and psychological trauma faced by those intimidated and harassed during the tension. The proposal for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is supported as a means to address this, together with improved functioning of local courts.

Youth highlighted a need to ensure that criminality be addressed locally through community policing and functioning local courts. It was recommended that RAMSI's role be expanded to address crime at the location it occurs, within the affected community, to prevent it spilling over to other provinces. They want to see evidence of imprisonment of the militant group leaders – MEF, IFM and others.

The successful resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced persons with improved community development programmes is considered vital to community harmony.

Violence against women is of major concern and further evidence of the commitment by RAMSI and the RSIP to take this seriously is welcomed. Women's active participation in the peace and reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction period is considered essential to increase development of women and improve the life of their communities.

There is fear that ex-combatants may regroup and CSOs request that RAMSI ensure full reintegration and disarmament before it downscales. The SICA, CSN and the Bar Association are particularly concerned that reconciliation based on compensation will perpetuate problems that previously resulted in extortion.

CSN has approached RAMSI requesting that corruption allegations be seriously addressed so that money extorted can be returned to Solomon Islands to invest in future development. CSN wants RAMSI to address this issue "before it pulls out as there may be a re-grouping of militia just waiting for RAMSI to go". Its expectation of RAMSI is high: "If RAMSI can begin nation building and individual politicians and provincial leaders begin nation building, they could contribute to a change in attitude and get people to unite as a nation."

Concerns were also expressed that the conflict will reoccur perpetually unless there is a concerted and genuine effort to reconcile and address causes of the crisis.

It was acknowledged that RAMSI has a lot of skills that could be transferred and contribute to development. "Why are engineers leaving when the country could use them to build the roads which are constraining development?" They noted people's expectations were high and that interventions are needed in more than finance and justice sectors, but also in the health and education sectors and infrastructure development.

⁹³ Interviews with SI Christian Association and the SI Bar Association (October 2003)

4.3.2 Population groups and civil society Social Impact Assessment indicators

Key indicators have been identified to monitor key priority issues for population groups and civil society organisations. These are considered essential to Solomon Islanders' future development in the post conflict recovery period.

The SIA indicators will monitor:

- Developments towards establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to reduce the negative impacts of trauma;
- Employment, income and educational opportunities particularly for internally displaced people, at risk youth and women;

- The development of a planned State Report on the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the National Policy on Violence Against Women;
- The reported level of domestic violence and police and court responsiveness to address violence against women;
- Government and community efforts to establish effective systems to address the causes of conflict in relation to land issues, and resolve disputes at community level;
- The levels of active involvement of civil society in free and open discussions on governance, democracy, security and development.

Chapter 5

Framework for Social Impact Assessment

This report has developed the following framework of indicators to guide future social impact assessments on the effectiveness and outcomes of RAMSI in the rebuilding of Solomon Islands in line with the National Economic Recovery, Reform and Development Plan and Millennium Development Goals.

The framework, laid out in the following matrix, identifies some of the main effects of the conflict and outlines the baseline status on law and order, economic and social development up to 100 days after RAMSI arrived in Solomon Islands. Key indicators are then selected to monitor future impacts.

A Framework for Social Impact Assessment on RAMSI Intervention for Solomon Islands

Law & order indicators (NERRDP/KSA 1)	Issues & concerns	Baseline (Since RAMSI)	SIA Indicators
<p>Normalising law and order and security situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhancing the capacity and capabilities of the Police force to quickly and effectively deal with militancy and retrieval of illegal weapons; Investigating crimes and apprehending criminals; reforming and 'cleansing' the police and prison service; Reviving the concept of community policing on strategic areas within the country; Improving policing throughout the country. 	<p>Between 400 – 1000 high powered, military style weapons stolen from police armories still at large;</p> <p>Former militants threatened and intimidated police (from enforcing the rule of law). Police inactive for fear of reprisal by former militants;</p> <p>The RSIP and Prison Service recruited former militants and associates of the MEF;</p> <p>Armed gangs made up of former IFM and MEF militants and some RSIP Special Constables terrorised citizens and stole property – especially in Honiara, Malaita, Guadalcanal and Western provinces. Villages and houses burnt and people brutalised, killed or taken hostage;</p> <p>Police involvement in criminal activities resulted in a loss of credibility and trust in the police;</p> <p>People in Malu'u have said that the peace brought about by RAMSI is 'peace with fear.' They are concerned that when RAMSI leaves, there will be reprisals from former militants towards informants; Better counterparting needed between RAMSI and local officers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over 3700 firearms, including 659 military-style weapons returned; Removal of guns resulted in immediate positive effects – fear subsided and people went about their lives unimpeded; 276 RAMSI Participatory Police Force (PPF) and 1858 military personnel are working with RSIP officers to restore law and order; Harassment and intimidation of people has stopped and stolen property returned; Extortion and compensation demands have stopped; More than 340 arrests made, with over 600 charges laid. 25 RSIP officers arrested on more than 92 charges including murder, arson, abduction and assault; 16 police posts established across the country, removing fear from peoples' lives; 24 PPF and 250 RAMSI Military personnel posted in all the provinces of Solomon Islands returning peace to people and their communities; A Strategic Review of the RSIP and the Prison Services to be conducted; 32 advisors to be provided to the Prison Service by the end of 2003; 2 new prisons to be built by RAMSI in Auki and Gizo; Commitment to renovate prison staff houses; A Police Business Plan for 2004 developed to address corruption, professional standards and public accountability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Further retrieval of guns; The number of RAMSI PPF and Military Personnel still in country; Number of reported cases (provincial/Honiara) Number of civilian arrests and types of convictions; Number of RSIP police officer arrests and type of convictions; Joint programmes and activities between the police and communities; Number of local police personnel transferred to the provinces; Nature of police training offered; Logistical support for police from RAMSI; Recommendations and outcomes of the Police and Prison Reviews; Status of Police Business Plan 2004; Number of officers dismissed for non-adherence to professional standards; Powers devolved to provincial police force.

<p>Strengthening the legal and justice system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing the capacity of the offices of the Attorney General, Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor, and the judiciary; • Prosecuting all offenders without regard to status or position; • Ensuring access to legal representation and fair trial and safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. 	<p>The law and justice sector affected nationwide because of a weakened enforcement sector (police and prisons) – RSIP failed to investigate and prosecute serious offences such as murder and extortion;</p> <p>The Court of Appeal, High Court and Magistrates Court operated throughout the crisis, but not at full capacity. Cases load dropped by 50%;</p> <p>The judiciary could not function effectively due to poor financial, staffing and logistical conditions;</p> <p>It has been suggested that RAMSI consult closely with the AGO and the other law and justice institutions to have a clear understanding of local laws;</p> <p>In reactivating local courts, RAMSI must address issues of customary law. The effective operation of the local courts would reduce the pressure on the Magistrates Courts;</p> <p>Need to strengthen the courts and judiciary through provision of proper budget support, materials and resources;</p> <p>Need to resolve outstanding serious crimes and bring those convicted to justice.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High profile ex-combatants – former leaders and followers of the IFM and MEF – arrested; UNDP ex-combatant programme; • A new Solicitor General provided by RAMSI to the AGO, as well as a Deputy Legal Draftsperson, Senior Crown Council and assistant legal draftsman; • Local courts not functioning; • Magistrate and High Court hearings in Auki, Gizo and Lata resumed; • Logistics and budgetary support provided to the courts and judiciary by RAMSI is boosting staff morale. Staff are arriving at work on time and work output is expected to improve. PSO received 2 laptops and 5 computers with ICT facilities; office furniture; • RAMSI committed to meet rental and utility expenses for the PSO and AGO for next two years; • Sheriff's Office at the High Court renovated; • New offices promised for PSO, AGO and the Ministry of Police and Justice; • PSO received RAMSI budgetary support of SBD27,000 in last quarter of 2003; • PSO promised 6 overseas lawyers, 4 local lawyers and 6 additional staff; • AGO received SBD73,240 from RAMSI budgetary support in the last quarter of 2003; • RAMSI has made the commitment to meet the salaries for 2 local associated judges, clerical officers and a librarian for the High Court; • RAMSI to fund a judge study tour to New South Wales, Australia; • The Solomon Islands Court of Appeal held its first sitting in August 2003 after nearly 3 years. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conviction of RSIP who have abused office; • The number of individuals represented by the PSO and the DPP; • RAMSI's working relationship with the AGO, the DPP, the Courts (especially in the areas of the criminal justice of Solomon Islands); • Courts re-opened in the provinces; • The number of Local Court hearings in the communities; • Progress by RAMSI on implementation of planned activities; • Number of court cases heard in the SICOA, the High Court and the Magistrates Court; • Recruitment (overseas / local personnel); • Cooperation between the police and courts in handling cases; • The number of SICOA sittings; • Investigation initiatives developed (e.g. special committees to look into outstanding cases).
<p>National reconciliation, unity and peace:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuing peace building and reconciliation process between provinces and communities; • Demobilising, reintegrating and rehabilitating Special Constables, ex-combatants and conflict affected youth. • Addressing needs of women, children and internally displaced people, and building trust in communities. 	<p>A proposal for establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is presented to Cabinet. A TRC is proposed to assist relatives of the hundreds of people who were either killed or disappeared during the conflict. The TRC could also address the causes of the conflict, including land issues. The proposal recommends that a Human Rights Commission be established to address the TRC recommendations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A TRC has been proposed to the government by the SICA and CSN; • Honiara Titenge Ridge settlement established for internally displaced persons; and UNDP ex-combatant programme implemented • RAMSI/CPRF/Red Cross assisting resettlement programme for displaced persons. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The TRC proposal is tabled in Parliament; • A human rights commission established; • Titinge internally displaced people resettled; • Demobilisation of the Special Constables by UNDP.

MDG Goals and Targets including NERRDP indicators on the status of the economy, health and education with specific reference to children, youth and women and development assistance			
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proportion of population below \$1 per day (PPP- values); 2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty); 3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption. <p>Target 2: Halve between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Prevalence of underweight children (under five years of age); 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption. <p><u>NERRDP Indicator</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Produce HIES survey 2004/ report; b. Achieve a positive GDP by end 2005; c. Achieve a positive growth in per capita by end of 2005; d. Achieve inflation rate below 5% 2005; e. Increase Government revenue collection and achieve budgeted levels for 2004, 2005, 2006; f. Achieve external reserves level equivalent of 3 months of import by end of 2004 and increase to 5 months import cover by end of 2005. 	<p>The Human Poverty Index (HPI) shows that Honiara has the lowest HPI and Malaita the highest among the provinces. The HPI shows that Malaita, Temotu and Guadalcanal have the highest level of human deprivation.</p> <p>The SI Government has committed to conduct a HIES in 2004 to assess poverty status to reveal impacts of the crisis and plan for more effective human development outcomes. The loss of income and employment both within the public service and private sector has exacerbated problems for those who rely on consumers to buy from the semi-subsistence productive sector. There was a loss of income earning capacity.</p> <p>It is important to note that any improved distribution of income needs fundamental policy, institutional and structural changes to stem the pattern of inequity. National income, growth and distribution is dependent on several factors including increasing production, incomes, employment, development of social services and implementation of the planned improvements which it is uncertain will be attained within the NERRDP period (2003-2006).</p> <p>Children were subjected to increased fear and the presence of guns, with unacceptable levels of violence in their formative years. Particularly male youth were at high risk of being caught up in the 'action'. The personal trauma experienced by many was extreme and many people expressed the need for increased support and services to reduce the effects of trauma. The effects on men, women and children differ. Women in particular have maintained their traditional role as primary carers placing considerable effort on holding families together. Social service provision was severely disrupted, affecting health and education status.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No indepth data available on prevalence of poverty, poverty depth and inequality since last HIES in early 1990s; • Available economic and social data suggest the poverty situation to be increasing; • 1999 GDP per capita – SBD831 (USD168); • 2001 GDP (- 9.0%); 2002 GDP (-2.4%); • Inflation 2002 (15%), 2003 (12%) (2nd quarter); • Second Quarter 2003 - SBD85.7 million (30.9% over budget estimates); • September 2003 – SBD29 million (2 million above average 2003 monthly revenue); • External reserves – 2000 (SBD159.8m net), 2001(103.0m gross), 2002 (129.9m gross), July 2003 (214.9 million gross); • New vulnerable groups are emerging (e.g. those displaced by the ethnic conflict, the unemployed and youth); • Significant inequalities exist between urban and rural income. The Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) shows that in the mid 1990s, the urban rural income per capita disparity was \$358 in the urban areas and \$55 for rural areas, with 93% of families in the low income group; • Prevalence of under 5 % weight of children was 23% (1989), with clinical detection at 12% (1998). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIES Survey undertaken (NEERDP 2004); • Analysis of HIES, including poverty analysis; • GDP and GDP per capita; • Inflation rate; • SIG monthly revenue collection; • External reserves; • Nutrition surveys; • Statistics on underweight children.

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u></p> <p>6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education;</p> <p>7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5;</p> <p>8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds.</p> <p><u>NERDP Indicators:</u></p> <p>g. Achieve universal access to 9 years of basic education from Standard 1 – Form 3 by 2015 and to establish target enrolments for 2006;</p> <p>h. 95% of all primary, and Forms 1-3 have school text books and a basic set of learning materials for all pupils on 1:1 by end 2004;</p> <p>i. Teaching service payroll validation complete by 2004-03-13;</p> <p>j. 110 primary teachers received training in curriculum materials by 2004 and all by 2008;</p> <p>k. Establish a comprehensive education management information system by 2004.</p>	<p>Enrolment had been on the increase prior to the instability. As a result of the crisis, the Ministry of Education enrolments in 1999 and 2000 were reportedly substantially lower than in 1998 due to the closure of schools in Guadalcanal. The ministry reported that the most schools disrupted were in Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal. This had major implications for a large number of students given that 53% of all students are from these areas.</p> <p>Education is neither free nor compulsory. Parents have to pay school fees to supplement the costs of their children's education. The attrition rate for girls is higher than for boys.</p> <p>Many families experience difficulties paying form fees (and exam fees). Scholarship allocations not forthcoming to overseas students. The SICHE closed, insufficient non formal education. Basic education planned to increase in 2004 budget.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to basic education is an aim of the SI Government. The current enrolment rates are low (66% of all eligible students). Insufficient allocation of resources from the SI Government Budget causes some students to be 'pushed out' of the system very early. Forty percent of students are 'pushed out' at Standard 6 level. Only 4% (349 of approx 8400) students survive to Form 6; • 1999 Census data indicates gross primary school enrolment of 77% and secondary of 29%. Enrolment rates vary between provinces; • According to the 1999 Census, the adult self reporting literacy rate was 77% - women have a higher illiteracy rate than men; • Teacher payrolls are to be cleansed in 2004 and new payment systems to be put in place so they do not continue to leave classes to collect salary payments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access – enrolment and attendance; • Schools open and remain opened (AusAID Report); • Teacher payrolls are cleansed, payment system in place and teachers not leaving classes to collect salary; • Data collection, management and analysis to provide information on education status; • Education Strategic Plan 2004-2006 policy development and plan implementation; • Actual expenditure against budget allocation on priorities and institutional reform (e.g. payrolls, facilities, non-formal education); • Number of teachers who will get access to training in SI College of Higher Education – male and female; • Community involvement in school programmes and access to schools by adults for community non-formal education (literacy); • Donor harmonisation to Education Sector (allocated/spent MOE Report 2003/04).

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u></p> <p>9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education;</p> <p>10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-24 year olds;</p> <p>11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector;</p> <p>12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament.</p> <p><u>NERRDP Indicators:</u></p> <p>l. Convene six consultative workshops (total of 180 participants) on rural skill training and economic empowerment by end of 2004;</p> <p>m. Achieve 100% equality of enrolment of boys and girls in primary education by 2006; eliminate gender disparity in basic education by 2015;</p> <p>n. Complete CEDAW Report by mid 2004 and submit to CEDAW Committee;</p> <p>o. Appointment of at least one female to each of the boards of directors of public authorities and other State-owned enterprises and achieve female representation on all boards by 2004.</p>	<p>There is anecdotal evidence that girls may have been more affected than boys as a result of the unrest and disruption in schooling. Girls are relied upon more than boys to support families and this situation is known to impact on girls' education more than boys. Shortage of family income results in priority to boys' education over girls'. There was also an expressed concern for the safety of girls, due to the perceived increase in rape and violations against girls and women during the crisis which restricted opportunities to attend school.</p> <p>Insecurity and instability impacts negatively on livelihoods and population groups. Women have been active in brokering peace and request representation in conflict resolution and peace agreements. Many men and women interviewed referred to the need to address the emotional and mental trauma faced by those who were intimidated and harassed to prevent long-term effects, particularly those subjected to sexual violence.</p> <p>Women report there was non initial consultation with women's focal points, but report this has improved. Distribution of employment opportunities, in particular for women. (Refer MDG Goal 8 for youth.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The gender gap remains noticeable in education and literacy rates, but has decreased. In 2002, girls had an enrolment rate of 47% in primary school and 43% in secondary school. There are 8952 (7.5%) more boys than girls accessing education. At primary level there are 5962 more boys than girls and at secondary level 3090 more boys are enrolled; The gender gap in adult literacy rate was 15%; In 1999 the share of women in total employment was just 23% and women's participation in the non-formal workforce is over 80%. Few women penetrate the upper ranks of civil service and the major private enterprises; No representation of women in Parliament. One woman is on the RSIP review team and the Ministry of Home Affairs (responsible for women) is represented on Planning Taskforces; RAMSI and RSIP mandated to take violence against women seriously. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender gap reduced; Criteria for allocating scholarships – to men and women; Representation on boards (sex disaggregated); National Policy on Violence Against Women (VAW); Police reporting and FSC Statistics on VAW; Evidence of economic empowerment (access to credit, income generation activities); Women Peace and Security Project supported; 24 Community Paralegal Trainers (CPT) trained and activities of CPT (males, females); CEDAW report written – analysis on status of women and submitted; Representation of women in boards and RSIP Review and Development Taskforces.
<p>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality</p>	<p>Issues</p>	<p>Baseline</p>	<p>SIA Indicators</p>
<p>Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under- five mortality rate.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u></p> <p>13. Under-five mortality rate;</p> <p>14. Infant mortality rate;</p> <p>15. Proportion of 1 year old children immunised against measles.</p> <p><u>NERRDP Indicators:</u></p> <p>p. Reduce IMR 66 to 50/100,00 by end 2005;</p> <p>q. Achieve 90% immunisation cover by 2005.</p>	<p>The major cause of IMR is complications at childbirth.</p> <p>In Guadalcanal there was a decline in antenatal care, family planning and immunisation coverage and maternal mortality rose. In Malu'u, Malaita the touring outreach Maternal Child Health Service programme to 5 rural health clinics stopped over a year ago. Financial support for Kilu'ufi Hospital suddenly stopped. Follow up immunisation for children was not received.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No recent data for under-five mortality rates but infant mortality has declined from 96 in 1986 to 66 in 1999; IMR was high at 66/1,000 (1999) live births (higher than the WHO average of 50/1,000). The SI immunisation coverage was 67% (HIS 2001-2001), but varies between provinces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IMR – antenatal and postnatal care (NRH and Malu'u Health Centre revisited); Immunisation coverage and cold chain supply and storage quality; Draft Child Rights Bill submitted to Parliament; Partnerships created to implement the Child Protection System and CRC Report recommendations.

Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 6: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 16. Maternal mortality ratio; 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel.</p> <p><u>NERRD Indicators:</u> r. Reduce MMR 129 to 80/100,00 by end 2005; s. Achieve 90% coverage of immunisation (TB, diphtheria, measles, hepatitis, polio etc).</p>	<p>There are verifiable stories of women giving birth in the bushes as a result of fleeing during the crisis. Two-thirds of neonatal mortality was reportedly due to trauma.</p> <p>Logistical difficulties, such as the lack of efficient transportation to rush women to emergency obstetric care, resulted in an increase in pregnancy complications.</p> <p>The drug used to reduce the risk of haemorrhage post delivery was not readily available, creating higher risk for postnatal women. The midwifery training programme was interrupted.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMR/MMR is not accurately known; • Estimates of maternal mortality rate indicate a reduction during the 1990s. MMR in 1997 was 209/100,000. In 2001 there were 25 reported maternal deaths. Recent health data indicates there has been an increase in MMR (2003); • The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel in clinic was 76% in 2001; • Antenatal care coverage 63% and postnatal coverage only 35%; • Family planning coverage only 8% (low by WHO standards 50%). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MMR – antenatal and postnatal care; • Family planning coverage; • Redirection of health services to meet demand in provinces. Increased service delivery in Malaita; • Institutional strengthening (finance and HRD): (salaries paid on time and actual expenditures improve; reduction of supply problems; improvement in staffing and morale, vacancies filled; number of midwives trained and posted to provinces.)
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria & other diseases	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 7: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/ AIDS.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 18. HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old pregnant women; 19. Contraceptive prevalence rate; 20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.</p> <p>Target 8: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria; 22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures; 23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis; 24. Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course).</p> <p><u>NERRD Indicators:</u> t. Reduce malaria 160 to 80/100,000 end 2005.</p>	<p>Malaria control programmes on Guadalcanal were badly affected. Malaria is again on the rise as the very successful anti-malaria programme was interrupted.</p> <p>TB second phase of treatment for patients was delayed. This situation may be the result in an increase in prevalence and incidence of TB.</p> <p>Diabetes is a fast growing disease in Solomon Islands. There is a rise in diabetes and in related complications (eye problems and amputations). Complications may have occurred as a result of delayed access to care.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No up-to-date data is available on HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Surveillance is being improved; • The incidence of malaria has been reduced about threefold from 440 per 100,000 in 1992 to 131 in 2001. The interruption in the malaria net programme led to an increase in malaria; • A dual disease pattern is emerging. Communicable diseases remain the main cause of morbidity, but lifestyle diseases are on the increase. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STI and HIV/AIDS rate, including education programmes; • Malaria incidence – restoration of malaria eradication programme; • TB admittance – the number of NRH visits and access to full drug treatments.

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest; 26. Land area protected to maintain biological diversity; 27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energy efficiency); 28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita).</p> <p>Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators</u> 29. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source.</p> <p><u>NERRDP Indicators:</u> u. Continue monitoring all licensed logging sites for compliance with Code of Logging Practices at least 4 times per year and inspecting 50% of all log shipments; v. Fishing rights-based management system in place and Tuna Management Plan (access Agreements) reviewed by December 2004; w. Facilitate transparent landowner election and landowner agreement and new Gold Ridge Mine-owner; x. Commence Tribal lands pilot project in 2004.</p> <p>Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 30. Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation; 31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure.</p>	<p>Need for resolution of land issues and payments to landowners by utility and resource managers to guarantee uninterrupted provision. Actual financial allocation and expenditure on the development water and electricity by government and development partners.</p> <p>Plans to develop better water sources did not materialise as negotiations with landowners fell through and there were insufficient funds to build a planned dam. Water distribution infrastructure is also poorly maintained – water pipes have deteriorated, causing leakages that deflate water pressure.</p> <p>The lack of water and intermittent electricity supplies during the conflict affected women most and the health of families was risked.</p> <p>Environment The current logging rate is highly unsustainable and production needs to be reduced to a more sustainable level of 500,000 cubic metres per year.</p> <p>NERRDP does not adequately address one of the main underlying causes of the ethnic conflict – the issue of land – and its relationship to economic development. Unless this issue is resolved, the reopening of major industries and new investments is uncertain.</p> <p>Government plans to establish and apply management systems to monitor environmentally sustainable harvests. logging, palm oil, fishing and mining in relation to economic development.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 1999 census data showed that 69% of the population was reported to have access to “safe water” (Honiara 95%, Malaita 60%, Guadalcanal 42%); • There are significant disparities between urban and rural areas; • There are inadequate water sources; • The national electricity coverage is low at 16%, with the provision focus in Honiara at 73% coverage; • Water problems of leakage plan an extension of provision and reliability of the water supply in Honiara <p>Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total log production is forecast at more than 800,000 cubic metres in 2003, with monthly average production of 67,000 cubic metres; • Gold Ridge Mine remains closed to date; • Fish catch during the 2003 June quarter declined by 26.9% to 5,850 metric tonnes from 8,000 in the previous quarter, due to unfavourable weather conditions. Fish catch is expected to increase when purse seiners rejoin fishing fleets after maintenance; • Increasing land disputes over access, ownership and compensation and the delay in resolving these issues is a source of ongoing tension; • Major industries are still closed; • Talks are currently ongoing on opening industries; • Lending to the private sector increased by 5% although there are still strict lending policies. More relaxed lending policies are anticipated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water and sanitation programme reinstated; • Electricity supply and maintenance. <p>Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened compliance with the Code of Logging Practice; • Logging rate; • Re-opening of major industries such as the Gold Ridge Mine and Solomon Islands Plantation Ltd (palm oil); • Fishing rights-based management system in place and Tuna Management Plan (access Agreements) reviewed by December 2004; • Status of tribal lands pilot project.

Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development	Issues	Baseline	SIA Indicators
<p>Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. (Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction- both nationally and internationally.)</p> <p>Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. (Includes tariff and quota free access for LDC exports: enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.)</p> <p>Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states.</p> <p>Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> (Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately for the LDCs, Africa, landlocked countries and small island developing states.)</p> <p>Official Development Assistance</p> <p>32. Net ODA as percentage of DAC donors' GNI (targets of 0.7% in total and 0.15% for LDCs);</p> <p>33. Proportion of ODA to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation);</p> <p>34. Proportion of ODA that is untied;</p> <p>35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small island developing states;</p> <p>36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in land-locked countries.</p> <p>Market access</p> <p>37. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding arms) admitted free of duties and</p>	<p>ODA</p> <p>Too much ODA Budget Supplementation may result in :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of capacity to implement; • Donor driven programmes that may not be suitable to local situation; • Dependency on 'handouts'; • Unsustainability by government to meet its donor commitments. <p>There is a concern about the governments ability to meet its budget requirements when RAMSI budgetary support is withdrawn.</p> <p>Market access – trade</p> <p>There is need for more supporting infrastructure, such as improved transport and increased buying centres for copra and cocoa smallholders in the rural areas.</p> <p>There have been concerns raised that financial assistance to the country under RAMSI should go more towards private sector development than into the inefficient public sector. RAMSI's term of presence in the country is unknown, which poses a further challenge in terms of sustaining the drive for economic reform for long-term purposes.</p>	<p>ODA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding for 2004 SIG Development Budget – 53% of ODA is allocated for basic social services and community development. <i>Note: This refers to the ODA is the Government development budget (not recurrent budget).</i> <p>Untied RAMSI budgetary support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RAMSI budgetary support for last quarter of 2003 (SBD \$10m); and for Recurrent Budget for period up to June 2004 (AUD12 million). <p>Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No accurate data for ODA budget for the environment available for 2003 and previous years. In 2004, 5.3% (SBD 1,827,500) of total ODA is allocated to environment and conservation. <p>Market access – trade and investment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Copra production in the second quarter rose by 41.1% from 1,939 tons to 2,736 tons; Cocoa production in the second quarter rose from 235 tons to 1,565 tons as compared with previous quarter; • 0.1% of ODA is allocated to development of commerce and industry in the 2004 development budget. • Trade account of SBD13.5 million surplus is recorded for the second quarter of 2003 as compared to SBD3.3 million in first quarter of 2003. • Despite a 5% growth in private sector lending by July 2003 and the private and investment sector growing; strict lending policies are still in place. 	<p>ODA for social services, community development and environment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2004 Development and Recurrent Budget outcomes; • % of ODA for community development expended; • Status of projects (education, health, utilities –water/sanitation/electricity). <p>Market access – trade and investment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production volume and price of cocoa and copra; • Extent of new smallholder buying centres; • Balance of payments and trade account; • Assess if improvements in trade between Pacific Islands and Solomons Islands companies (e.g. Fiji/ flour); • Investment enquiries, export-import licences; • Growth in private sector lending; • Status of new investment Promotion Act.

<p>excluding arms) admitted free of duties and quotas;</p> <p>38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and clothing;</p> <p>39. Domestic and export agricultural products subsidies in OECD countries;</p> <p>40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity.</p> <p><u>NERRDP Indicators</u></p> <p>y. Increase copra production by smallholders from 11,000 metric tonnes to 24,000; cocoa from 3,500 metric tonnes to 5,000 by end of 2005;</p> <p>z. Private sector borrowing to grow by 10% by 2004 and pass a new Investment Promotion Act by of 2004.</p> <p>Debt sustainability</p> <p>41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled;</p> <p>42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services;</p> <p>43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief;</p> <p>44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points.</p> <p><u>NERRDP Indicators:</u></p> <p>Good Governance:</p> <p>aa. Government accounts for 199-2003 audited by June 2004;</p> <p>bb. Control recurrent budget expenditure within budget estimates;</p> <p>cc. Stop and eliminate all 'ghost' workers from public sector payroll;</p> <p>dd. Downsizing of public service - Phase 1 completed by June 2004, Phase 2 by end of 2004 (number of redundancies to be determined after payroll cleansing);</p> <p>ee. Control recurrent budget expenditure within budget estimates;</p> <p>ff. New Federal Constitution Bill launched by July 2004.</p> <p>Transport:</p> <p>gg. Seven new wharves completed by 2005;</p> <p>hh. Rehabilitate and upgrade roads and bridges and airfields</p>	<p>Debt sustainability</p> <p>Some debt clearing and servicing is done through RAMSI direct financial assistance and has a direct impact on the economy. However, the sustainability of debt relief is dependant on the maintenance of law and order.</p> <p>Planned civil service reforms intend to reduce the pool of paid employees. There is a risk of civil and social disruption as a result of future redundancies in the civil service.</p> <p>Good Governance</p> <p>Corruption and extortion was rife. The government has identified the need for considerable improvement to mitigate risks to the economy and the longer term social development of the country. NERRDP is built upon earlier initiatives on economic governance (October/November 2003) and multisectoral planning which included wide consultation from April to October 2003. RAMSI created a conducive environment to finalise NERRDP. NERRDP sets out a strategic framework that identifies clear priority targets, actions and indicators with the government and its development partners will use to guide and fund work towards achieving economic recovery and reform.</p>	<p>Debt sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AusAID paid loan arrears of USD338,000 and USD2.65 million in 2003 to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank respectively; • No data on above proportionate to ODA; • Debt management priorities are being developed since RAMSI arrived; • Debt management strategy had been developed in 2003; • Forecasts for debt servicing for fourth quarter 2003 and 2004 had been developed; • Loans examined , some removed from the stock of debt; • SIG external debt arrears by September 2003 was SBD101.5 million; SIG domestic debt arrears at SBD 177.4 million by Sept. 2003. <p>Good Governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No auditing of government accounts since 1998; • September 2003 - monthly expenditure was SBD16 million below average 2003 monthly expenditure of SBD26million; • A payroll cleansing scheme is underway to reduce expenditure and rid payroll of ghosts (employees made redundant and employees on two or more payrolls); • Planned mass redundancy for 2001 that would see 1,500 officers leave the service was stalled due to lack of funds. Redundancy exercise is planned to be undertaken in two phases; • Draft Constitutional Reform Bill (after rounds of consultation) will be taken back to people for final consultation before tabled to Parliament. <p>Transport</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No accurate data available for 2003 and previous years; 4% (SBD17,940,000) of total ODA allocated to transportation in 2004 Development Budget; Construction of a total of 14 jetties is part of the 1998 EU Stabex fund. Work on the Gizo jetty has begun; Inspection of roads in Honiara under 1998 Stabex fund completed since RAMSI arrived; Work on roads in Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces under ADB project has resumed. 	<p>Debt sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIG debt arrears and service outcomes. <p>Good Governance and SI Economic Recovery indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audited government accounts; • Monthly expenditure; • Reduced expenditure on payroll; • Reduced size of public service; • Status of Draft Constitutional Reform Bill. <p>Transport</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of jetty constructions (total completed); • Status of road works.
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<p>Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 45. Unemployment rate of 15-24 year olds.</p> <p><u>NERRD Indicators:</u> ff. Formulate and implement a national programme for reintegration and rehabilitation of conflict affected youth in in 2004 gg. Establish Youth Centres for employment, training, and micro-credit promotion in Malaita (Auki) , Guadalcanal and Honiara; hh. Generate 500 new jobs in private sector by end of 2004; ii. Resume annual employment survey to monitor employment trends and produce 2003 report in 2004.</p>	<p>Youth groups recommended RAMSI's role be expanded to address crime at the location it occurs, within the affected community, to prevent it spilling over to other provinces</p> <p>Youth aspire to improved education, employment and income opportunities.</p> <p>SIG needs to develop the informal sector to offer more employment opportunities to youth, in particular disaffected youth.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Latest employment information is for 1999; • 23% of the adult population (14 years and over) in formal employment and 11% unemployed (65% males) (1999 Census); • 61% of youth (age-group 14-29yrs) is unemployed (1999 Census); • Between 1994-1998 the private sector provided 69% of employment; • No data on number of jobs in private sector in 2003; • British funding Youth Centre in Honiara since 2003. Assistance by Oceania Olympic Committee and Solomon Islands Olympic Committee to support develop recreation facilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth Centres established for employment programme and implemented; • Training of 24 community / youth paralegal trainers and effectiveness of use of training; • Adult population employment in formal sector (by sex); • Employment statistics for youth and women; • Number of new jobs generated; • Annual employment report produced; • 3 youth centres established for employment, training and micro-credit.
<p>Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis.</p>	<p>Drugs availability was compromised as government did not maintain purchasing power with agent to supply SI.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cabinet decision to maintain purchasing power with NZ and Australia drug suppliers, but this was not acted on and drug supplies were not always forthcoming. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drugs supplied to hospitals and clinics in provinces.
<p>Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.</p> <p><u>MDG Indicators:</u> 47. Telephone lines per 1000 people; 48. Personal computers per 1000 people.</p>	<p>Media harassment and intimidation resulted in restricted media coverage. However, there is improvement and evidence of more open dialogue, freedom of movement and speech. PFNet able to function and support communications with radio/telephone links to computer networks.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media harassment and intimidation reduced; • Increase in letters to the editor, discussions on radio about corruption; • More cooperation with existing alternative media and communication on RAMSI to the provinces. • 'Helpem Frens' webpage established to provide coverage and feedback from community on RAMSI. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media able to exercise freedom of expression with no political interference; • PFNet functioning/funded to service outlying provinces and rural areas. 'Helpem Frens' continues.

Annex I

Terms of Reference

Social impact study on regional peacekeeping intervention in Solomon Islands

Background

1. Solomon Islands has faced a deteriorating law and order situation since the political crisis of 2000. In June 2003, the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Solomon Islands sought external assistance to address this issue.

2. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Pacific Islands Forum met in Sydney, Australia on 30 June 2003 to discuss a regional response to assist Solomon Islands according to the principles set out in the Biketawa Declaration. Ministers indicated their overwhelming support for assisting Solomon Islands to restore law and order and it was agreed that a regional intervention force be sent to undertake this task. (The outcome statement from the Sydney meeting is attached at Annex 1 and the Biketawa Declaration at Annex 2)

Social Impact Assessment on the Pacific Islands Forum Intervention in Solomon Islands

3. Many aspects of normal life in Solomon Islands, such as the provision of education and health services, have suffered due to the negative law and order situation. The economy has suffered greatly and there are major issues with governance. A 2002 United Nations Common Country Assessment reported: "Social and economic development gains achieved in the previous two decades have been eroded."⁹⁴ It has been asserted that development cannot proceed until effective law and order is in place⁹⁵.

4. The Social Impact Assessment (SIA) will take into consideration the situation of disadvantaged groups in society, particularly the poor, displaced persons, women and children. Evidence shows that women suffer in conflict situations in particular ways. Women hold their families and communities together, yet they suffer from the lack of services resulting from conflict. Women are frequently subject to increasing levels of violence in conditions of conflict. A recent UNIFEM study noted "Women have become the greatest victims of war – and the biggest stakeholders of peace."⁹⁶ It will be essential, therefore, to capture the circumstances of Solomon Island women in this survey.

5. The SIA will take place in stages. An initial baseline study will be undertaken to provide a benchmark for further monitoring. It is anticipated that systematic monitoring will take place every six months for the duration of the intervention exercise, with a final evaluative report at its termination.

Objective of Consultancy

6. The objective of the SIA is to provide reliable information through systematic monitoring and analysis to the Solomon Islands government and other stakeholders on the impact of the regional intervention force; assessing whether its presence has enabled a return to normal life, particularly the restoration of services; as well as assessing the impact of its presence on the people of Solomon Islands.

7. The consultant will be required to undertake intensive social research⁹⁷, followed by an analysis of the data collected:

- Develop a framework for monitoring, based on the list of indicators is at Annex 3.

⁹⁴ UN Common Country Assessment Solomon Islands, p.xiv

⁹⁵ For example at a UNIFEM Round Table Meeting on Women, Peace and Security in October 2001

⁹⁶ UNIFEM, 2002, Women, War and Peace, p.vii

⁹⁷ It is anticipated that the research will be confined to the greater Honiara area in the first instance.

- Undertaking a baseline study with agreed indicators, followed by regular monitoring at six-monthly intervals.
- Analysing the information collected to produce a report at each stage. The analysis should attempt to assess whether the presence of the peacekeeping forces is assisting a return to normalcy.

Methodology

8. In order to gain information that is as complete and accurate as possible, a range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies should be utilised. It is anticipated that consultative, participatory approaches will be crucially important. A wide range of stakeholders such as community groups, chiefs, non-governmental and civil society organisations, women's groups, youth groups, churches, government, regional and international agencies should be consulted. Key stakeholders will need to be identified and an appropriate framework established for their participation. In addition to primary data from surveys, focus groups and key informants, secondary data from relevant government departments should be used where appropriate. Sex disaggregated data should always be used where possible.

Reporting Requirements

9. Full analytical reports should be submitted to the Forum Secretariat following each phase of the study.

Required Skills

10. The consultant(s) will be required to have in-depth knowledge of the socio-economic and political situation in Solomon Islands and ability to communicate in Pijin, as well as proven experience and competence in:

- conducting social surveys, preferably participatory social impact assessments;
- gender expertise;
- social analysis; and
- high level report writing.

Time-frame

11. It is envisaged that the first stage of the survey should commence within two weeks of signing the contract and should last for duration of 20-25 working days.

12. The second stage should take place six months after the completion of the first stage and the third stage in a further six months.

Designation of Person to whom Consultant will Report

13. The Director (through the Social Policy Adviser) of the Development and Economic Policy Division, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS).

Tenders

14. *Consultants wishing to tender for this contract should send a detailed Curriculum Vitae, with a covering letter detailing proposed methodology and costing and confirming availability to Dr Helen Tavola, Social Policy Adviser, Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji, by 29 August 2003, fax (+679) 330 0192 or email helent@forumsec.org.fj*

The following annexes to the Terms of Reference are not included and can be obtained from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat:

- *2003 Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers' Meeting Outcome Statement;*
- *The Biketawa Declaration;*
- *A framework for the Social Impact Assessment.*

Annex II

Facilitation of International Assistance Bill 2003

Part 1 Preliminary

Short title and commencement

1. This Act may be cited as the Facilitation of International Assistance Bill 2003, and shall come into operation on assent.

Interpretation

2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –

"assistance agreement" means the assistance agreement identified in the international assistance notice under subsection 3 (2);

"assisting country" means the assisting country identified in the international assistance notice under paragraph 3 (1) (a);

"international assistance notice" means the notice under subsection 3 (1) that causes this Act to apply, as may be amended from time to time;

"public purpose" means the purposes of ensuring the security and safety of persons and property, maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, preventing and suppressing violence, intimidation and crime, maintaining law and order, supporting the administration of justice, supporting and developing Solomon Islands institutions and responding to natural catastrophic events;

"visiting contingent" means the visiting contingent identified in the international assistance notice under paragraph 3 (1) (b).

International assistance notice

3. – (1) The Governor-General may publish a notice that -

- (a) states that the Government has requested the assistance of the government of another country (the "assisting country") for a public purpose; and

- b) states that the assistance will be provided by a contingent of persons (the "visiting contingent") from the assisting country or another country; and

- (c) states that, because of subsection (3), this Act applies in relation to the visiting contingent.

- (2) The notice may specify an agreement or arrangement between the Government and the government of the assisting country that covers the operations and activities in the Solomon Islands of the visiting contingent (the "assistance agreement").

- (3) This Act applies on the making of a notice under subsection (1).

Membership of visiting contingent

4. – (1) The visiting contingent shall consist of –

- (a) members of the police forces or armed forces of the assisting country, or of another country notified by the assisting country to the Ministry responsible for foreign affairs and accepted by the Ministry; and

- (b) other individuals notified by the assisting country to the Ministry responsible for foreign affairs.

- (2) If the assisting country notifies the Ministry responsible for foreign affairs that specified members of the visiting contingent are not to be accorded specified powers or privileges under this Act, those members may not exercise those powers or privileges.

Area of application of Act

5. This Act applies to the territory of the Solomon Islands, all areas where it exercises maritime jurisdiction, and the superjacent airspace.

Part 2 Powers and privileges of visiting contingent

Powers and privileges may be varied

6. The regulations may limit, vary or add to the powers and privileges set out in this Part, but not so as to limit the effect of sections 7, 15, 16, 17, and 19.

Use of force and police powers

7. – (1) Armed forces and police members of the visiting contingent may exercise any powers that may be exercised by police officers appointed under the Police Act.

(2) In addition to the powers under subsection (1), armed forces and police members of the visiting contingent may use such force as is reasonably necessary to achieve a public purpose.

Eligibility for appointment to the Police Force

8. – (1) A member of the visiting contingent shall be deemed to be eligible for appointment to any office in the Police Force (but the exercise by a member of powers under section 7 does not depend on such an appointment).

(2) Section 11 of the Police Act shall not apply to a person appointed to an office in the Police Force by reason of this section.

Carriage of weapons by the visiting contingent

9. Members of the visiting contingent may possess, carry and use arms in accordance with their internal orders or rules in order to -

- (a) protect themselves or the visiting contingent; or
- (b) protect other persons; or
- (c) protect property of the visiting contingent; or
- (d) protect public or private property; or
- (e) achieve a public purpose.

Seizure and destruction of weapons

10. – (1) The visiting contingent may seize any weapons, as necessary for the achievement of a public purpose.

(2) The visiting contingent may, with the permission in writing of the Solomon Islands Commissioner of Police, destroy seized weapons.

(3) The visiting contingent shall, as far as practicable, record particulars of weapons seized or destroyed, including serial numbers (if applicable) and the dates and places of seizure or destruction, and the particulars of the persons from whom they were seized.

(4) In considering whether to give permission under subsection (2), the Commissioner shall take into account whether it is likely that the weapons will be required for production as evidence in ongoing criminal investigation or civil matters.

Freedom of movement

11. – (1) Members of the visiting contingent, together with service vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the area to which this Act applies.

(2) The visiting contingent may use roads, bridges, canals and other waters, port and airfield facilities without payment of dues, tolls or any other charges or fees.

(3) Members of the visiting contingent may operate vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other equipment without a permit or licence.

(4) Vehicles, vessels, aircraft or other equipment provided and used by the visiting contingent shall not be subject to registration and licensing laws.

Accommodation and use of public utilities

12. – (1) Members of the visiting contingent may use such premises, including facilities, as may be necessary for their accommodation while engaged in fulfilling a public purpose free of charge, unless otherwise negotiated.

(2) Members of the visiting contingent may use water, electricity and other public utilities free of charge, unless otherwise negotiated.

(3) The visiting contingent may generate, transmit and distribute electricity for its own use without being subject to regulation or licensing requirements and free of charge.

Wearing of national uniform

13. Members of the visiting contingent may wear their national uniforms when on official duty.

Medical staff

14. Members of the visiting contingent who are medical, nursing or paramedic staff may treat members of the visiting contingent and other persons without being subject to regulation or licensing requirements.

Entry, departure and customs

15. – (1) Members of the visiting contingent shall be exempt from any visa laws and immigration inspection and restrictions when entering or departing from the Solomon Islands.

(2) Members of the visiting contingent shall be exempted from Departure Tax.

(3) The visiting contingent may import into the Solomon Islands without licence or other restriction or registration and free of customs, duties and taxes or any other charge that may be sought to be levied, equipment (including vehicles and weapons) and other supplies required for a public purpose, together with personal effects of and items for the support of members of the visiting contingent.

(4) Any material belonging to an individual member of the visiting contingent that is imported under this section and later sold in the Solomon Islands to persons other than those entitled to tax-free privileges shall be subject to customs and other duties at the time of its sale.

(5) Any material imported under this section may be re-exported without licence or other restriction or registration and free of customs, duties and taxes or any other charge that may be sought to be levied.

Taxation

16. Members of the visiting contingent shall be exempt from direct taxes, including income tax and death duties, and all other fees and charges.

Immunity from legal proceedings

17. – (1) Members of the visiting contingent, the assisting country, and any other country whose personnel are members of the visiting contingent, shall have immunity from legal proceedings in Solomon Islands courts and tribunals in relation to actions of the visiting contingent or its members that are taken in the course of, or are incidental to, official duties.

(2) Criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction shall not be exercised over a member of the Visiting Contingent arising out of an action taking place in Solomon Islands if such jurisdiction is asserted over that member in respect of that action by a country referred to in section 3(1)(b).

(3) Where criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction has been exercised over a member of the Visiting Contingent arising out of an action taking place in Solomon Islands, that jurisdiction will be relinquished to a country referred to in section 3(1)(b) if that country asserts jurisdiction over that member in respect of that action.

(4) For this section, legal proceedings includes criminal, civil, disciplinary and administrative proceedings, and proceedings seeking to enforce customary law.

(5) For this section, the Minister responsible for justice shall be deemed to have directed the Director for Public Prosecutions that he is to initiate no action with respect to members of the visiting contingent for actions referred to in subsections (1) and (2), unless the assisting country has expressly consented to the exercise of such jurisdiction.

(6) The assisting country may waive immunity granted by this section.

Deceased members of the visiting contingent

18. The visiting contingent may take charge of and repatriate the body of a member of the visiting contingent who dies in the Solomon Islands.

Command and control of visiting contingent

19. While respecting the laws of Solomon Islands, the Visiting Contingent shall have sole responsibility for the internal command, control, discipline and administration of the personnel of the Visiting Contingent.

Part 3 Control of weapons

Controlled weapons area

20. – (1) The Governor-General may publish a notice that –

- (a) declares an area in the territory of the Solomon Islands to be a controlled weapons area; and
- (b) states that members of the visiting contingent are permitted to carry weapons in the area; and
- (c) specifies other persons who are permitted to carry weapons in the area; and
- (d) prohibits all other persons from carrying weapons in the area.

(2) A person who carries a weapon in a controlled weapons area while prohibited from doing so by a notice under subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of \$25,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.

Weapons surrender area

21. – (1) The Governor-General may publish a notice that –

- (a) declares an area in the territory of the Solomon Islands to be a weapons surrender area; and
- (b) states that members of the visiting contingent are permitted to possess weapons in the area; and
 - (c) specifies other persons who are permitted to possess weapons in the area; and
 - (d) prohibits all other persons from possessing weapons in the area.

(2) A person who –

- (a) is prohibited from possessing a weapon by a declaration under subsection (1); and
- (b) is in, or comes into, possession of a weapon; and
- (c) fails to give the weapon, as soon as practicable, to a member of the visiting contingent shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of \$25,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.

Part 4 Miscellaneous

Regulations

22. – (1) The Governor-General may make regulations providing for any matter which is necessary or convenient to give effect to this Act.

- (2) Without limiting subsection (1) or section 6, the regulations may do the following –
- (a) provide for the implementation of the assistance agreement, or of any other agreement or arrangement between the Government and the government of the assisting country that deals with the visiting contingent;
 - (b) authorise specified members of the visiting contingent (in addition to those authorised by subsection 7 (1)) to exercise any powers that may be exercised by police officers appointed under the Police Act;
 - (c) provide that members of the visiting contingent may exercise powers, or perform functions, that can be exercised under a specified law or by suitably qualified or authorised persons;
 - (d) provide that a specified law does not apply to members of the visiting contingent.
- (3) In subsection (2), a reference to a law includes a reference to a provision of a law.

Review of international assistance notice

23. – (1) The Parliament shall be given the opportunity to review the international assistance notice every 1 year in accordance with this section.

- (2) For this section, the review dates of the international assistance notice are the following –
- (a) the day 1 year after the day on which the notice was published;
 - (b) the day each 1 year after that day.
- (3) The international assistance notice, as currently amended, shall be laid before Parliament within the period of 3 months that ends on a review date, unless it is revoked earlier.
- (4) If Parliament passes a resolution within 3 months after the review date, to the effect that the international assistance notice is annulled, the notice ceases to have effect from 21 days after the date of the resolution, but without affecting the validity of anything previously done under this Act because of the notice.

Act to have effect notwithstanding other legislation

24. – (1) Subject to the Constitution, this Act and any regulations or other subsidiary legislation made under this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any other law of the Solomon Islands.

- (2) An Act enacted after the commencement of this Act is not to be interpreted as –
- (a) amending or repealing, or otherwise altering the effect or operation of, this Act or subsidiary legislation made under this Act; or
 - (b) authorising the making of subsidiary legislation amending or repealing, or otherwise altering the effect or operation of, a provision of this Act or of the subsidiary legislation made under it.
- (3) Subsection (2) does not affect the interpretation of an Act so far as that Act expressly provides for that Act, or subsidiary legislation made under that Act, to have effect despite this Act or despite subsidiary legislation made under this Act.

Evidentiary rules

25. Every document purporting to be a regulation, order, rule, licence, permit, certificate, direction, authority or other document made, granted or issued by the Governor-General or any other authority or person under this Act or any subsidiary legislation authorised under this Act, and purporting to be signed by or on behalf of the Governor-General or that other authority or person, shall be received in evidence, and shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been made, granted or issued by the Governor-General or that authority or person.

Annex III

Law & order tables

Table 1.3 RAMSI's initial input to Solomon Islands

Country of origin	Police Personnel	Military Personnel	Logistics	
			Air Elements	Marine Elements
Australia	196 (including 50 Protective Security Officers)	1379	6 (2 DH-C4 Caribou aircraft; 4 UH1H Iroquois helicopters)	4 (Royal Australian Navy Vessels)
New Zealand	33	240	4 (UH1H Iroquois helicopters)	
Fiji	15	121	-	
PNG	-	83	-	
Samoa	15	-	-	
Tonga	10	35	-	
Kiribati	5	-	-	
Cook Islands	2	-	-	
Total	276	1858	10	4

Source: RAMSI Information Update, Office of the Special Coordinator, Honiara, 16 September, 2003

Table 1.4 RAMSI arrests and charges

	Arrests	Charges
Crimes in Weathercoast and Malaita	62	185+ (including murder, arson, abduction and assault)
RSIP	25	92+ (including murder, assault, intimidation, inappropriate use of firearms and robbery)
General cases in Honiara	127	187+ (including assault, theft and disorderly behaviour)
Provincial police	130	135+

Source: RAMSI Fact Sheet, 31 October, 2003

Table 1.5 Police posts established around Solomon Islands (98)

	No. of police posts		at posts	personnel at posts
Malaita Province	3	Auki, Atori and Malu'u	6 (2 New Zealanders; 2 Tongan; 2 Australians)	90 (Including Australians, PNGs, and New Zealanders)
Central Province	2	Tulagi and Yandina	2 (Australians)	Nil
Guadalcanal	5	Turarana, Avu Avu, Mbambanakira, Kolina and Obo Obo	8 (3 New Zealanders; 1 Tongan; 1 Kiribati; 3 Australians)	160 (Including Fijians, Australians, Tongans and PNGs)
Western Province	2	Gizo and Munda	2 (1 Australian; 1 New Zealander)	Nil
Choiseul Province	1	Taro	2 (1 Australian; 1 Fijian)	Nil
Makira Province	1	Kira Kira	2 (1 Australian; 1 Tongan)	Nil
Temotu Province	1	Lata ⁹⁹	Nil	Nil
Isabel Province	1	Buala	2 (1 Australian; 1 New Zealander)	Nil
Rennel/Bellona Province	1	Tinggoa ¹⁰⁰	Nil	Nil
Total	17		24	250

Source: RAMSI Fact Sheets, 16 September and 31 October, 2003

⁹⁸ Data recorded as of 16 September, 2003.

⁹⁹ This police post was not yet established by 16 September, 2003.

¹⁰⁰ This police post was not yet established by 16 September, 2003.

Table 2.6: RAMSI's direct input into the Justice sector

section	Assistance				
	Human resources	Equipment and logistics	Finance	Office	Effect on court cases
	12 personnel (Including new Solicitor General, new Senior Crown Council, 6 lawyers, and 1 assistant legal draftsman.)	To provide new computers, internet and email facilities, and furniture. Will pay rent and utilities for a two-year period.	SBD73,240 is from the RAMSI Budgetary Support.	New office space for the AGO and the Ministry of Police and Justice and its administration.	None at the moment.
	Expecting 6 overseas lawyers, 4 new local lawyers and 6 additional staff.	2 new laptops, 5 computers and stationery.	SBD\$27,000 from the RAMSI Budgetary Support. To provide funds for provincial tours.	New office promised.	Number of cases increased. <i>People feel free to report cases.</i> Civil cases increased.
	A staff increase promised.	Basic resources and equipment including computer software provided. Assisting with office supplies. A new standby generator bought. 2 storage containers bought for old office files.	RAMSI is prepared to put in money. A judges study tour to Australia to be funded by RAMSI. Judges tours to provinces to be funded by RAMSI.	Sheriff's office renovated. Courtrooms extended. Local judges associates will be paid for. RAMSI paying for High Court renovations.	Increase in cases by 10% - 15%. 10 trials to be referred to the High Court from the Magistrates - will take about 300 days (10 days per trial) nearly one whole year. Problem of having only one courtroom.
	Promise to increase staff.	Assisting with office supplies. Old High Court generator given to Magistrates Court.	RAMSI prepared to put in money after reviewing the AusAID Law and Justice Institutional Strengthening Project. Funds for magistrates provincial tours promised.	Extension of courtrooms and courts renovations in Honiara and the provinces. To provide housing for Magistrates in Honiara and Provinces.	30 major cases directly relating to the tension heard.

	Human resources	Equipment and logistics	Finance	Office
	<p>18 advisors provided so far. By the end of 2003 it is anticipated that there will be 32 advisors including Shift Advisors, Operational Officers, a Finance Advisor and a Human Resources Advisor.</p> <p>Government approved extra 35 staff, which will enable the Prison Services to open 4 new wings. Total approved staff will be 308.</p>	<p>Logistics such as fuel, uniforms, gas and furniture has been provided by RAMSI.</p>	<p>Indirect financial assistance in form of logistics.</p>	<p>RAMSI to complete the unfinished Rove Prison in Honiara and will renovate Tetere Prison. Will also renovate staff housing and build 2 new prisons, one for Auki and one for Gizo. Both prisons with a capacity of 60 each.</p>

Source: Interviews with the different Justice sectors, November 2003

Annex IV

RAMSI inputs to Department of Finance

Security environment at MOF and protecting staff and public funds

- Security fences installed;
- Guards patrol gates 24 hours, supported by RAMSI police;
- Appointments and passes required to see Ministry staff;
- Enquiry counters established for payments and inland revenue.

Some key principles that the government committed itself to:

- Will develop affordable and sustainable budgets;
- Will deliver services to the public in an efficient and low cost manner;
- Will not borrow domestically or internationally to finance recurrent expenditure;
- Will create an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and competition in the private sector;
- Will create a level playing field for businesses;
- Will tighten fiscal controls by monitoring expenditure and enhancing revenue collection;
- Will develop practical and achievable budget plans for the rest of 2003 and 2004;
- Departments will be held accountable and responsible for their allocated expenditures;
- Will work to make room in the Budget to start servicing some parts of its debts and bills;
- Cannot afford any compensation payments;
- Will increase the transparency of public finances by releasing budgetary information.

Budget Strategy

Phase 1: Budget Stabilisation

- Get expenditure under control;
- Get the spending mix right;
- Increase revenue via better tax compliance rather than introducing new taxes;
- Slow the build up in arrears.

Developments in September 2003

- Expenditure tightly reigned in and brought under control;
- Monthly expenditure was \$16 million well below average 2003 monthly expenditure of \$26 million;
- Monthly revenue was \$29 million, \$2 million above average 2003 monthly revenue;
- A contingency reserve/buffer of SBD 6.0 million has been established;
- Public servants have been paid on time for the last 7 weeks.

Budget 2003 – December quarter Plan

- With the Budget so off track, couldn't wait for the 2004 Budget for some planning action;
- The December quarter Budget Plan is very simple – merely allocates available revenue to departments in accordance with historical relativities;
- It strives for a reasonable spending mix by reigning in police and improving service delivery;
- It provides a solid benchmark for allocating expenditure for the remainder of the year;
- The December quarter plan will allow Departments to start to become more operational again;
- The Australian Government is providing budget support in the December quarter of \$10 million and by servicing the ADB and World Bank loans. This adds an additional 18% to available revenue.

December Quarter Allocations

Budget 2004

- Builds on the December quarter plan in trying to get the expenditure mix right;
- Supported by substantial Budget supplementation from Australia and New Zealand;
- Health, Education, Provincial Affairs and the Auditor General's Office are the big winners;
- Overall 19% increase in payroll allocations against expected outcomes in 2003.

Budget 2003 vs Budget 2004

Budget 2004

- Departments will be held accountable and responsible for their allocated expenditure;
- Funding to be made available on a quarterly basis to prevent overspending;
- Allocations will be adjusted as more information comes to hand;
- The budget will be reviewed on a quarterly basis.

Consultation – Budget 2003 & 2004

- Extensive consultation with Ministries on Budget allocations and funding requirements;
- Regular meetings held with all Permanent Secretaries/Accounting Officers;
- Departments are appreciating the consultation process;
- A better understanding of departmental financial needs will be established over time.

Expenditure Control

- All expenditure now requires signoff by the Accountant General;
- All expenditure is being screened by the Accountant General;
- The payments section reviews all expenditure and checking procedures have been established for all payment vouchers.

Government Bank Accounts

- Information has been sought from Banks and Ministries with a view to closing illegal accounts and reviewing legal accounts;
- These are being cross-checked and discrepancies investigated;
- There appears to be a relatively large number of accounts with small balances;
- Departments are being tardy with assistance, and a lot of follow up work needs to be done.

Payroll Cleansing

- Exercise to rid payroll of those who shouldn't be there: ghosts, employees made redundant and employees on 2 or more payrolls;
- Current Ministry of Finance payroll lists have been provided to ministries and most have now provided the information sought;
- This initiative needs a large amount of follow up and persistence work;
- Payroll legislation is being examined and enforced.

Inland Revenue

- Aim to increase revenue collection via better compliance, working within existing tax laws;
- A tax amnesty has been announced until the end of 2003 exempting those who come forward from penalties and interest;
- 10% sales tax is being enforced on bar trade.

Current activities and exercises include:

- Personal visits being conducted with all businesses to inform them of their PAYE obligations;
- Restoring the integrity of the taxpayer database;
- Improving information gathering and compliance systems;
- Investigations being held into non payment of tax, particularly with Goods Tax;
- Working close with Customs.

Auditing

- Auditor General's Office has been decimated and consists of 2 staff. DoF has 3 internal auditors;
- Staff capacity and expertise is inadequate and no auditing has taken place since 1998;
- Substantial increase in Budget allocation to allow auditing to take place and essential recruitment;
- Major project to train staff and build capacity;
- An audit of customs has commenced.

Debt management

- Formal and informal debt information is being collated;
- A number of loans have been examined and removed from the stock of debt;
- Debt management priorities are being developed;
- Forecasts for debt servicing for December quarter 2003 and 2004 have been developed;
- Arrears have now been ring fenced from October 1 and will be included in the debt management strategy.

Capacity Building

- Extensive training and capacity building going on in each area;
- The Budget Team are working closely with local staff in the preparation of the Budget;
- A 11 week formal training program has been instituted in Inland Revenue;
- Training in the use of processes and computer systems in the payment section. All staff are being trained in various aspects of the work to build capacity;
- Repairing and rebuilding capacity in the Audit office;
- Identification and further training of particularly promising local staff for roles in Budget, Revenue Audit and Payments.

Performance Management

- The Ministry of Finance now releases monthly Budget outcome reports to the public;
- This should improve transparency and accountability of public finances.

Communications

- The message of the importance of fiscal stability and current improvements is being delivered to the community;
- Regular media releases issued on all aspects of the Budget and Financial management exercises;
- Frequent radio appearances by the Budget Stabilisation Team and Ministry of Finance staff;
- The press has been very supportive to date.

The way forward

- The 2004 Budget is being presented to Cabinet in late October and the Parliament in November;
- Maintaining expenditure control and enhancing revenue throughout 2004 will be a major exercise;
- The Budget will be continually updated as new information comes to hand;
- The Government will be attempting to pay most obligations going forward to slow the build up of arrears.

Risks to the Outlook

- Too much Budget supplementation may have been provided and too soon, which could reduce the pressure and incentive to reform;
- Expectations are too high;
- RAMSI honeymoon period could end;
- Political risk.

Annex V

1999 Solomon Islands population and housing census, summary of major findings

	All provinces	Choiseul	Western	Isabel	Central	Rennell-Bellona	Guadalcanal	Malaita	Makira-Ulawa	Temotu	Honiara
Total population	409,042	20,008	62,739	20,421	21,577	2,377	60,275	122,620	31,006	18,912	49,107
Inter-censal annual growth rate	2.8%	3.0%	3.2%	2.6%	2.0%	2.2%	1.5%	3.3%	2.7%	1.9%	3.8%
Sex ratio (male per 100 female)	107	105	112	104	108	107	109	100	106	94	126
Life expectancy at birth: males	60.6	60.6	60.6	59.6	61	61	59.8	60.2	60.8	61.5	61.7
Life expectancy at birth: females	61.6	61.6	61.6	60.4	62.1	62.1	60.7	61.1	61.9	61.9	62.8
IMR	66										
CBR	34	36	34	33	34	29	36	38	37	33	29
CDR	9	10	9	10	10	13	9	10	10	11	7
Total Fertility Rate	4.8	5.3	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	5	5.4	5.1	4.1	3.4
Number of households	65,014	3,142	9,992	3,556	3,625	432	10,399	18,606	4,926	3,415	6,921
Average household size	6.3	6.4	6.3	5.7	6	5.5	5.8	6.6	6.3	5.5	7.1
Population aged 14 and over, doing paid work	57,472 (23%)	2,668 (23%)	13,497 (35%)	2,721 (22%)	3,740 (28%)	184 (13%)	6,740 (19%)	8,713 (12%)	2,342 (13%)	1,407 (12%)	15,460 (44%)
Males	39,761 (31%)	1,858 (31%)	9,209 (45%)	1,975 (32%)	2,686 (39%)	150 (20%)	4,555 (24%)	5,964 (18%)	1,631 (17%)	944 (18%)	10,789 (54%)
Females	17,711 (15%)	810 (14%)	4,288 (24%)	746 (12%)	1,054 (17%)	34 (5%)	2,185 (13%)	2,794 (8%)	711 (8%)	463 (7%)	4,671 (32%)
Population aged 14 and over, doing unpaid work	111,329 (45%)	5507 (47%)	15,985 (42%)	6,993 (56%)	6,409 (49%)	756 (52%)	20,310 (56%)	36,369 (52%)	10,516 (56%)	5,295 (46%)	3,189 (9%)

	All provinces	Choiseul	Western	Isabel	Central	Rennell-Bellona	Guadalcanal	Malaita	Makira-Ulawa	Temotu	Honiara
Self-reported literacy, pop. 15+	77%	92%	94%	75%	72%	87%	73%	61%	81%	61%	91%
Males	84%	93%	95%	83%	82%	92%	80%	72%	87%	74%	94%
Females	69%	91%	93%	67%	62%	81%	66%	51%	75%	50%	86%
5-19 years of age attending sch	56%	63%	65%	66%	57%	72%	41%	49%	65%	62%	68%
Males	58%	63%	65%	67%	60%	73%	43%	52%	67%	65%	69%
Females	54%	64%	66%	65%	53%	71%	40%	46%	64%	58%	66%
Disabled population	2.7%	2.8%	2.8%	2.3%	2.5%	5.5%	2.7%	2.9%	2.6%	3.5%	1.9%
Population using bednets	53%	68%	54%	64%	59%	26%	60%	53%	48%	42%	36%
Pop. displaced due to ethnic tension (1999)	35,309	316	1,140	331	486	32	12,806	12,676	584	599	6,339
Household amenities											
Access to modern toilet facility	23%	13%	28%	16%	11%	22%	15%	12%	10%	8%	88%
Acc. To SIWA/RWSS water sup.	60%	56%	61%	86%	61%	1%	40%	57%	65%	43%	95%
Households with electricity	16%	8%	20%	12%	14%	1%	8%	4%	5%	3%	73%
Households with working radio	41%	37%	40%	39%	41%	46%	39%	36%	28%	26%	79%

Source: 1999 Population & Housing Census / Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002

Annex VI

Education statistics

Education status prior to RAMSI

Education provision

Early childhood centres

- 1999 there were 272 Centres (392 teachers trained and 179 undergoing training)*

Primary schools:

- 1999 there were 535 (117 Malaita, 72 Guadalcanal and 9 in Honiara)*

Community High Schools:

- 1999 there were 77 (44 of these were in Honiara, Guadalcanal and Malaita)*

*Survey on schools enrolment and attendance for 2003 currently being undertaken.

Enrolment and participation¹⁰¹

- Early Childhood Centre enrolment is 14,000 (1999) and 16,050 (2001-2002) - 48% girls
- Primary and CHS enrollment: 77,188 students with a mean enrollment rate per school of 125
- 56% of schools in 2000 were not offering all grades
- Mean enrolment per school is 126 (165 Malaita, 36 Guadalcanal and 299 Honiara with a mean low of 18 to a high of 394)¹⁰²
- SI participation rate 6-15 year olds 66%
- 33,650 children between 6-15 are not attending school (1999)
- Higher national average enrolment of 6-15 years olds in Honiara, Malaita and Guadalcanal of 77% (average 66%)
- In 1999 enrolment - 66% of all males (39,862): 63% of females (34,690) with 5,172 more males than females enrolled
- In 2001-2002 primary enrolment was 82,330 - 53.5% of all those enrolled were males (43,844) and 46.5% females (38,486) with 5,378 more boys in primary school than girls
- In 2001-2002 secondary enrolment was 21,700 - 66% of males (12,091) and 44% (9,609), with 2,482 more boys than girls in secondary school
- In 2001-2002 there were 8,448 more SI boys than girls enrolled in primary and secondary school
- The majority (53%) of students are from the areas cost affected by the crisis in Malaita (28%). Guadalcanal (16.5%) and Honiara City Council (8%)
- 2001 revised extrapolation of figures estimate participation rate as 70%. This is an estimate of enrolment, but does not take account of the attendance rates, which would be lower as a result of schools closing during the crisis.¹⁰³

Teachers

- 1999 there were an estimated 3,100-3,700 teachers
- Ministry cannot accurately state the number of teachers employed¹⁰⁴
 - 2001 primary teachers payroll lists 2,920 teachers, evidence of 2,665 being paid¹⁰⁵
 - 2001 secondary teachers payroll lists 1,104, with evidence of 986 being paid
- 19% (362) of primary teachers and 16% (51) of CHS teachers untrained
- Average of one trained teacher per 30-35 pupils
- Women are underrepresented in the teaching services
 - Females are 37% of PSS teachers (38% trained and 32% untrained)
 - Females are 37% of CHS teachers (36% trained and 44% untrained)

Tertiary

- 1998 there were 644 students had overseas scholarships (only 20% female)
- 2000 496 (with 180 unable to resume studies at USP due to government lack of finance)

¹⁰¹ According to the SI Ministry of Education *Annual Report 2002* these figures were based on a 81% response rate

¹⁰² Survey of 318 primary schools conducted in late 2000. The mean school enrolment in Honiara, Malaita, Honiara and Isabel is higher than the national average

¹⁰³ EU/Education Department Survey currently in process to identify enrollment and attendance for 2003

¹⁰⁴ Despite efforts on 200-2001 to estimate the number of teachers employed

¹⁰⁵ This figure does not take account of the intermittent payments and attendance of teachers during the crisis

Public expenditure on education and health (\$m)

Year	Health			Education		
	Recurrent budget	As % of total government expenditure	As % of GDP	Recurrent budget	As % of total government expenditure	As % of GDP
1991	20.5	12.6	3.7	34.2	15.1	6.2
1992	24.3	11.6	3.7	35.6	17.6	5.8
1994	34.4	13.5	3.8	46.9	18.3	5.2
1997	48.8	11.8	3.6	63.5	15.4	5.3
1998	48.7	13.4	2.8	64.3	17.2	3.6
1999	53.2	11.5	3.1	77.7	16.8	4.5
2000	61.5	16.2	4.4	88.5	23.3	6.3
2001	66.9	14.9	5.9	90.1	20.1	8.0

Source: Solomon Islands Government annual recurrent budget estimates / Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002

Annex VII

Methodology

Guidelines for key informants/focus group discussions, October 2003

(Interviewer develop specific key issues questions (based on TOR / research) as relevant for each key informant / sector / group)

Introduction: The Reason for the SIA study. Collect participants names, contacts on participants list, and explain the process (i.e. the objectives of the focus group discussion):

- *To illicit sectoral perceptions of RAMSI in Solomon Islands;*
- *To identify RAMSI input into key sectors/population groups (status);*
- *To identify changes anticipated to improve essential services / law and order etc;*
- *To identify indicators to monitor and evaluate.*

1. Describe how the instability, insecurity and uncertainty, as a result of the conflict, has affected the work functions in your sector / group.
2. What is your understanding of RAMSI's contribution to your sector / group? Describe inputs.
3. What is your sector's / group's role in contributing to RAMSI?
4. Has RAMSI to date (July – October) influenced change for your sector / group? If so, how has it changed the situation? Provide illustrations in the following areas:
 - Work environment – financial and HRD
 - Institutional development – planning
 - Outcomes for your sector – functional
 - Social development – (law and order, security and essential services (health, education, water, transport etc.)
 - Other
5. Do you anticipate RAMSI, in the coming year, making a positive change in the Solomon Islands situation for your sector / group? If so, provide illustrations in the following areas:
 - Work environment – financial and HRD
 - Institutional development – planning
 - Outcomes for your sector – functional
 - Social development – (law and order, security and essential services (health, education, water, transport etc.)
 - Other
6. Do you anticipate any risks from RAMSI within your sector / group? If so, what are the risks and how will you minimise these risks?
7. How would you describe security and safety:
 - a) From a personal perspective; and
 - b) From a community perspective?
8. What will be the indicators of success of RAMSI?

Guidelines for opinion poll, October 2003

Instructions

1. Introduce yourself and the study (as below):
 - This poll will contribute to a study on the social impacts of the RAMSI intervention. It is a study on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat;
 - Tell them the study is confidential, we do not record names;
 - We welcome their views on RAMSI's impact on people and their communities in Honiara;
 - We plan to seek views of 500 people.
2. Request 10 minutes of their time.
3. Take the particulars (sex, age, education, province / ethnicity - not their name).
4. Refer to the notes on Poll:
 - *In general note comments. If they do not give an answer use probe to check.*
 - Tick the issues discussed and note 1, 2, 3 in order issues are discussed.
5. On completion thank them for their time. Check the study details, ticks and numbering.
6. Tick off the Roll (below) and select another interviewee.

	Age	Malaita			Guadal.		Other				
Ferale	16-20	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	21-44	4	5	6	3	4	6	7	8	9	10
		7	8	9	5	6	11	12	13	14	15
	45-59	10	11	12	7	8	16	17	18	19	20
	60+	13	14	15			21	22	23	24	25
Malaita	16-20	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	21-44	4	5	6	3	4	6	7	8	9	10
		7	8	9	5	6	11	12	13	14	15
	45-59	10	11	12	7	8	16	17	18	19	20
	60+	13	14	15			21	22	23	24	25

SIA of RAMSI POLL:	Male	Female	Education
	Age	Occupation	Province

Core question	Analysis	Comments	Instructions
1. Why do you think RAMSI is here in SI?	1.1 Securing safety of persons and property		<p>Note comments</p> <p><i>Tick the issues discussed and beside each note 1,2,3 in order issues are discussed.</i></p>
	1.2 Maintaining supplies of services essential to the life of the community		
	1.3 Preventing and suppressing violence, intimidation and crime		
	1.4 Maintaining law and order		
	1.5 Supporting the administration on justice		
	1.6 Supporting and developing SI institutions		
	1.7 Other		
2. What was life (the situation) like in Honiara (Malaita, Guadalcanal) before RAMSI came to SI? List three important things.	2.1 Law and order		<p>Note comments</p> <p><i>Tick the issues discussed and beside each note 1,2,3 in order issues are discussed.</i></p>
	2.2 Health		
	2.3 Education		
	2.4 Housing		
	2.5 Food		
	2.6 Communications		
	2.7 Transport		
	2.8 Other		
3. What do you think caused the crisis ?	3.1 Land issues		<p>Note comments.</p> <p><i>Tick the issues discussed and beside each note 1,2,3 in order issues are discussed.</i></p>
	3.2 Political		
	3.3 Corruption		
	3.4 Lack of Govt services		
	3.6 Ethnic conflict		
	3.7 Lack of rural devt		
	3.8 Other		
4. Have you experienced any effect on your life because of the crisis before RAMSI came to SI?	4.1 YES		<p><i>If there has been a direct effect, request them to give examples to illustrate.</i></p> <p><i>If not just X and go to Q 5.</i></p>
	4.2 NO		
	4.3 To you and your family		
	4.4 To your property		
5. What things do you think are the good things (benefits) for people in SI because of RAMSI being here?	5.1 Securing safety of persons and property		<p>Note comments.</p> <p><i>Tick the issues discussed and beside each note 1,2,3 in order issues are discussed.</i></p>
	5.2 Maintaining supplies of services essential to the life of the community		
	5.3 Preventing and suppressing violence, intimidation and crime		
	5.4 Maintaining law and order		
	5.5 Supporting the administration on justice		
	5.6 Supporting and developing SI institutions – e.g. police, economic reform, other social services		
	5.7 Other		
6. What things might go wrong / what concerns do you have about RAMSI being in SI. What do you think could be done to prevent such problems?			<p><i>Make additional notes as required:</i></p>

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

List of interviewees

No.	Name	Position	Organisations
GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS			
1	John Ta'aru	Permanent Secretary	Department of Infrastructure Development
2	Shadrach Fanega	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Finance
3	Nairy Alamu	Permanent Secretary	Department of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace
4	George Hiele	Secretary to the Prime Minister	Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
5	Ethel Sigimanu	Permanent Secretary (Acting)	Women and Development Division (WDD), Department of Home Affairs
6	Donald Kudu	Permanent Secretary	Department of National Reform and Planning
7	Allan Arafoa	Permanent Secretary	Department of Commerce, Industries and Employment
8	Colin Beck	Pacific Asia Desk	Department of Foreign Affairs
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS			
9	Hon Waeta Ben	Premier	Guadalcanal Province
PUBLIC UTILITIES			
10	Michael Nation	General Manager	Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (SIEA)
11	Freda Unusi	Communication Officer	Solomon Islands Water Authority (SIWA)
12	Loyley Ngira	Deputy General Manager	Solomon Telekom Company Limited
NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL			
13	Paul Tovua	Chairman	National Peace Council
14	Natasha Spark	Advisor	National Peace Council
15	Mike Maena	NPC Staff	NPC Maluu Post
16	Billy Basimola	NPC Staff	NPC Maluu Post
17	Jesimiel Menia	NPC Staff	NPC Maluu Post
18	Joy Kere	Councillor	National Peace Council

ROYAL SOLOMON ISLANDS POLICE			
19	William Morrel	Commissioner of Police	Royal Solomon Islands Police
20	Michael Maena	Minister	Department of Police and National Security
21	Sgt. Ben Toala	Station Officer	Malu'u Police Station
22	Max Osifalea	Police Officer	Malu'u Police Station
23	Barnabas Dalana	Police Officer	Malu'u Police Station
24	Ben Lesibana	Police Officer	Malu'u Police Station
25	Rita Bennett	Officer in Charge	Munda Police Station
26	Susan	Secretary	Commissioner of Police Office
RAMSI PERSONNEL			
27	Nick Warner	Special Coordinator	Office of the Special Coordinator, RAMSI
28	Chris Elstoft	Policy Advisor	Office of the Special Coordinator, RAMSI
29	Allan Moody	Development Advisor	Office of the Special Coordinator, RAMSI
30	Jason Brown	RAMSI Sergeant in Charge	Malu'u Police Station
JUSTICE SECTOR			
31	Justice Albert Palmer	Puine Judge	High Court of Solomon Islands
32	David Chetwynd	Acting Chief Magistrate and Registrar	High Court of Solomon Islands
33	Ken Averre	Director	Public Solicitor's Office
34	Francis Haisoma	Acting Controller of Prison	Prison Services
35	Primo Afeau	Attorney General	Attorney General's Office
36	Gabriel Suri	President	SI Bar Association
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS			
37	Rick Hou	Governor	Central Bank of Solomon Islands
38	Luke Eta	Managing Director	Development Bank of Solomon Islands
DONORS			
39	Dr. Hendrik Smets	Charg'e d'Affaires a.i	European Union
40	Richard Ponzio	Coordinator (outgoing)	UNDP Sub Office, Honiara

41	Heather Riddell	High Commissioner	New Zealand High Commission
42	Judi Pattison	Project Manager	Community Peace and Restoration Fund (CPRF)
43	Brian Baldwin	High Commissioner	British High Commission
44	Michael Shih	Consular	Republic of China Taiwan Embassy
45	Bob Davies	High Commissioner	Australian High Commission
46	Anita Butler	Deputy High Commissioner	Australian High Commission
47	Kiyoshi Takahama	Ambassador	Japanese Embassy
48	Ashley Wickham	National Human Rights Project Officer	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
49	John Faimua	Reintegration Councillor	Demobilisation of Special Constables Project
HEALTH SECTOR			
50	Dr George Malefoasi	Under Secretary	Health Care and Health Improvement
51	Dr Judson Leafasia	Medical Superintendent / Chief Executive Officer (supervising)	Ministry of Health and Medical Services
52	Dr Cyril Pitakaka	Paediatrician	AJS Private Clinic
53	Dr Junilyn Pikacha	Director	Reproductive and Child Health Unit
54	Peter Wale	Director	Health Planning Unit
55	Dr Henry Kako	Director	Provincial Health and Medical Services, Malaita Province
56	Komina Liosulia	Acting Senior Nursing Officer	Malu'u Area Health Centre
EDUCATION SECTOR			
57	Derek Sikua	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Education
58	Donald Malasa	Under Secretary	Ministry of Education and Human Resources
59	Gabriel Taloikwai	Director	Solomon Islands College of Higher Education (SICHE)
60	Stanley Brown	Chief Education Officer	Malaita Province
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY			
61	Benol Jack	Eco Forestry Officer	SIDT
62	John Halisi	Chief Trainer	Literacy Association of Solomon Islands (LASI)
63	Josephine Teakeni	Director	Vois Blong Mere Solomon (VBMS)

64	Margaret Sandy	Trainer	Solomon Islands National Council of Women
65	Doreen Donne	Chairperson	Isabel Women's Association
66	Koto Fukishima	Country Representative	Oxfam Australia Solomon Islands Office
67	Zalynn Peishi	Staff	Oxfam Australia,
68	Jenny Piri	Staff	Development Services Exchange (DSE)
69	Thelma Namusu	Staff	World Vision, Solomon Islands
70	Philip Jionisi	Coordinator	Civil Society Network (CSN)
71	Abraham Baeania	Director	Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT)
72	Anne Saenemua	Women's Coordinator	Solomon Islands Christian Association, Federation of Women (SICA FOW)
73	Ken Konare	Coordinator	Adolescence Reproductive Health (ARH) Project
74	Edgar Pakoa	Secretary	Development Services Exchange (DSE)
75	Cherry Galo	Director	Adventist Disaster Relief Agency (ADRA)
76	Julie Poa	Staff	Adventist Disaster Relief Agency (ADRA)
77	Roselyn Kabu	Staff	Kastom Gaden
78	Errol Kerebule	Staff	Adventist Disaster Relief Agency (ADRA)
WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS			
79	Lynda Tupe	Programme Officer	Family Support Centre
80	Kristina Sau	Agriculture Officer	Ministry of Agriculture
81	Sarah Dyer	President	Solomon Islands National Council of Women
82	Martina Ului	Matron	Solomon Islands College of Higher Education (SICHE)
83	Alison Heorake	Community Paralegal Trainer	Rara Community, Malaita Province
MEDIA/INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS			
84	Johnson Honimae	General Manager	Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC)
85	Randall Biliki	Coordinator	Pipol Fastaem Network
86	Wendy Tuhaika	Communications Officer	Pipol Fastaem Network
PROVINCIAL PEOPLE			
87	Smiley Lakete'e	Manager	Island Traveller's Motel

88	Frank Fulaga	Administrator	Maluu Provincial Sub Station
89	Diau Mauga	Chairman	Baelelea Council of Chiefs
90	Fannie Tom	Church Administrator	Seventh Day Adventist
91	Paul Supa	Farmer	Silolo
92	Francis Susuwaniatu	Village Development Worker	SIDT
93	Patson Zebedee	Chainsaw Operator	Self Employed
YOUTH FOCUS MEETING			
94	Dann Tolia		D.A. Youth
95	Simon Onai		SIDT Youth
96	Michael Freggy		D.A. Youth
97	Ieu Bobai		D.A. Youth
98	Len Boso		D.A. Youth
99	David Vouza		D.A. Youth
100	Pio Baeania		D.A. Youth
101	Andrew Ani		D.A. Youth
102	Leon Boso		D.A. Youth
103	Margaret Suri		Vois Blong Mere Solomon
104	Ellen Embi		Vois Blong Mere Solomon
105	Alfred Karuhou		SIDT Youth
106	Alex Wate		SIDT Small Malaita Vernacular Education Pilot Project
107	Walter Watson	Volunteer	Literacy Association of Solomon Islands
108	Jimmy Robert Pova	Volunteer	COM Youth, All Saints
109	Francis Wateliu	Volunteer	Literacy Association of Solomon Islands
110	Mary Joinisi		Youth
111	Francis Susuwaniatu		SIDT

Community Meetings		
Sector / group	Location	Number in attendance
Manakwai Village	North Malaita	50 villagers
Police	Malu'u. North Malaita	5 police officers
Silolo Market	North Malaita	300 vendors and buyers
Malango Community	East Guadalcanal	28 (3 men, 8 young women & 17 women)
SIA Poll		
	Honiara	420

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